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- All HBS Web
(287)
- People (1)
- News (59)
- Research (202)
- Events (4)
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- Faculty Publications (60)
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- July 1974
- Journal Article
Repeated Games with Absorbing States
By: Elon Kohlberg
Kohlberg, Elon. "Repeated Games with Absorbing States." Annals of Statistics 2, no. 4 (July 1974): 724–738.
- Article
Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags
By: Drew Fudenberg, Yuhta Ishii and Scott Duke Kominers
We extend the folk theorem of repeated games to two settings in which players' information about others' play arrives with stochastic lags. In our first model, signals are almost-perfect if and when they do arrive, that is, each player either observes an almost-perfect... View Details
Fudenberg, Drew, Yuhta Ishii, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags." Journal of Economic Theory 150 (March 2014): 487–514.
- March 1975
- Article
Optimal Strategies in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
By: Elon Kohlberg
Kohlberg, Elon. "Optimal Strategies in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information." International Journal of Game Theory 4, no. 1 (March 1975): 7 – 24.
- September 1974
- Article
Repeated Games of Incomplete Information: The Symmetric Case
By: Elon Kohlberg and Shmuel Zamir
Kohlberg, Elon, and Shmuel Zamir. "Repeated Games of Incomplete Information: The Symmetric Case." Annals of Statistics 2, no. 5 (September 1974): 1040–1041.
- June 1975
- Article
The Information Revealed in Infinitely Repeated Games of Incomplete Information
By: Elon Kohlberg
Kohlberg, Elon. "The Information Revealed in Infinitely Repeated Games of Incomplete Information." International Journal of Game Theory 4, no. 2 (June 1975): 57–59.
- Article
Third-Party Punishment as a Costly Signal of High Continuation Probabilities in Repeated Games
By: Jillian J. Jordan and David G. Rand
Why do individuals pay costs to punish selfish behavior, even as third-party observers? A large body of research suggests that reputation plays an important role in motivating such third-party punishment (TPP). Here we focus on a recently proposed reputation-based... View Details
Jordan, Jillian J., and David G. Rand. "Third-Party Punishment as a Costly Signal of High Continuation Probabilities in Repeated Games." Journal of Theoretical Biology 421 (May 21, 2017): 189–202.
- Research Summary
Game Theory for Business Strategy
Game theory--the mathematical study of strategic interactions--came of age, in a sense, when three of the field's pioneers were awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1994. Yet despite the development of the theory and the widespread use of game-theoretic jargon in... View Details
- June 2012
- Article
Managing Risks: A New Framework
By: Robert S. Kaplan and Anette Mikes
Risk management is too often treated as a compliance issue that can be solved by drawing up lots of rules and making sure that all employees follow them. Many such rules, of course, are sensible and do reduce some risks that could severely damage a company. But... View Details
Keywords: Risk Management; Governance Controls; Corporate Strategy; Management Analysis, Tools, and Techniques; Framework
Kaplan, Robert S., and Anette Mikes. "Managing Risks: A New Framework." Harvard Business Review 90, no. 6 (June 2012).
- Research Summary
The Game Has Changed
By: Max H. Bazerman
Many prior books on negotiation, including books co-authored by Max Bazerman, have addressed how to create and claim value in negotiation. These ideas have proliferated in business schools, where negotiation is often the most popular course. Class participants... View Details
- 2016
- Chapter
Deriving an Optimally Deceptive Policy in Two-Player Iterated Games
By: Elisabeth Paulson and Christopher Griffin
We formulate the problem of determining an optimally deceptive strategy in a repeated game framework. We assume that two players are engaged in repeated play. During an initial time period, Player 1 may deceptively train his opponent to expect a specific strategy. The... View Details
Paulson, Elisabeth, and Christopher Griffin. "Deriving an Optimally Deceptive Policy in Two-Player Iterated Games." In Proceedings of 2016 American Control Conference. IEEE Press, 2016. (Developed with Booz Allen Hamilton.)
- 2011
- Working Paper
Better-reply Dynamics in Deferred Acceptance Games
In this paper we address the question of learning in a two-sided matching mechanism that utilizes the deferred acceptance algorithm. We consider a repeated matching game where at each period agents observe their match and have the opportunity to revise their strategy... View Details
Keywords: Learning; Marketplace Matching; Outcome or Result; Game Theory; Mathematical Methods; Strategy
Haeringer, Guillaume, and Hanna Halaburda. "Better-reply Dynamics in Deferred Acceptance Games." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 11-126, June 2011.
