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- 2016
- Working Paper
Through the Grapevine: Network Effects on the Design of Executive Compensation Contracts
By: Susanna Gallani
Effective design of executive compensation contracts involves choosing and weighting performance measures, as well as defining the mix between fixed and incentive-based pay components, with a view to fostering talent retention and goal congruence. The variability in... View Details
Keywords: Compensation Design; Board Interlocks; Compensation Consultants; Network Centrality; Homophily; Quadratic Assignment Procedure; Blockholders; Executive Compensation
Gallani, Susanna. "Through the Grapevine: Network Effects on the Design of Executive Compensation Contracts." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 16-019, August 2015. (Revised December, 2016.)
- March 2010
- Article
The Evolution of Corporate Ownership after IPO: The Impact of Investor Protection
By: C. Fritz Foley and Robin Greenwood
We use firm-level data from 34 countries covering the 1995-2006 period to analyze how the characteristics of public markets shape the process by which firms become widely held. Firms in all countries in the sample tend to have concentrated ownership at the time they go... View Details
Keywords: Blockholding; Float; Shareholder Rights; Investor Protection; Ownership; Financial Liquidity; Business History; Market Timing; Going Public; Business and Government Relations; Business and Shareholder Relations
Foley, C. Fritz, and Robin Greenwood. "The Evolution of Corporate Ownership after IPO: The Impact of Investor Protection." Review of Financial Studies 23, no. 3 (March 2010): 1231–1260. (Formerly NBER Working Paper No. 14557.)
- October 1990
- Article
Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders: Evidence on Changes in Corporate Ownership and Control When Firms Default
By: S. C. Gilson
In 111 publicly traded firms that either file for bankruptcy or privately restructure their debt between 1979 and 1985, bank lenders frequently become major stockholders or appoint new directors. On average, only 46% of incumbent directors remain when bankruptcy or... View Details
Keywords: Insolvency and Bankruptcy; Governance; Banks and Banking; Change; Business Ventures; Ownership
Gilson, S. C. "Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders: Evidence on Changes in Corporate Ownership and Control When Firms Default." Journal of Financial Economics 27, no. 2 (October 1990): 355–387.