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- Faculty Publications (2,372)
Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(4,947)
- People (7)
- News (810)
- Research (3,510)
- Events (47)
- Multimedia (21)
- Faculty Publications (2,372)
- September 2016
- Article
Disproportional Control Rights and the Bonding Role of Debt
By: Aiyesha Dey, Valeri Nikolaev and Xue Wang
We examine the governance role of debt in the context of U.S.-based dual class ownership structures. We hypothesize that the use of debt alleviates the conflict between shareholder classes by balancing the power of controlling insiders. We document that dual class... View Details
Keywords: Dual Class; Private Debt; Debt Covenants; Bonding Mechanisms; Ownership Type; Capital Structure; Borrowing and Debt
Dey, Aiyesha, Valeri Nikolaev, and Xue Wang. "Disproportional Control Rights and the Bonding Role of Debt." Management Science 62, no. 9 (September 2016): 2581–2614.
- July 2010 (Revised December 2011)
- Case
Controlling Hot Money
By: Robert C. Pozen
The manager of the Japan Equities Fund is faced with an increase in "hot money" moving quickly in and out of the Fund. This short-term trading is an attempt to take advantage of the difference between the closing times of the Tokyo and New York Stock Exchanges. The CFO... View Details
Keywords: Stocks; International Finance; Investment Funds; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Market Timing; Market Transactions; Financial Services Industry; New York (city, NY)
Pozen, Robert C. "Controlling Hot Money." Harvard Business School Case 311-022, July 2010. (Revised December 2011.)
- 2023
- Article
Conduit Incentives: Eliciting Cooperation from Workers Outside of Managers' Control
By: Susanna Gallani
Can managers use monetary incentives to elicit cooperation from workers they cannot reward for their efforts? I study “conduit incentives,” an innovative incentive design, whereby managers influence bonus-ineligible workers’ effort by offering bonus-eligible employees... View Details
Keywords: Organizational Behavior Modification; Peer Monitoring; Persistence Of Performance Improvements; Crowding Out; Implicit Incentives; Compensation; Healthcare; Social Pressure; Image Motivation; Incentives; Motivation; Performance; Behavior; Motivation and Incentives; Compensation and Benefits; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Organizational Culture; Health Industry; California
Gallani, Susanna. "Conduit Incentives: Eliciting Cooperation from Workers Outside of Managers' Control." Accounting Review 93, no. 3 (2023): 1–28.
- 1977
- Book
Management Accounting and Control of Data Processing
By: R. L. Nolan
Nolan, R. L. Management Accounting and Control of Data Processing. NY: National Association of Accountants, 1977.
- 09 Sep 2010
- Working Paper Summaries
Boundary Spanning in a For-Profit Research Lab: An Exploration of the Interface Between Commerce and Academe
- Teaching Interest
Financial Reporting and Control
By: Suraj Srinivasan
Financial Reporting and Control (FRC) covers topics about how managers can design and use performance measurement systems for external reporting and internal management to build more effective organizations. Throughout their careers, business leaders are required to... View Details
Keywords: Financial Reporting
- Article
Guilt Enhances the Sense of Control and Drives Risky Judgments
By: Maryam Kouchaki, Christopher Oveis and F. Gino
The present studies investigate the hypothesis that guilt influences risk-taking by enhancing one's sense of control. Across multiple inductions of guilt, we demonstrate that experimentally induced guilt enhances optimism about risks for the self (Study 1), preferences... View Details
Kouchaki, Maryam, Christopher Oveis, and F. Gino. "Guilt Enhances the Sense of Control and Drives Risky Judgments." Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 143, no. 6 (December 2014): 2103–2110.
- 26 Nov 2008
- Working Paper Summaries
Spanning the Institutional Abyss: The Intergovernmental Network and the Governance of Foreign Direct Investment
Keywords: by Juan Alcacer & Paul Ingram
- 15 Mar 2018
- Working Paper Summaries
Targeted Price Controls on Supermarket Products
- March 2018 (Revised January 2021)
- Case
China Vanke: Battle for Control (A)
By: Lynn S. Paine, Charles C.Y. Wang, Dawn H. Lau and Anthony K. Woo
In June 2016, the board of China Vanke, one of China’s largest and best-known private residential real estate developers, must vote on a proposed acquisition that is opposed by its largest shareholders, state-owned China Resources Co. and the lesser-known property... View Details
Keywords: China Vanke; China Resources; Hostile Takeover; Board Of Directors; Shareholding Structure; Shareholder Rights; Asset Restructuring; Corporate Governance; Governing and Advisory Boards; Valuation; Business and Shareholder Relations; Real Estate Industry; China
Paine, Lynn S., Charles C.Y. Wang, Dawn H. Lau, and Anthony K. Woo. "China Vanke: Battle for Control (A)." Harvard Business School Case 318-117, March 2018. (Revised January 2021.)
