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- October 2015
- Article
Managing the Performance Tradeoffs from Partner Integration: Implications of Contract Choice in R&D Projects
By: Alan MacCormack and Anant Mishra
Formal contracts represent an important governance instrument with which firms exercise control of and compensate partners in R&D projects. The specific type of contract used, however, can vary significantly across projects. In some, firms govern partnering... View Details
Keywords: ""Partner Integration; Contract Choice; R&D Project Management; Relational Contracts; Partnering Performance; Research and Development; Projects; Partners and Partnerships; Performance; Contracts
MacCormack, Alan, and Anant Mishra. "Managing the Performance Tradeoffs from Partner Integration: Implications of Contract Choice in R&D Projects." Production and Operations Management 24, no. 10 (October 2015): 1552–1569.
- July 31, 2017
- Article
A Commitment Contract to Achieve Virologic Suppression in Poorly Adherent Patients with HIV/AIDS
By: Marcella Alsan, John Beshears, Wendy S. Armstrong, James J. Choi, Brigitte C. Madrian, Minh Ly T. Nguyen, Carlos Del Rio, David Laibson and Vincent C. Marconi
Objective: Assess whether a commitment contract informed by behavioral economics leads to persistent virologic suppression among HIV-positive patients with poor antiretroviral therapy (ART) adherence.
Design: Single-center pilot randomized clinical trial and a... View Details
Keywords: Adherence; Antiretroviral Therapy; Behavioral Economics; Commitment Contract; Financial Incentives; HIV-1 Virologic Suppression; Health Disorders; Motivation and Incentives
Alsan, Marcella, John Beshears, Wendy S. Armstrong, James J. Choi, Brigitte C. Madrian, Minh Ly T. Nguyen, Carlos Del Rio, David Laibson, and Vincent C. Marconi. "A Commitment Contract to Achieve Virologic Suppression in Poorly Adherent Patients with HIV/AIDS." AIDS 31, no. 12 (July 31, 2017): 1765–1769.
- Research Summary
Optimal Contracts under Inequity Aversion with Voluntary Enforcement (with Tilman Borgers)
We analyze contract structure and efficiency in a Moral Hazard model with possibly fairminded agent and principal when the contract is not automatically enforced but this is a voluntary choice by the contracting parties independently. We find that no penalizing... View Details
- March 2000
- Case
Lockheed Martin: The Employer of Choice Mission
By: Clayton M. Christensen and Michael D Overdorf
A Lockheed Martin manager is faced with the decision of where to focus the organization's resources in order to develop a world-class employee development system. The manager's recommendation will serve as the basis for the company's goal of becoming an Employer of... View Details
Keywords: Organizational Culture; Resource Allocation; Decision Choices and Conditions; Employees; Human Resources; Leadership Development; Cost Management; Organizational Design; Aerospace Industry
Christensen, Clayton M., and Michael D Overdorf. "Lockheed Martin: The Employer of Choice Mission." Harvard Business School Case 300-032, March 2000.
- Article
Shadow of the Contract: How Contract Structure Shapes Inter-Firm Dispute Resolution
By: Fabrice Lumineau and Deepak Malhotra
This paper investigates how contract structure influences inter-firm dispute resolution processes and outcomes by examining a unique dataset consisting of over 150,000 pages of documents relating to 102 business disputes. We find that the level of contractual detail... View Details
Keywords: Governance Controls; Contracts; Rights; Negotiation; Conflict and Resolution; Power and Influence
Lumineau, Fabrice, and Deepak Malhotra. "Shadow of the Contract: How Contract Structure Shapes Inter-Firm Dispute Resolution." Strategic Management Journal 32, no. 5 (May 2011): 532–555.
- December 2010
- Article
Social Preferences and Strategic Uncertainty: An Experiment on Markets and Contracts
This paper reports a three-phase experiment on a stylized labor market. In the first two phases, agents face simple games, which we use to estimate subjects' social and reciprocity concerns. In the last phase, four principals compete by offering agents a contract from... View Details
Keywords: Strategy; Risk and Uncertainty; Markets; Contracts; Decisions; Distribution; Labor; Game Theory
Cabrales, Antonio, Raffaele Miniaci, Marco Piovesan, and Giovanni Ponti. "Social Preferences and Strategic Uncertainty: An Experiment on Markets and Contracts." American Economic Review 100, no. 5 (December 2010): 2261–2278.
