Filter Results:
(12)
Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(12)
- Research (12)
- Faculty Publications (6)
Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(12)
- Research (12)
- Faculty Publications (6)
Page 1 of 12
Results
- March 2010
- Article
The Evolution of Corporate Ownership after IPO: The Impact of Investor Protection
By: C. Fritz Foley and Robin Greenwood
We use firm-level data from 34 countries covering the 1995-2006 period to analyze how the characteristics of public markets shape the process by which firms become widely held. Firms in all countries in the sample tend to have concentrated ownership at the time they go... View Details
Keywords: Blockholding; Float; Shareholder Rights; Investor Protection; Ownership; Financial Liquidity; Business History; Market Timing; Going Public; Business and Government Relations; Business and Shareholder Relations
Foley, C. Fritz, and Robin Greenwood. "The Evolution of Corporate Ownership after IPO: The Impact of Investor Protection." Review of Financial Studies 23, no. 3 (March 2010): 1231–1260. (Formerly NBER Working Paper No. 14557.)
- 2016
- Working Paper
Through the Grapevine: Network Effects on the Design of Executive Compensation Contracts
By: Susanna Gallani
Effective design of executive compensation contracts involves choosing and weighting performance measures, as well as defining the mix between fixed and incentive-based pay components, with a view to fostering talent retention and goal congruence. The variability in... View Details
Keywords: Compensation Design; Board Interlocks; Compensation Consultants; Network Centrality; Homophily; Quadratic Assignment Procedure; Blockholders; Executive Compensation
Gallani, Susanna. "Through the Grapevine: Network Effects on the Design of Executive Compensation Contracts." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 16-019, August 2015. (Revised December, 2016.)
- 2009
- Working Paper
Estimating the Effects of Large Shareholders Using a Geographic Instrument
By: Bo Becker, Henrik Cronqvist and Rudiger Fahlenbrach
Large shareholders may play an important role for firm performance and policies, but identifying this empirically presents a challenge due to the endogeneity of ownership structures. We develop and test an empirical framework which allows us to separate selection from... View Details
Keywords: Business Headquarters; Geographic Location; Corporate Governance; Governance Controls; Performance Effectiveness; Business and Shareholder Relations; Mathematical Methods
Becker, Bo, Henrik Cronqvist, and Rudiger Fahlenbrach. "Estimating the Effects of Large Shareholders Using a Geographic Instrument." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 10-028, October 2009. (Revised February 2010.)
- Article
Family Control of Firms and Industries
We test what explains family control of firms and industries and find that the explanation is largely contingent on the identity of families and individual blockholders. Founders and their families are more likely to retain control when doing so gives the firm a... View Details
Keywords: Family Business; Cost vs Benefits; Governance Controls; Family Ownership; Business and Shareholder Relations; Competitive Advantage
Villalonga, Belen, and Raphael Amit. "Family Control of Firms and Industries." Financial Management 39, no. 3 (Fall 2010): 863–904. (Lead article.)
- October 1990
- Article
Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders: Evidence on Changes in Corporate Ownership and Control When Firms Default
By: S. C. Gilson
In 111 publicly traded firms that either file for bankruptcy or privately restructure their debt between 1979 and 1985, bank lenders frequently become major stockholders or appoint new directors. On average, only 46% of incumbent directors remain when bankruptcy or... View Details
Keywords: Insolvency and Bankruptcy; Governance; Banks and Banking; Change; Business Ventures; Ownership
Gilson, S. C. "Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders: Evidence on Changes in Corporate Ownership and Control When Firms Default." Journal of Financial Economics 27, no. 2 (October 1990): 355–387.
- Article
Estimating the Effects of Large Shareholders Using a Geographic Instrument
Large shareholders may play an important role for firm performance and policies, but identifying this empirically presents a challenge due to the endogeneity of ownership structures. We develop and test an empirical framework, which allows us to separate selection from... View Details
Keywords: Business and Shareholder Relations; Performance; Policy; Ownership; Selection and Staffing; Business Headquarters; Geography; Framework
Becker, Bo, Henrik Cronqvist, and Rudiger Fahlenbrach. "Estimating the Effects of Large Shareholders Using a Geographic Instrument ." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 46, no. 4 (August 2011): 907–942.
- 20 Aug 2007
- Working Paper Summaries
Hedge Fund Investor Activism and Takeovers
- 08 Jan 2008
- First Look
First Look: January 8, 2008
(forthcoming) Abstract In large U.S. corporations, founding families are the only blockholders whose control rights on average exceed their cash flow rights. We analyze how they achieve this wedge, and at what cost. Indirect ownership... View Details
Keywords: Martha Lagace
- 20 Oct 2009
- First Look
First Look: October 20
and test an empirical framework which allows us to separate selection from treatment effects of large shareholders. Individual blockholders tend to hold blocks in public firms located close to where they reside. Using this empirical... View Details
Keywords: Martha Lagace
- 29 Oct 2009
- Working Paper Summaries
Estimating the Effects of Large Shareholders Using a Geographic Instrument
- 16 Mar 2010
- First Look
First Look: March 16
empirical framework, which allows us to separate selection from treatment effects of large shareholders. Individual blockholders tend to hold blocks in public firms located close to where they reside. Using this empirical observation, we... View Details
Keywords: Martha Lagace
- 31 Mar 2009
- First Look
First Look: March 31, 2009
countries, firms are more likely to issue equity when investment opportunities are high, becoming widely held in the process. We find scant evidence, however, that changes in percentage blockholding forecast future returns, inconsistent... View Details
Keywords: Martha Lagace