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- All HBS Web
(40)
- Faculty Publications (8)
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- August, 2024
- Article
Absenteeism, Productivity, and Relational Contracts Inside the Firm
By: Achyuta Adhvaryu, Jean-François Gauthier, Anant Nyshadham and Jorge Tamayo
We study relational contracts among managers using a unique dataset that tracks transfers of workers across teams in Indian ready-made garment factories. We focus on how relational contracts help managers cope with worker absenteeism shocks, which are frequent, often... View Details
Keywords: Implicit Contracts; Productivity; Misallocation; Absenteeism; Supervisors; Readymade Garments; Performance Productivity; Employees; Relationships; Fashion Industry; India
Adhvaryu, Achyuta, Jean-François Gauthier, Anant Nyshadham, and Jorge Tamayo. "Absenteeism, Productivity, and Relational Contracts Inside the Firm." Journal of the European Economic Association 22, no. 4 (August, 2024): 1628–1677.
- April–May 2021
- Article
Labor Mobility and Antitakeover Provisions
By: Aiyesha Dey and Joshua White
How do firms protect their human capital? We test whether firms facing an increased threat of being acquired strengthen their antitakeover provisions (ATPs) in order to bond with their employees. We use the adoption of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) by U.S.... View Details
Keywords: Labor Mobility; Antitakeover Provisions; Trade Secrets; Implicit Contracting; Employee Bonding; Corporate Governance; Acquisition; Human Capital; Strategy; Innovation and Invention; Intellectual Property; Safety
Dey, Aiyesha, and Joshua White. "Labor Mobility and Antitakeover Provisions." Art. 101388. Journal of Accounting & Economics 71, nos. 2-3 (April–May 2021).
- 2010
- Working Paper
Agency Revisited
By: Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and Daniel F. Spulber
The article presents a comprehensive overview of the principal-agent model that emphasizes the role of trust in the agency relationship. The analysis demonstrates that the legal remedy for breach of duty can result in a full-information efficient outcome eliminating... View Details
Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Daniel F. Spulber. "Agency Revisited." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 10-082, March 2010.
- October 2008
- Article
It's Time to Make Management a True Profession
By: Nitin Nohria and Rakesh Khurana
In the face of the recent institutional breakdown of trust in business, managers are losing legitimacy. To regain public trust, management needs to become a true profession in much the way medicine and law have, argue Khurana and Nohria of Harvard Business School. True... View Details
Keywords: Competency and Skills; Education; Ethics; Corporate Accountability; Management; Trust; Value Creation
Nohria, Nitin, and Rakesh Khurana. "It's Time to Make Management a True Profession." Harvard Business Review 86, no. 10 (October 2008).
- Article
Trust and Incentives in Agency
By: Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and Daniel F Spulber
Contracts between a principal and an agent are not formed in a vacuum. Although formal contracts between a principal and an agent contain explicit incentives for performance, the relationship between a principal and an agent also involves implicit incentives. Three... View Details
Keywords: Trust; Motivation and Incentives; Agency Theory; Contracts; Market Transactions; Performance; Relationships; Societal Protocols; Legal Liability; Cost
Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Daniel F Spulber. "Trust and Incentives in Agency." Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 15, no. 1 (Fall 2005): 45–104.
- 1985
- Chapter
Implicit Labor Contracts Viewed as Options: A Discussion of 'Insurance Aspects of Pensions'
By: Robert C. Merton
Keywords: Compensation and Benefits; Decision Choices and Conditions; Contracts; Labor and Management Relations; Insurance
Merton, Robert C. "Implicit Labor Contracts Viewed as Options: A Discussion of 'Insurance Aspects of Pensions'." In Pensions, Labor and Individual Choice, edited by David A. Wise. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985.
- Article
Wage-Employment Contracts
By: Jerry R. Green and Charles M. Kahn
This paper studies the efficient agreements about the dependence of workers' earnings on employment, when the employment level is controlled by firms. The firms' superior information about profitability conditions is responsible for this form of contract governance.... View Details
Green, Jerry R., and Charles M. Kahn. "Wage-Employment Contracts." Quarterly Journal of Economics 98, Suppl., no. 2 (1983): 173–188.
- Forthcoming
- Article
Redemption Mechanisms in Poison Pills: Evidence on Pill Design and Law Firm Effects
By: Olivier Baum and Guhan Subramanian
We present the first evidence on the incidence of “trip wire” versus “last look” poison pills. Using a hand-collected data set of 130 poison pills implemented and/or amended between January 1, 2020 and March 31, 2023, we find that pills are almost evenly divided... View Details