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- 2022
- Article
Pills in a World of Activism and ESG
By: Guhan Subramanian and Caley Petrucci
Easterbrook and Fischel’s The Economic Structure of Corporate Law advances their now famous passivity thesis, which posits that managers should remain passive in the face of an unsolicited tender offer for the company’s shares. Consistent with the broader... View Details
Subramanian, Guhan, and Caley Petrucci. "Pills in a World of Activism and ESG." University of Chicago Business Law Review 1 (2022): 417–439.
- November 2010
- Article
A New Era for Raiders
The article presents information on corporate methods of preventing hostile takeovers by corporate raiders, such as the poison pill strategy. It is noted that some of these techniques have become less popular and effective. An argument is presented that Section 203 of... View Details
Subramanian, Guhan. "A New Era for Raiders." Harvard Business Review 88, no. 11 (November 2010): 34.
- October 2007 (Revised December 2008)
- Background Note
Evaluating M&A Deals: How Poison Pills Work
The poison pill defense against hostile takeovers was invented in 1982 by Martin Lipton, of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen and Katz. Pills are considered the most effective of all the normal defenses against a hostile bidder. Describes the two basic types of poison pills... View Details
Baldwin, Carliss Y. "Evaluating M&A Deals: How Poison Pills Work." Harvard Business School Background Note 208-061, October 2007. (Revised December 2008.)
- winter 2007
- Article
Bargaining in the Shadow of PeopleSoft's (Defective) Poison Pill
Subramanian, Guhan. "Bargaining in the Shadow of PeopleSoft's (Defective) Poison Pill." Harvard Negotiation Law Review (winter 2007).
- June 1998
- Article
A New Takeover Defense Mechanism: Using an Equal Treatment Agreement as an Alternative to the Poison Pill
Subramanian, Guhan. "A New Takeover Defense Mechanism: Using an Equal Treatment Agreement as an Alternative to the Poison Pill." Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 23, no. 2 (June 1998).
- Forthcoming
- Article
Redemption Mechanisms in Poison Pills: Evidence on Pill Design and Law Firm Effects
By: Olivier Baum and Guhan Subramanian
We present the first evidence on the incidence of “trip wire” versus “last look” poison pills. Using a hand-collected data set of 130 poison pills implemented and/or amended between January 1, 2020 and March 31, 2023, we find that pills are almost evenly divided... View Details