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  • All HBS Web  (10)
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    • All HBS Web  (10)
      • Faculty Publications  (2)

      by Rafael Di Tella and Julio J. RotembergRemove by Rafael Di Tella and Julio J. Rotemberg →

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      • Article

      Populism and the Return of the 'Paranoid Style': Some Evidence and a Simple Model of Demand for Incompetence as Insurance against Elite Betrayal

      By: Rafael Di Tella and Julio J. Rotemberg
      We present a simple model of populism as the rejection of “disloyal” leaders. We show that adding the assumption that people are worse off when they experience low income as a result of leader betrayal (than when it is the result of bad luck) to a simple voter choice... View Details
      Keywords: Populism; Corruption; Betrayal; Incompetence; Voting; Attitudes
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      Di Tella, Rafael, and Julio J. Rotemberg. "Populism and the Return of the 'Paranoid Style': Some Evidence and a Simple Model of Demand for Incompetence as Insurance against Elite Betrayal." Journal of Comparative Economics 46, no. 4 (December 2018): 988–1005.
      • 2016
      • Working Paper

      Populism and the Return of the 'Paranoid Style': Some Evidence and a Simple Model of Demand for Incompetence as Insurance Against Elite Betrayal

      By: Rafael Di Tella and Julio J. Rotemberg
      We present a simple model of populism as the rejection of “disloyal” leaders. We show that adding the assumption that people are worse off when they experience low income as a result of leader betrayal (than when it is the result of bad luck) to a simple voter choice... View Details
      Keywords: Corruption; Betrayal; Populism; Incompetence; Literacy; Crime and Corruption; Income; Ethics; Political Elections; Race; Residency
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      Di Tella, Rafael, and Julio J. Rotemberg. "Populism and the Return of the 'Paranoid Style': Some Evidence and a Simple Model of Demand for Incompetence as Insurance Against Elite Betrayal." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 17-056, December 2016.
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