- May 2016
- Article
Matching with Slot-Specific Priorities: Theory
By: Scott Duke Kominers and Tayfun Sönmez
We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches that may have multiple slots available to accept contracts. Each slot has its own linear priority order over contracts; a branch chooses contracts by... View Details
Keywords: Matching With Contracts; Stability; Strategy-proofness; School Choice; Affirmative Action; Airline Seat Upgrades; Contracts; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
Kominers, Scott Duke, and Tayfun Sönmez. "Matching with Slot-Specific Priorities: Theory." Theoretical Economics 11, no. 2 (May 2016): 683–710.
- June 2024
- Article
Counterparty Risk and Counterparty Choice in the Credit Default Swap Market
By: Wenxin Du, Salil Gadgil, Michael Gordy and Clara Vega
We investigate how market participants price and manage counterparty credit risk using confidential trade repository data on single-name credit default swap (CDS) transactions. We find that counterparty risk has a modest impact on the pricing of CDS contracts but a... View Details
Keywords: Credit Derivatives and Swaps; Market Participation; Risk and Uncertainty; Price; Financial Markets; Credit
Du, Wenxin, Salil Gadgil, Michael Gordy, and Clara Vega. "Counterparty Risk and Counterparty Choice in the Credit Default Swap Market." Management Science 70, no. 6 (June 2024): 3808–3826.
- October 2022
- Article
A Structural Model of Organizational Buying for Business-to-Business Markets: Innovation Adoption with Share-of-Wallet Contracts
By: Navid Mojir and K. Sudhir
The paper develops the first structural model of organizational buying to study innovation diffusion in a B2B market. Our model is particularly applicable for routinized exchange relationships, whereby centralized buyers periodically evaluate and choose contracts,... View Details
Keywords: Organizational Buying Behavior; Healthcare Marketing; B2B Markets; B2B Innovation; New Product Diffusion; New Product Adoption; Organizations; Acquisition; Behavior; Health Care and Treatment; Marketing; Innovation and Invention
Mojir, Navid, and K. Sudhir. "A Structural Model of Organizational Buying for Business-to-Business Markets: Innovation Adoption with Share-of-Wallet Contracts." Journal of Marketing Research (JMR) 59, no. 5 (October 2022): 883–907.
- 1985
- Chapter
Implicit Labor Contracts Viewed as Options: A Discussion of 'Insurance Aspects of Pensions'
By: Robert C. Merton
Keywords: Compensation and Benefits; Decision Choices and Conditions; Contracts; Labor and Management Relations; Insurance
Merton, Robert C. "Implicit Labor Contracts Viewed as Options: A Discussion of 'Insurance Aspects of Pensions'." In Pensions, Labor and Individual Choice, edited by David A. Wise. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985.
- February 1995
- Article
Does Familiarity Breed Trust? The Implications of Repeated Ties on Contractual Choice in Alliances
By: Ranjay Gulati
Gulati, Ranjay. "Does Familiarity Breed Trust? The Implications of Repeated Ties on Contractual Choice in Alliances." Academy of Management Journal 38, no. 1 (February 1995): 85–112.
- April 2019
- Article
Internalizing Global Value Chains: A Firm-Level Analysis
By: Laura Alfaro, Pol Antràs, Davin Chor and Paola Conconi
In recent decades, advances in information and communication technology and falling trade barriers have led firms to retain within their boundaries and in their domestic economies only a subset of their production stages. A key decision facing firms worldwide is the... View Details
Keywords: Global Value Chains; Sequential Production; Incomplete Contracts; Demand and Consumers; Customer Value and Value Chain; Globalization
Alfaro, Laura, Pol Antràs, Davin Chor, and Paola Conconi. "Internalizing Global Value Chains: A Firm-Level Analysis." Journal of Political Economy 127, no. 2 (April 2019): 508–559. (See Online Appendix. Replications files available here. Also NBER Working Paper 21582.)