- September 2023
- Article
A Pull versus Push Framework for Reputation
Reputation is a powerful driver of human behavior. Reputation systems incentivize 'actors' to take reputation-enhancing actions, and 'evaluators' to reward actors with positive reputations by preferentially cooperating with them. This article proposes a reputation... View Details
Jordan, Jillian J. "A Pull versus Push Framework for Reputation." Trends in Cognitive Sciences 27, no. 9 (September 2023): 852–866.
- Forthcoming
- Article
Collusion in Brokered Markets
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Richard Lowery
High commissions in the U.S. residential real estate agency market present a puzzle for economic theory because brokerage is not a concentrated industry. We model brokered markets as a game in which agents post prices for customers and then choose which other agents to... View Details
Keywords: Real Estate Agents; Real Estate; Realtors; Broker Networks; Brokerage; Brokerage Commissions; "Brokerage Industry; Brokered Markets; Brokering; Brokers; Industrial Organization; Repeated Game Framework; "Repeated Games"; Collusion; Antitrust; Microeconomics; Market Design; Theory; Game Theory; Real Estate Industry
Hatfield, John William, Scott Duke Kominers, and Richard Lowery. "Collusion in Brokered Markets." Journal of Finance (forthcoming).
- 01 Oct 2001
- News
Books: Winning the Influence Game
framework for analyzing the effects of government on business and an introduction to the techniques that are necessary for organizing to influence government. "The workings of government are so remote from the commonsense practices of the... View Details
- 01 Jun 2001
- News
Virtual Plant Tours and Beer Game Dysfunction
Professor Lynda Applegate’s Building E-Businesses course does more than just translate standard case material into an online format. She uses audio and video clips for storytelling, then offers eye-catching visuals and drill-down explanations for conceptual View Details
- June 2017
- Article
When Novel Rituals Lead to Intergroup Bias: Evidence from Economic Games and Neurophysiology
By: Nicholas M. Hobson, Francesca Gino, Michael I. Norton and Michael Inzlicht
Long-established rituals in pre-existing cultural groups have been linked to the cultural evolution of large-scale group cooperation. Here we test the prediction that novel rituals—arbitrary hand and body gestures enacted in a stereotypical and repeated fashion—can... View Details
Keywords: Ritual; Intergroup Dynamics; Intergroup Bias; Neural Reward Processing; Open Data; Open Materials; Preregistered; Groups and Teams; Behavior; Prejudice and Bias; Cooperation
Hobson, Nicholas M., Francesca Gino, Michael I. Norton, and Michael Inzlicht. "When Novel Rituals Lead to Intergroup Bias: Evidence from Economic Games and Neurophysiology." Psychological Science 28, no. 6 (June 2017): 733–750.
- 2006
- Conference Paper
Modeling Repeated Play of the Prisoners' Dilemma with Reinforcement Learning over an Enriched Strategy Set
By: A. E. Roth and Ido Erev
- 18 Aug 2022
- Op-Ed
Your Best Employees Are Burning Out: A Framework for Retaining Talent
business leaders need to step up their game to attract and retain the top talent they need to remain competitive, productive, and cohesive to get through this tumultuous period. "Leaders must realize that their workers are their greatest... View Details
Keywords: by Hise Gibson and MaShon Wilson
- May 2021
- Article
Is No News (Perceived as) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure
By: Ginger Zhe Jin, Michael Luca and Daniel Martin
This paper uses laboratory experiments to directly test a central prediction of disclosure theory: that strategic forces can lead those who possess private information to voluntarily provide it. In a simple sender-receiver game, we find that senders disclose favorable... View Details
Keywords: Communication Games; Disclosure; Unraveling; Experiments; Information; Product; Quality; Communication; Consumer Behavior
Jin, Ginger Zhe, Michael Luca, and Daniel Martin. "Is No News (Perceived as) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 13, no. 2 (May 2021): 141–173.
- Research Summary
Why Do Consumers Contribute to Connected Goods? A Dynamic Game of Competition and Cooperation in Social Networks
Social network platforms and media rely on the voluntary contributions of individual users to stay relevant. Consumers (users) contribute content such as photographs, videos, tweets etc.: these are available to any of their friends or peers, but not... View Details