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- All HBS Web (356)
- Faculty Publications (146)
Show Results For
- All HBS Web (356)
- Faculty Publications (146)
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- 1988
- Chapter
The Expected Utility of Playing a Game
By: A. E. Roth
Roth, A. E. "The Expected Utility of Playing a Game." In The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley, edited by A. E. Roth, 51–70. Cambridge University Press, 1988.
- June 2008
- Article
Minimally Acceptable Altruism and the Ultimatum Game
By: Julio J. Rotemberg
I suppose that people react with anger when others show themselves not to be minimally altruistic. With heterogeneous agents, this can account for the experimental results of ultimatum and dictator games. Moreover, it can account for the surprisingly large fraction of... View Details
Rotemberg, Julio J. "Minimally Acceptable Altruism and the Ultimatum Game." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 66, nos. 3-4 (June 2008).
- 2007
- Working Paper
Correlated Equilibrium and Nash Equilibrium as an Observer's Assessment of the Game
By: John Hillas, Elon Kohlberg and John W. Pratt
Noncooperative games are examined from the point of view of an outside observer who believes that the players are rational and that they know at least as much as the observer. The observer is assumed to be able to observe many instances of the play of the game; these... View Details
Hillas, John, Elon Kohlberg, and John W. Pratt. "Correlated Equilibrium and Nash Equilibrium as an Observer's Assessment of the Game." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 08-005, July 2007.
- Article
Statistical Physics of Human Cooperation
By: Matjaž Perc, Jillian J. Jordan, David G. Rand, Zhen Wang, Stefano Boccaletti and Attila Szolnoki
Extensive cooperation among unrelated individuals is unique to humans, who often sacrifice personal benefits for the common good and work together to achieve what they are unable to execute alone. The evolutionary success of our species is indeed due, to a large... View Details
Keywords: Human Cooperation; Evolutionary Game Theory; Public Goods; Reward; Punishment; Tolerance; Self-organization; Pattern Formation; Cooperation; Behavior; Game Theory
Perc, Matjaž, Jillian J. Jordan, David G. Rand, Zhen Wang, Stefano Boccaletti, and Attila Szolnoki. "Statistical Physics of Human Cooperation." Physics Reports 687 (May 8, 2017): 1–51.
- 14 Jun 2007
- Working Paper Summaries
Evolution Analysis of Large-Scale Software Systems Using Design Structure Matrices and Design Rule Theory
- July– September 2002
- Article
Predictive Value and the Usefulness of Game Theoretic Models
By: Ido Erev, Alvin E. Roth, Robert L. Slonim and Greg Barron
Erev, Ido, Alvin E. Roth, Robert L. Slonim, and Greg Barron. "Predictive Value and the Usefulness of Game Theoretic Models." International Journal of Forecasting 18, no. 3 (July– September 2002): 359–368.
- 2020
- Working Paper
To Infinity and Beyond: Scaling Economic Theories via Logical Compactness
By: Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Scott Duke Kominers and Ran I. Shorrer
Many economic-theoretic models incorporate finiteness assumptions that, while introduced for simplicity, play a real role in the analysis. Such assumptions introduce a conceptual problem, as results that rely on finiteness are often implicitly nonrobust; for example,... View Details
Gonczarowski, Yannai A., Scott Duke Kominers, and Ran I. Shorrer. "To Infinity and Beyond: Scaling Economic Theories via Logical Compactness." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 19-127, June 2019. (Revised November 2020.)
- Article
Third-Party Punishment as a Costly Signal of High Continuation Probabilities in Repeated Games
By: Jillian J. Jordan and David G. Rand
Why do individuals pay costs to punish selfish behavior, even as third-party observers? A large body of research suggests that reputation plays an important role in motivating such third-party punishment (TPP). Here we focus on a recently proposed reputation-based... View Details
Jordan, Jillian J., and David G. Rand. "Third-Party Punishment as a Costly Signal of High Continuation Probabilities in Repeated Games." Journal of Theoretical Biology 421 (May 21, 2017): 189–202.
- July 2002
- Article
The Economist As Engineer: Game Theory, Experimental Economics and Computation As Tools of Design Economics
By: Alvin E Roth
Roth, Alvin E. "The Economist As Engineer: Game Theory, Experimental Economics and Computation As Tools of Design Economics." Econometrica 70, no. 4 (July 2002): 1341–1378.
- Forthcoming
- Article
Collusion in Brokered Markets
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Richard Lowery
High commissions in the U.S. residential real estate agency market present a puzzle for economic theory because brokerage is not a concentrated industry. We model brokered markets as a game in which agents post prices for customers and then choose which other agents to... View Details
Keywords: Real Estate Agents; Real Estate; Realtors; Broker Networks; Brokerage; Brokerage Commissions; ＂Brokerage Industry; Brokered Markets; Brokering; Brokers; Industrial Organization; Repeated Game Framework; ＂Repeated Games＂; Collusion; Antitrust; Microeconomics; Market Design; Theory; Game Theory; Real Estate Industry
Hatfield, John William, Scott Duke Kominers, and Richard Lowery. "Collusion in Brokered Markets." Journal of Finance (forthcoming).