- 2017
- Working Paper
Internalizing Global Value Chains: A Firm-Level Analysis
By: Laura Alfaro, Pol Antràs, Davin Chor and Paola Conconi
In recent decades, advances in information and communication technology and falling trade barriers have led firms to retain within their boundaries and in their domestic economies only a subset of their production stages. A key decision facing firms worldwide is the... View Details
Keywords: Global Value Chains; Sequential Production; Incomplete Contracts; Demand and Consumers; Customer Value and Value Chain; Globalization
Alfaro, Laura, Pol Antràs, Davin Chor, and Paola Conconi. "Internalizing Global Value Chains: A Firm-Level Analysis." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 16-028, September 2015. (Updated October 2017. See Online Appendix. Also NBER Working Paper 21582. Forthcoming in the Journal of Political Economy.)
- 2015
- Working Paper
Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Westkamp
We consider the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts, where firms may
demand multiple contracts but each worker desires at most one contract. We introduce
three novel conditions—observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity,... View Details
Keywords: Matching With Contracts; Stability; Strategy-proofness; Substitutability; Size Monotonicity; Cumulative Offer Mechanism; Contracts; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
Hatfield, John William, Scott Duke Kominers, and Alexander Westkamp. "Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms." Working Paper, July 2015.
- May 2021
- Article
Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Westkamp
We consider the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts, where firms may demand multiple contracts, but each worker desires at most one contract. We introduce three novel conditions—observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity, and... View Details
Keywords: Matching With Contracts; Stability; Strategy-proofness; Substitutability; Size Monotonicity; Cumulative Offer Mechanism; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
Hatfield, John William, Scott Duke Kominers, and Alexander Westkamp. "Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms." Review of Economic Studies 88, no. 3 (May 2021): 1457–1502.
- March 2020
- Article
Which Early Withdrawal Penalty Attracts the Most Deposits to a Commitment Savings Account?
By: John Beshears, James J. Choi, Christopher Harris, David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian and Jung Sakong
Previous research has shown that some people voluntarily use commitment contracts that restrict their own choice sets. We study how people divide money between two accounts: a liquid account that permits unrestricted withdrawals and a commitment account that is... View Details
Keywords: Quasi-hyperbolic Discounting; Present Bias; Sophistication; Naiveté; Commitment; Flexibility; Savings; Contract Design; Defined Contribution Retirement Plan; 401 (K); IRA; Saving; Behavior; Contracts; Design; Interest Rates
Beshears, John, James J. Choi, Christopher Harris, David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian, and Jung Sakong. "Which Early Withdrawal Penalty Attracts the Most Deposits to a Commitment Savings Account?" Art. 104144. Journal of Public Economics 183 (March 2020).
- March 2022 (Revised February 2023)
- Case
Sunōmi Switchel: Time to Switch?
By: Lindsay N. Hyde, Shani Carter McKinney and Alexandra Horvitz
Nicole Blank has bootstrapped her functional beverage company, Sunōmi Switchel, to contracts with leading grocery retailers. She is now faced with a series of choices for if and how to continue to grow the business. View Details
Keywords: Startup; Start-up; Startup Management; Burnout; Entrepreneur; Entrepreneurial Journey; Bootstrap; Entrepreneurship; Growth and Development Strategy; Business Startups; Crisis Management; Financial Condition; Retail Industry; Food and Beverage Industry; District of Columbia
Hyde, Lindsay N., Shani Carter McKinney, and Alexandra Horvitz. "Sunōmi Switchel: Time to Switch?" Harvard Business School Case 822-078, March 2022. (Revised February 2023.)
- Awards
Wickham Skinner Award
Winner of the 2016 Wickham Skinner Award for the best paper published in Production and Operations Management for “Managing the Performance Tradeoffs from Partner Integration: Implications of Contract Choice in R&D Projects” (October 2015) with Anant Mishra. View Details
- 21 May 2019
- Working Paper Summaries
rTSR: When Do Relative Performance Metrics Capture Relative Performance?
- 27 Feb 2006
- Research & Ideas
When Rights of First Refusal Are a Bad Deal
Rights of first refusal are contract clauses common in such industries as entertainment. In 2001, Paramount Studios and the National Broadcasting Company negotiated the broadcasting rights for the hit show "Frasier." NBC held a... View Details