Publications
Publications
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- All HBS Web
(67)
- Faculty Publications (19)
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- December 2024
- Article
Respect for Improvements and Comparative Statics in Matching Markets
One of the oldest results in the theory of two-sided matching is the entry comparative static, which shows that under the Gale–Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm, adding a new agent to one side of the market makes all the agents on the other side weakly... View Details
- June 2023
- Exercise
Clash of Two Giants Simulation Exercise Instructions
By: Feng Zhu and Marco Iansiti
Many markets are organized around platforms that connect consumers with complimentary applications and services. These platforms are two-sided because both sides - consumers and those providing applications or services - need access to the same platform to interact. A... View Details
- 2021
- Working Paper
Deep Learning for Two-Sided Matching
By: Sai Srivatsa Ravindranatha, Zhe Feng, Shira Li, Jonathan Ma, Scott Duke Kominers and David Parkes
We initiate the use of a multi-layer neural network to model two-sided matching and to explore the design space between strategy-proofness and stability. It is well known that both properties cannot be achieved simultaneously but the efficient frontier in this design... View Details
- July 2021
- Article
Outsourcing Tasks Online: Matching Supply and Demand on Peer-to-Peer Internet Platforms
By: Zoë Cullen and Chiara Farronato
We study the growth of online peer-to-peer markets. Using data from TaskRabbit, an expanding marketplace for domestic tasks at the time of our study, we show that growth varies considerably across cities. To disentangle the potential drivers of growth, we look... View Details
- November 2020
- Article
Taxation in Matching Markets
By: Arnaud Dupuy, Alfred Galichon, Sonia Jaffe and Scott Duke Kominers
We analyze the effects of taxation in two-sided matching markets, i.e., markets in which all agents have heterogeneous preferences over potential partners. In matching markets, taxes can generate inefficiency on the allocative margin by changing who is matched to whom,... View Details
- December 2019
- Article
Costly Concessions: An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility
By: Alfred Galichon, Scott Duke Kominers and Simon Weber
We introduce an empirical framework for models of matching with imperfectly transferable utility and unobserved heterogeneity in tastes. Our framework allows us to characterize matching equilibrium in a flexible way that includes as special cases the classic fully- and... View Details
- 2020
- Working Paper
To Infinity and Beyond: Scaling Economic Theories via Logical Compactness
By: Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Scott Duke Kominers and Ran I. Shorrer
Many economic-theoretic models incorporate finiteness assumptions that, while introduced for simplicity, play a real role in the analysis. Such assumptions introduce a conceptual problem, as results that rely on finiteness are often implicitly nonrobust; for example,... View Details
- January 2018 (Revised February 2018)
- Technical Note
Making Markets
Explains how to identify and capitalize on marketplace design opportunities. Defines markets and marketplaces and describes the basic functions of each. Discusses attributes (e.g., heterogeneity of participants' preferences and asymmetry in available information) that... View Details
- 2016
- Working Paper
Refugee Resettlement
By: David Delacretaz, Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Teytelboym
Over 100,000 refugees are permanently resettled from refugee camps to hosting
countries every year. Nevertheless, refugee resettlement processes in most countries
are ad hoc, accounting for neither the priorities of hosting communities nor the preferences of refugees... View Details
- January 2016 (Revised July 2017)
- Case
HourlyNerd
By: Jill Avery and Joseph Fuller
HourlyNerd, a two-sided marketplace platform for matching freelance consultants with small companies looking for help, struggles to define a growth plan for the future. The company, started as a class project in HBS' FIELD 3 course, is assessing three growth paths:... View Details
- Article
Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation
By: Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and M. Utku Ünver
Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms... View Details
- March 1991
- Article
Incentives in Two-Sided Matching with Random Stable Mechanisms
By: A. E. Roth and J. H. Vande Vate
Keywords: Motivation and Incentives
- January 1991
- Article
Sorority Rush as a Two-Sided Matching Mechanism
By: S. Mongell and A. E. Roth
Keywords: Groups and Teams
- November 1990
- Journal Article
Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
By: A. E. Roth and J. H. Vande Vate
- August 1988
- Article
Interior Points in the Core of Two-Sided Matching Markets
By: A. E. Roth and M. Sotomayor
Keywords: Markets