Skip to Main Content
HBS Home
  • About
  • Academic Programs
  • Alumni
  • Faculty & Research
  • Baker Library
  • Giving
  • Harvard Business Review
  • Initiatives
  • News
  • Recruit
  • Map / Directions
Faculty & Research
  • Faculty
  • Research
  • Featured Topics
  • Academic Units
  • …→
  • Harvard Business School→
  • Faculty & Research→
  • Research
    • Research
    • Publications
    • Global Research Centers
    • Case Development
    • Initiatives & Projects
    • Research Services
    • Seminars & Conferences
    →
  • Publications→

Publications

Publications

Filter Results: (12) Arrow Down
Filter Results: (12) Arrow Down Arrow Up

Show Results For

  • All HBS Web  (60)
    • Faculty Publications  (12)

    Show Results For

    • All HBS Web  (60)
      • Faculty Publications  (12)

      Costly SignalingRemove Costly Signaling →

      Page 1 of 12 Results

      Are you looking for?

      →Search All HBS Web
      • 2024
      • Working Paper

      Modest Victims: Victims Who Decline to Broadcast Their Victimization Are Seen As Morally Virtuous

      By: Nathan Dhaliwal, Jillian J. Jordan and Pat Barclay
      What do people think of victims who conceal their victimhood? We propose that the decision to not broadcast that one has been victimized serves as a costly act of modesty—in doing so, one is potentially forgoing social support and compensation from one’s community. We... View Details
      Keywords: Public Opinion; Mathematical Methods; Communication; Perception; Reputation
      Citation
      Read Now
      Related
      Dhaliwal, Nathan, Jillian J. Jordan, and Pat Barclay. "Modest Victims: Victims Who Decline to Broadcast Their Victimization Are Seen As Morally Virtuous." Working Paper, August 2024.
      • Article

      Emotional Acknowledgment: How Verbalizing Others' Emotions Fosters Interpersonal Trust

      By: Alisa Yu, Justin M. Berg and Julian Zlatev
      People often respond to others’ emotions using verbal acknowledgment (e.g., “You seem upset”). Yet, little is known about the relational benefits and risks of acknowledging others’ emotions in the workplace. We draw upon Costly Signaling Theory to posit how emotional... View Details
      Keywords: Emotion; Costly Signaling; Interpersonal Trust; Emotional Valence; Interpersonal Relationships; Empathic Accuracy; Emotions; Relationships; Trust; Interpersonal Communication
      Citation
      Find at Harvard
      Register to Read
      Related
      Yu, Alisa, Justin M. Berg, and Julian Zlatev. "Emotional Acknowledgment: How Verbalizing Others' Emotions Fosters Interpersonal Trust." Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 164 (May 2021): 116–135.
      • Article

      Signaling When Nobody Is Watching: A Reputation Heuristics Account of Outrage and Punishment in One-shot Anonymous Interactions

      By: Jillian J. Jordan and David G. Rand
      Moralistic punishment can confer reputation benefits by signaling trustworthiness to observers. However, why do people punish even when nobody is watching? We argue that people often rely on the heuristic that reputation is typically at stake, such that reputation... View Details
      Keywords: Signaling; Morality; Trustworthiness; Anger; Third-party Punishment; Moral Sensibility; Behavior; Trust; Reputation
      Citation
      Find at Harvard
      Purchase
      Related
      Jordan, Jillian J., and David G. Rand. "Signaling When Nobody Is Watching: A Reputation Heuristics Account of Outrage and Punishment in One-shot Anonymous Interactions." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 118, no. 1 (January 2020).
      • Article

      Third-Party Punishment as a Costly Signal of High Continuation Probabilities in Repeated Games

      By: Jillian J. Jordan and David G. Rand
      Why do individuals pay costs to punish selfish behavior, even as third-party observers? A large body of research suggests that reputation plays an important role in motivating such third-party punishment (TPP). Here we focus on a recently proposed reputation-based... View Details
      Keywords: Direct Reciprocity; Evolution; Dispersal; Cooperation; Trust; Reputation; Game Theory
      Citation
      Read Now
      Related
      Jordan, Jillian J., and David G. Rand. "Third-Party Punishment as a Costly Signal of High Continuation Probabilities in Repeated Games." Journal of Theoretical Biology 421 (May 21, 2017): 189–202.
      • May 2017
      • Article

      Experimental Evidence of Pooling Outcomes Under Information Asymmetry

      By: William Schmidt and Ryan W. Buell
      Operational decisions under information asymmetry can signal a firm's prospects to less-informed parties, such as investors, customers, competitors, and regulators. Consequently, managers in these settings often face a tradeoff between making an optimal decision and... View Details
      Keywords: Behavioral Decision Research; Information Asymmetry; Signaling; Decision Choices and Conditions; Alignment
      Citation
      Find at Harvard
      Related
      Schmidt, William, and Ryan W. Buell. "Experimental Evidence of Pooling Outcomes Under Information Asymmetry." Management Science 63, no. 5 (May 2017): 1586–1605.
      • August 2, 2016
      • Article

