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Publications

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    • All HBS Web  (3)
      • Faculty Publications  (3)

      Incentive-compatible ElicitationRemove Incentive-compatible Elicitation →

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      • 2025
      • Working Paper

      Incentive-Compatible Recovery from Manipulated Signals, with Applications to Decentralized Physical Infrastructure

      By: Jason Milionis, Jens Ernstberger, Joseph Bonneau, Scott Duke Kominers and Tim Roughgarden
      We introduce the first formal model capturing the elicitation of unverifiable information from a party (the "source") with implicit signals derived by other players (the "observers"). Our model is motivated in part by applications in decentralized physical... View Details
      Keywords: Mathematical Methods; Infrastructure; Information Infrastructure
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      Milionis, Jason, Jens Ernstberger, Joseph Bonneau, Scott Duke Kominers, and Tim Roughgarden. "Incentive-Compatible Recovery from Manipulated Signals, with Applications to Decentralized Physical Infrastructure." Working Paper, March 2025.
      • 2024
      • Working Paper

      How Real Is Hypothetical?: A High-Stakes Test of the Allais Paradox

      By: Uri Gneezy, Yoram Halevy, Brian Hall, Theo Offerman and Jeroen van de Ven
      Researchers in behavioral and experimental economics often argue that only incentive-compatible mechanisms can elicit effort and truthful responses from participants. Others argue that participants make less-biased decisions when the stakes are sufficiently high.... View Details
      Keywords: Research; Behavioral Finance; Economics; Behavior; Prejudice and Bias
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      Gneezy, Uri, Yoram Halevy, Brian Hall, Theo Offerman, and Jeroen van de Ven. "How Real Is Hypothetical? A High-Stakes Test of the Allais Paradox." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 25-005, August 2024.
      • April 2020
      • Article

      Field Comparisons of Incentive-Compatible Preference Elicitation Techniques

      By: Shawn A. Cole, A. Nilesh Fernando, Daniel Stein and Jeremy Tobacman
      Knowledge of consumer demand is important for firms, policy makers, and economists. One common tool for incentive-compatible demand elicitation, the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism, has been widely used in laboratory settings but rarely evaluated for... View Details
      Keywords: Incentive-compatible Elicitation; Experimental Methods; Weather Insurance; Rainfall Insurance; Agricultural Extension; Demand and Consumers
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      Cole, Shawn A., A. Nilesh Fernando, Daniel Stein, and Jeremy Tobacman. "Field Comparisons of Incentive-Compatible Preference Elicitation Techniques." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 172 (April 2020): 33–56.
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