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Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(1,682)
- People (1)
- News (225)
- Research (1,233)
- Events (6)
- Multimedia (6)
- Faculty Publications (828)
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- 1999
- Chapter
Aspects of Financial Contracting in Venture Capital
Sahlman, William A. "Aspects of Financial Contracting in Venture Capital." Chap. 16 in The Entrepreneurial Venture. 2nd ed. by William A. Sahlman, Howard H. Stevenson, Michael J Roberts, and Amar V. Bhide, 304–325. Harvard Business School Press, 1999. (Originally published in Continental Bank Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 1, no. 2 (summer 1988): 23-36. Also reprinted in The New Corporate Finance: Where Theory Meets Practice, edited by D. Chew, 229. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993. Part IV: 4.)
- fall 2002
- Article
Distortion and Risk in Optimal Incentive Contracts
By: George P. Baker
Baker, George P. "Distortion and Risk in Optimal Incentive Contracts." Journal of Human Resources 37, no. 4 (fall 2002).
- June 1981
- Teaching Note
Contract and Consensus at General Motors--1900-1984, Teaching Note
By: J. Ronald Fox
- April 2011
- Supplement
Emergia: Driving Profitability on Help Desk Contracts (CW)
By: F. Asis Martinez Jerez
Contact Data for September 2010, dictionary of terms, and agent login information. View Details
Keywords: Contracts
- October 1996
- Article
The Changing Social Contract in American Business
By: D. Q. Mills
Mills, D. Q. "The Changing Social Contract in American Business." European Management Journal 14, no. 5 (October 1996).
- June 1989 (Revised October 1989)
- Case
Hi Tech Industries (A): Negotiating Corporate Contracts
Corey, E. Raymond. "Hi Tech Industries (A): Negotiating Corporate Contracts." Harvard Business School Case 589-117, June 1989. (Revised October 1989.)
- Research Summary
'Optimal Incentive Contracts under Inequity Aversion' (with Achim Wambach) ), 2005
We analyze the Moral Hazard problem, assuming that the agent is inequity averse. Our results differ from conventional contract theory and are more in line with empirical findings than these standard results. Our key findings are: Inequity aversion alters the structure... View Details
- April 2011
- Teaching Note
Emergia: Driving Profitability on Help Desk Contracts (TN)
By: Francisco de Asis Martinez-Jerez
Teaching Note for#111-048. View Details
- 2021
- Other Unpublished Work
Obsolescence of the Obsolescing Bargain: Why Governments Must Get Investor-State Contracts Right
By: Louis T. Wells and Karl P. Sauvant
Gone are the days when governments could easily renegotiate natural resource and other investment contracts if foreign investors, e.g., reaped bonanzas from rising resource prices, surprisingly rich discoveries, or terms that were too favorable. Today, international... View Details
Wells, Louis T., and Karl P. Sauvant. "Obsolescence of the Obsolescing Bargain: Why Governments Must Get Investor-State Contracts Right." Columbia FDI Perspectives, No. 298, Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, February 2021.
- fall 1982
- Article
Risk-Spreading Properties of Common Tax and Contract Instruments
By: James K. Sebenius and Peter Stan
Sebenius, James K., and Peter Stan. "Risk-Spreading Properties of Common Tax and Contract Instruments." Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 13, no. 2 (fall 1982): 555–560.
- 2016
- Working Paper
Through the Grapevine: Network Effects on the Design of Executive Compensation Contracts
By: Susanna Gallani
Effective design of executive compensation contracts involves choosing and weighting performance measures, as well as defining the mix between fixed and incentive-based pay components, with a view to fostering talent retention and goal congruence. The variability in... View Details
Keywords: Compensation Design; Board Interlocks; Compensation Consultants; Network Centrality; Homophily; Quadratic Assignment Procedure; Blockholders; Executive Compensation
Gallani, Susanna. "Through the Grapevine: Network Effects on the Design of Executive Compensation Contracts." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 16-019, August 2015. (Revised December, 2016.)
- Article
Management Practices, Relational Contracts and the Decline of General Motors
By: Susan Helper and Rebecca Henderson
General Motors was once regarded as one of the best managed and most successful firms in the world, but between 1980 and 2009 its share of the U.S. market fell from 62.6% to 19.8%, and in 2009 the firm went bankrupt. In this paper we argue that the conventional... View Details
Keywords: Organizational Design; Management Practices and Processes; Insolvency and Bankruptcy; Manufacturing Industry; Auto Industry; United States
Helper, Susan, and Rebecca Henderson. "Management Practices, Relational Contracts and the Decline of General Motors." Journal of Economic Perspectives 28, no. 1 (Winter 2014): 49–72.
- May 2000
- Article
The Use of Performance Measures in Incentive Contracting
By: George P. Baker
Baker, George P. "The Use of Performance Measures in Incentive Contracting." American Economic Review 90, no. 2 (May 2000).
- December 2010
- Article
Social Preferences and Strategic Uncertainty: An Experiment on Markets and Contracts
This paper reports a three-phase experiment on a stylized labor market. In the first two phases, agents face simple games, which we use to estimate subjects' social and reciprocity concerns. In the last phase, four principals compete by offering agents a contract from... View Details
Keywords: Strategy; Risk and Uncertainty; Markets; Contracts; Decisions; Distribution; Labor; Game Theory
Cabrales, Antonio, Raffaele Miniaci, Marco Piovesan, and Giovanni Ponti. "Social Preferences and Strategic Uncertainty: An Experiment on Markets and Contracts." American Economic Review 100, no. 5 (December 2010): 2261–2278.
- September 1982
- Article
Risk Aversion and the Negotiation of Insurance Contracts
By: R. Kihlstrom and A. E. Roth
Kihlstrom, R., and A. E. Roth. "Risk Aversion and the Negotiation of Insurance Contracts." Journal of Risk and Insurance 49 (September 1982): 372–387.
- Article
Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
By: George P. Baker, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy
Baker, George P., Robert Gibbons, and Kevin J. Murphy. "Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm." Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, no. 1 (February 2002).
- 2014
- Working Paper
Management Practices, Relational Contracts and the Decline of General Motors
By: Susan Helper and Rebecca Henderson
General Motors was once regarded as one of the best managed and most successful firms in the world, but between 1980 and 2009 its share of the US market fell from 62.6 to 19.8 percent, and in 2009 the firm went bankrupt. In this paper we argue that the conventional... View Details
Keywords: Organizational Change and Adaptation; Management Practices and Processes; Organizational Structure; Decision Making; Insolvency and Bankruptcy; Manufacturing Industry; Auto Industry
Helper, Susan, and Rebecca Henderson. "Management Practices, Relational Contracts and the Decline of General Motors." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 14-062, January 2014. (NBER Working Paper Series, No. 19867, January 2014.)
- January 2013 (Revised April 2013)
- Technical Note
Relational Contracts and the Roots of Sustained Competitive Advantage
This note focuses on organizational "competencies" or "capabilities" as a potential source of sustained competitive advantage. Research in this area hypothesizes that some firms outperform their competition because they can do things that their rivals cannot. View Details
Henderson, Rebecca M. "Relational Contracts and the Roots of Sustained Competitive Advantage." Harvard Business School Technical Note 313-105, January 2013. (Revised April 2013.)