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- All HBS Web
(70)
- Faculty Publications (10)
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- September 10, 2022
- Article
NFT Sales: Clearing the Market, Avoiding Gas Wars
By: Scott Duke Kominers and Tim Roughgarden
Instead of letting the market decide the price for their primary sale offerings, many NFT projects choose to initially sell their NFTs at prices below the market-clearing level. But what happens when market designers trade off efficiency for equity; or when demand far... View Details
Kominers, Scott Duke, and Tim Roughgarden. "NFT Sales: Clearing the Market, Avoiding Gas Wars." a16zcrypto.com (September 10, 2022).
- July 2021
- Article
Discovering Auctions: Contributions of Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson
By: Alex Teytelboym, Shengwu Li, Scott Duke Kominers, Mohammad Akbarpour and Piotr Dworczak
The 2020 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel was awarded to Paul R. Milgrom and Robert B. Wilson for “improvements to auction theory and inventions of new auction formats.” In this survey article, we review the contributions of the... View Details
Teytelboym, Alex, Shengwu Li, Scott Duke Kominers, Mohammad Akbarpour, and Piotr Dworczak. "Discovering Auctions: Contributions of Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson." Scandinavian Journal of Economics 123, no. 3 (July 2021): 709–750. (Authors' names are in certified random order.)
- December 2020
- Article
The Parable of the Auctioneer: Complexity in Paul R. Milgrom's Discovering Prices
By: Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Teytelboym
Designing marketplaces in complex settings requires both novel economic theory and real-world engineering, often drawing upon ideas from fields such as computer science and operations research. In Discovering Prices, Milgrom (2017) explains the theory and design... View Details
Kominers, Scott Duke, and Alexander Teytelboym. "The Parable of the Auctioneer: Complexity in Paul R. Milgrom's Discovering Prices." Journal of Economic Literature 58, no. 4 (December 2020): 1180–1196.
- 2020
- Book
Dealmaking: The New Strategy of Negotiauctions
Based on broad research and detailed case studies, Dealmaking provides the jargon-free, empirically sound advice you need to close the deal.
Leading dealmaking scholar Guhan Subramanian specializes in understanding how deals work. As a Harvard Business... View Details
Leading dealmaking scholar Guhan Subramanian specializes in understanding how deals work. As a Harvard Business... View Details
Subramanian, Guhan. Dealmaking: The New Strategy of Negotiauctions. 2nd edition. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2020.
- Article
An Invitation to Market Design
By: Scott Duke Kominers, Alexander Teytelboym and Vincent P. Crawford
Market design seeks to translate economic theory and analysis into practical solutions to real-world problems. By redesigning both the rules that guide market transactions and the infrastructure that enables those transactions to take place, market designers can... View Details
Keywords: Matching; Trading; Scrip; Liquidity; Efficiency; Equity; Allocation Rules; Marketplaces; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Auctions
Kominers, Scott Duke, Alexander Teytelboym, and Vincent P. Crawford. "An Invitation to Market Design." Oxford Review of Economic Policy 33, no. 4 (Winter 2017): 541–571.
- March 2010
- Teaching Note
Disruptive IPOs? WR Hambrecht & Co. (TN)
By: Willy C. Shih
Teaching Note for 610065. View Details
- October 2007
- Article
The Art of Designing Markets
By: Alvin E. Roth
Traditionally, markets have been viewed as simply the confluence of supply and demand. But to function properly, they must be able to attract a sufficient number of buyers and sellers, induce participants to make their preferences clear, and overcome congestion by... View Details
Keywords: Market Design; Market Participation; Market Transactions; Information Technology; Internet and the Web
Roth, Alvin E. "The Art of Designing Markets." Harvard Business Review 85, no. 10 (October 2007): 118–126.
- May 2006
- Article
Late and Multiple Bidding in Second-Price Internet Auctions: Theory and Evidence Concerning Different Rules for Ending an Auction
By: Axel Ockenfels and Alvin E. Roth
Keywords: Bids and Bidding; Auctions; Internet and the Web; Theory; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms
Ockenfels, Axel, and Alvin E. Roth. "Late and Multiple Bidding in Second-Price Internet Auctions: Theory and Evidence Concerning Different Rules for Ending an Auction." Games and Economic Behavior 55, no. 2 (May 2006): 297–320.
- winter 2005
- Article
An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions
By: Dan Ariely, Axel Ockenfels and A. E. Roth
Ariely, Dan, Axel Ockenfels, and A. E. Roth. "An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions." RAND Journal of Economics 36, no. 4 (winter 2005): 891–908.
- January 1992
- Article
Theory and Misbehavior in First-Price Auctions: Comment
By: J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth
Kagel, J. H., and A. E. Roth. "Theory and Misbehavior in First-Price Auctions: Comment." American Economic Review 82, no. 5 (January 1992): 1379–1391.