- Article
Analyzing Scrip Systems
By: Kris Johnson, David Simchi-Levi and Peng Sun
Scrip systems provide a nonmonetary trade economy for exchange of resources. We model a scrip system as a stochastic game and study system design issues on selection rules to match potential trade partners over time. We show the optimality of one particular rule in... View Details
Keywords: ＂Repeated Games＂; Stochastic Trust Game; Dynamic Program; P2P Lending; Scrip Systems; Artificial Currency; Non-monetary Trade Economies; Marketplace Matching; Currency; Operations; Game Theory
Johnson, Kris, David Simchi-Levi, and Peng Sun. "Analyzing Scrip Systems." Operations Research 62, no. 3 (May–June 2014): 524–534.
- November 2006 (Revised November 2009)
- Course Overview Note
Introduction to Competitive Dynamics: Strategy and Tactics
By: Dennis A. Yao
Provides an overview of the course Competitive Dynamics: Strategy and Tactics and discusses challenges facing those who wish to use game theory to assist in strategic and tactical decision making. View Details
Yao, Dennis A. "Introduction to Competitive Dynamics: Strategy and Tactics." Harvard Business School Course Overview Note 707-475, November 2006. (Revised November 2009.)
- Research Summary
FOUNDATIONS OF BUSINESS STRATEGY
Pankaj Ghemawat is involved in an ongoing stream of research and course development on the foundations of business strategy. Recent work has included the application of game theory to business strategy, as reported in the book Games Businesses Play, and the... View Details
- Article
Howard Raiffa: The Art, Science, and Humanity of a Legendary Negotiation Analyst
Rightly known as the “father of negotiation analysis,” Howard Raiffa was my thesis advisor, colleague, and friend for over 30 years. The bulk of this article develops an account of his intellectual trajectory from game theory to statistical decision theory to decision... View Details
Keywords: Negotiation Analysis; Bargaining; Howard Raiffa; Negotiation; Personal Development and Career
Sebenius, James K. "Howard Raiffa: The Art, Science, and Humanity of a Legendary Negotiation Analyst." Negotiation Journal 33, no. 4 (October 2017): 283–307.
- March 2023
- Article
Not from Concentrate: Collusion in Collaborative Industries
By: Jordan M. Barry, John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Richard Lowery
The chief principle of antitrust law and theory is that reducing market concentration—having more, smaller firms instead of fewer, bigger ones—reduces anticompetitive behavior. We demonstrate that this principle is fundamentally incomplete.
In many... View Details
In many... View Details
Keywords: Antitrust; Antitrust Law; Antitrust Theory; Law And Economics; Collusion; Collaboration; Collaborative Industries; Regulation; ＂Repeated Games＂; IPOs; Initial Public Offerings; Underwriters; Real Estate; Real Estate Agents; Realtors; Syndicated Markets; Syndication; Brokers; Market Concentration; Competition; Law; Economics; Collaborative Innovation and Invention; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Game Theory; Initial Public Offering
Barry, Jordan M., John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers, and Richard Lowery. "Not from Concentrate: Collusion in Collaborative Industries." Iowa Law Review 108, no. 3 (March 2023): 1089–1148.
- 2016
- Book
Competing Against Luck: The Story of Innovation and Customer Choice
By: Clayton M. Christensen, Taddy Hall, Karen Dillon and David S. Duncan
The foremost authority on innovation and growth presents a path-breaking book every company needs to transform innovation from a game of chance to one in which they develop products and services that customers want to buy and are willing to purchase at a premium price.... View Details
Christensen, Clayton M., Taddy Hall, Karen Dillon, and David S. Duncan. Competing Against Luck: The Story of Innovation and Customer Choice. New York: Harper Business, 2016.
- 26 Mar 2024
- Research & Ideas
How Humans Outshine AI in Adapting to Change
that required increasingly more flexible self-orienting. Like a simplified version of a four-player scenario of the classic video game Mario Kart, each game included four “possible selves,” which were... View Details
- August 2010 (Revised October 2012)
- Exercise
To Catch a Vandal: A Power & Influence Exercise
By: Amy J.C. Cuddy, Ruwan Tharindu Gunatilake and Meredith Hodges
This exercise is based on the "Mafia" game created by psychologist Dimma Davidoff, and is designed to give students a broad introduction to multiple theories of influence and to challenge their instincts about which techniques are the most powerful and how they may be... View Details
Keywords: Nonverbal Communication; Knowledge Use and Leverage; Management Analysis, Tools, and Techniques; Management Skills; Groups and Teams; Power and Influence; Trust
Cuddy, Amy J.C., Ruwan Tharindu Gunatilake, and Meredith Hodges. "To Catch a Vandal: A Power & Influence Exercise." Harvard Business School Exercise 911-013, August 2010. (Revised October 2012.)