- Article
Exclusivity, Contingent Control Rights, and the Design of Internet Portal Alliances
By: Josh Lerner and Dan Elfenbein
We explore the relationship between exclusivity and state-contingent control rights using a sample of over 100 Internet portal alliance contracts. We find that stronger exclusivity arrangements are associated with more frequent usage of contingent control rights. For... View Details
Lerner, Josh, and Dan Elfenbein. "Exclusivity, Contingent Control Rights, and the Design of Internet Portal Alliances." Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 28, no. 1 (April 2012): 45–76.
- summer 1991
- Article
Corporate Control and the Politics of Finance
By: M. C. Jensen
Keywords: Finance
Jensen, M. C. "Corporate Control and the Politics of Finance." Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 4, no. 2 (summer 1991): 13–33. (Abridged version forthcoming in Management Revolution: The Legacy of the Market for Corporate Control, (Harvard University Press, Forthcoming).)
- June 2012
- Article
The Transparency Paradox: A Role for Privacy in Organizational Learning and Operational Control
Using data from embedded participant-observers and a field experiment at the second largest mobile phone factory in the world, located in China, I theorize and test the implications of transparent organizational design on workers' productivity and organizational... View Details
Keywords: Transparency; Privacy; Organizational Learning; Operational Control; Organizational Performance; Chinese Manufacturing; Field Experiment; Rights; Interpersonal Communication; Management Practices and Processes; Ethics; Corporate Disclosure; Performance Productivity; Boundaries; Organizations; Social and Collaborative Networks; Labor and Management Relations; Power and Influence; Manufacturing Industry; China
Bernstein, Ethan S. "The Transparency Paradox: A Role for Privacy in Organizational Learning and Operational Control." Administrative Science Quarterly 57, no. 2 (June 2012): 181–216.
- Teaching Interest
Finance Reporting and Control
Financial Reporting and Control (FRC) is a course about how leaders can design and use performance measurement systems to build more effective organizations. Throughout their careers, business leaders are required to... View Details
- 2022
- Working Paper
Control and Fairness: What Determines Elected Local Leaders’ Support for Hosting Refugees in Their Community?
By: Kristin Fabbe, Eleni Kyrkopoulou, Konstantinos Matakos and Aslı Unan
When it comes to successful refugee reception the local level matters. Research overwhelmingly examines host communities' attitudes, but endorsement from local politicians is equally important to resolving conflicts and facilitating harmonious interaction. Yet, the... View Details
Keywords: Values; Control; Refugee Resettlement; Local Elites; Contact; Fair-share; Conjoint Experiment; Refugees; Integration; Local Range; Leadership; Attitudes; Fairness
Fabbe, Kristin, Eleni Kyrkopoulou, Konstantinos Matakos, and Aslı Unan. "Control and Fairness: What Determines Elected Local Leaders’ Support for Hosting Refugees in Their Community?" Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 21-088, February 2021. (Revised June 2022.)
- January 1984
- Background Note
Just-in-Time Production Controlled by Kanban
Describes the method of control of repetitive manufacturing as used at Toyota by Just-in-Time and Kanban. The objective is to facilitate an understanding of how the method works and its rationale. View Details
Rhea, James T. "Just-in-Time Production Controlled by Kanban." Harvard Business School Background Note 684-047, January 1984.
- October 1991 (Revised September 1998)
- Case
Maxwell Appliance Controls
By: Robert S. Kaplan
A profitable manufacturing division of a large company is looking for new ways to identify sources of productivity improvements. Led by its senior finance officer, an activity-based cost system is developed to identify activities performed for its highly varied product... View Details
Keywords: Activity Based Costing and Management; Management Teams; Quality; Performance Improvement; Organizational Culture; Problems and Challenges; Production; Manufacturing Industry
Kaplan, Robert S. "Maxwell Appliance Controls." Harvard Business School Case 192-058, October 1991. (Revised September 1998.)
- 2010
- Working Paper
Boundary Spanning in a For-profit Research Lab: An Exploration of the Interface Between Commerce and Academe
By: Christopher C. Liu and Toby E. Stuart
In innovative industries, private-sector companies increasingly are participants in open communities of science and technology. To participate in the system of exchange in such communities, firms often publicly disclose what would otherwise remain private discoveries.... View Details
Keywords: For-Profit Firms; Higher Education; Information Publishing; Innovation and Invention; Science-Based Business; Social and Collaborative Networks; Boundaries; Biotechnology Industry; Pharmaceutical Industry
Liu, Christopher C., and Toby E. Stuart. "Boundary Spanning in a For-profit Research Lab: An Exploration of the Interface Between Commerce and Academe." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 11-012, August 2010.
- February 1998
- Background Note
Contracting and Control in Venture Capital
By: Paul A. Gompers
Discusses the control mechanisms and contracts utilized by venture capitalists. The emphasis is on understanding potential conflicts of interest and how the contracts mitigate those conflicts. View Details
Keywords: Venture Capital; Governance Controls; Contracts; Business or Company Management; Conflict of Interests
Gompers, Paul A. "Contracting and Control in Venture Capital." Harvard Business School Background Note 298-067, February 1998.