      Uncalculating Cooperation Is Used to Signal Trustworthiness

      By: Jillian J. Jordan, Moshe Hoffman, Martin A. Nowak and David G. Rand
      Humans frequently cooperate without carefully weighing the costs and benefits. As a result, people may wind up cooperating when it is not worthwhile to do so. Why risk making costly mistakes? Here, we present experimental evidence that reputation concerns provide an... View Details
      Keywords: Social Evaluation; Experimental Economics; Moral Psychology; Cooperation; Reputation; Decision Making
      Citation
      Read Now
      Related
      Jordan, Jillian J., Moshe Hoffman, Martin A. Nowak, and David G. Rand. "Uncalculating Cooperation Is Used to Signal Trustworthiness." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113, no. 31 (August 2, 2016): 8658–8663.
      • Article

      Third-party Punishment as a Costly Signal of Trustworthiness

      By: Jillian J. Jordan, Moshe Hoffman, Paul Bloom and David G. Rand
      Third-party punishment (TPP), in which unaffected observers punish selfishness, promotes cooperation by deterring defection. But why should individuals choose to bear the costs of punishing? We present a game theoretic model of TPP as a costly signal of... View Details
      Keywords: Third-party Punishment; Trustworthiness; Behavior; Trust; Game Theory
      Citation
      Find at Harvard
      Read Now
      Related
      Jordan, Jillian J., Moshe Hoffman, Paul Bloom, and David G. Rand. "Third-party Punishment as a Costly Signal of Trustworthiness." Nature 530, no. 7591 (2016): 473–476.
      • 2016
      • Working Paper

      Paying (for) Attention: The Impact of Information Processing Costs on Bayesian Inference

      By: Scott Duke Kominers, Xiaosheng Mu and Alexander Peysakhovich
      Human information processing is often modeled as costless Bayesian inference. However, research in psychology shows that attention is a computationally costly and potentially limited resource. We study a Bayesian individual for whom computing posterior beliefs is... View Details
      Keywords: Behavior; Cognition and Thinking; Economics
      Citation
      Read Now
      Related
      Kominers, Scott Duke, Xiaosheng Mu, and Alexander Peysakhovich. "Paying (for) Attention: The Impact of Information Processing Costs on Bayesian Inference." Working Paper, February 2016.
      • November 2015
      • Article

      Modularity and Intellectual Property Protection

      By: Carliss Y. Baldwin and Joachim Henkel
      Modularity is a means of partitioning technical knowledge about a product or process. When state-sanctioned intellectual property (IP) rights are ineffective or costly to enforce, modularity can be used to hide information and thus protect IP. We investigate the impact... View Details
      Keywords: Modularity; Value Appropriation; Relational Contracts; Clans; Intellectual Property
      Citation
      Find at Harvard
      Read Now
      Related
      Baldwin, Carliss Y., and Joachim Henkel. "Modularity and Intellectual Property Protection." Strategic Management Journal 36, no. 11 (November 2015): 1637–1655.
      • June 2014
      • Article

      The Red Sneakers Effect: Inferring Status and Competence from Signals of Nonconformity

      By: Silvia Bellezza, Francesca Gino and Anat Keinan
      We examine how people react to nonconforming behaviors, such as entering a luxury boutique wearing gym clothes rather than an elegant outfit or wearing red sneakers in a professional setting. Nonconforming behaviors, as costly and visible signals, can act as a... View Details
      Keywords: Marketing; Consumer Behavior
      Citation
      Find at Harvard
      Read Now
      Related
      Bellezza, Silvia, Francesca Gino, and Anat Keinan. "The Red Sneakers Effect: Inferring Status and Competence from Signals of Nonconformity." Journal of Consumer Research 41, no. 1 (June 2014): 35–54. (Finalist, 2017 Best Article Award for a paper published in JCR in 2014.))
      • 2014
      • Working Paper

      Modularity and Intellectual Property Protection

      By: Carliss Y. Baldwin and Joachim Henkel
      Modularity is a means of partitioning technical knowledge about a product or process. When state-sanctioned intellectual property (IP) rights are ineffective or costly to enforce, modularity can be used to hide information and thus protect IP. We investigate the impact... View Details
      Keywords: Modularity; Value Appropriation; Relational Contracts; Clans; Rights; Complexity; Intellectual Property
      Citation
      SSRN
      Read Now
      Related
      Baldwin, Carliss Y., and Joachim Henkel. "Modularity and Intellectual Property Protection." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 14-046, December 2013. (Revised June 2014.)
      • January 2012
      • Article

      Paying to Be Nice: Consistency and Costly Prosocial Behavior

      By: Ayelet Gneezy, Alex Imas, Amber Brown, Leif D. Nelson and Michael I. Norton
      Building on previous research in economics and psychology, we propose that the costliness of initial prosocial behavior positively influences whether that behavior leads to consistent future behaviors. We suggest that costly prosocial behaviors serve as a signal of... View Details
      Keywords: Behavior; Perception; Performance Consistency; Identity
      Citation
      Find at Harvard
      Read Now
      Purchase
      Related
      Gneezy, Ayelet, Alex Imas, Amber Brown, Leif D. Nelson, and Michael I. Norton. "Paying to Be Nice: Consistency and Costly Prosocial Behavior." Management Science 58, no. 1 (January 2012): 179–187.
      • 1

      Are you looking for?

      →Search All HBS Web
      ǁ
      Campus Map
      Harvard Business School
      Soldiers Field
      Boston, MA 02163
      →Map & Directions
      →More Contact Information
      • Make a Gift
      • Site Map
      • Jobs
      • Harvard University
      • Trademarks
      • Policies
      • Accessibility
      • Digital Accessibility
      Copyright © President & Fellows of Harvard College.