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Publications
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- Faculty Publications (5)
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- Article
Games of Threats
By: Elon Kohlberg and Abraham Neyman
A game of threats on a finite set of players, N, is a function d that assigns a real number to any coalition, S ⊆ N, such that d(S) = -d(N\S). A game of threats is not necessarily a coalitional game as it may fail to satisfy the condition d(Ø) = 0. We show that analogs... View Details
- 2015
- Chapter
Negotiations: Statistical Aspects
'Negotiation analysis' seeks to develop prescriptive theory and useful advice for negotiators and third parties. It generally emphasizes the parties' underlying interests, alternatives to negotiated agreement, approaches to productively manage the inherent tension... View Details
- 2014
- Working Paper
Tommy Koh and the U.S.–Singapore Free Trade Agreement: A Multi-Front 'Negotiation Campaign'
By: Laurence A. Green and James K. Sebenius
Complex, multiparty negotiations are often analyzed as principals negotiating through agents, as two-level games (Putnam 1988), or in coalitional terms. The relatively new concept of a "multi-front negotiation campaign" (Sebenius 2010, Lax and Sebenius, 2012) offers... View Details
- 1980
- Article
The Effect of Group Size and Communication Availability on Coalition Bargaining in a Veto Game
By: J. K. Murnighan and A. E. Roth
- Article
The Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting Process
By: Jerry R. Green
The core is the set of all unblocked allocations. Implicit in this definition is the idea that if an allocation is proposed which could be blocked, some coalition will form and issue a counterproposal which it can enforce. A process of successive counterproposals based... View Details