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- All HBS Web (346)
- Faculty Publications (147)
Show Results For
- All HBS Web (346)
- Faculty Publications (147)
- October 2009
- Article
Negotiation Analysis: From Games to Inferences to Decisions to Deals
Exemplified by the pioneering work of Howard Raiffa and often expressed in the pages of the Negotiation Journal, the emergent prescriptive field of "negotiation analysis" progressively developed from Raiffa's early contributions to game theory and to his later... View Details
Keywords: Decision Choices and Conditions; Negotiation Participants; Negotiation Preparation; Negotiation Process; Negotiation Tactics; Game Theory
Sebenius, James K. "Negotiation Analysis: From Games to Inferences to Decisions to Deals." Negotiation Journal 25, no. 4 (October 2009): 449–465.
- Article
Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags
By: Drew Fudenberg, Yuhta Ishii and Scott Duke Kominers
We extend the folk theorem of repeated games to two settings in which players' information about others' play arrives with stochastic lags. In our first model, signals are almost-perfect if and when they do arrive, that is, each player either observes an almost-perfect... View Details
Fudenberg, Drew, Yuhta Ishii, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags." Journal of Economic Theory 150 (March 2014): 487–514.
- 2007
- Chapter
Negotiation Analysis: Between Decisions and Games
- 1985
- Chapter
Toward a Focal-Point Theory of Bargaining
By: A. E. Roth
Roth, A. E. "Toward a Focal-Point Theory of Bargaining." In Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining, edited by A. E. Roth, 259–268. Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- July 16, 2016
- Article
A Game Theoretic Model for Resource Allocation Among Countermeasures with Multiple Attributes
By: Elisabeth C. Paulson, Igor Linkov and Jeffrey Keisler
We study a strategic, two-player, sequential game between an attacker and defender. The defender must allocate resources amongst possible countermeasures and across possible targets. The attacker then chooses a type of threat and a target to attack. This paper proposes... View Details
Paulson, Elisabeth C., Igor Linkov, and Jeffrey Keisler. "A Game Theoretic Model for Resource Allocation Among Countermeasures with Multiple Attributes." European Journal of Operational Research 252, no. 2 (July 16, 2016): 610–622.
- 1988
- Chapter
The Expected Utility of Playing a Game
By: A. E. Roth
Roth, A. E. "The Expected Utility of Playing a Game." In The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley, edited by A. E. Roth, 51–70. Cambridge University Press, 1988.
- June 2008
- Article
Minimally Acceptable Altruism and the Ultimatum Game
By: Julio J. Rotemberg
I suppose that people react with anger when others show themselves not to be minimally altruistic. With heterogeneous agents, this can account for the experimental results of ultimatum and dictator games. Moreover, it can account for the surprisingly large fraction of... View Details
Rotemberg, Julio J. "Minimally Acceptable Altruism and the Ultimatum Game." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 66, nos. 3-4 (June 2008).
- 2007
- Working Paper
Correlated Equilibrium and Nash Equilibrium as an Observer's Assessment of the Game
By: John Hillas, Elon Kohlberg and John W. Pratt
Noncooperative games are examined from the point of view of an outside observer who believes that the players are rational and that they know at least as much as the observer. The observer is assumed to be able to observe many instances of the play of the game; these... View Details
Hillas, John, Elon Kohlberg, and John W. Pratt. "Correlated Equilibrium and Nash Equilibrium as an Observer's Assessment of the Game." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 08-005, July 2007.
- Article
Statistical Physics of Human Cooperation
By: Matjaž Perc, Jillian J. Jordan, David G. Rand, Zhen Wang, Stefano Boccaletti and Attila Szolnoki
Extensive cooperation among unrelated individuals is unique to humans, who often sacrifice personal benefits for the common good and work together to achieve what they are unable to execute alone. The evolutionary success of our species is indeed due, to a large... View Details
Keywords: Human Cooperation; Evolutionary Game Theory; Public Goods; Reward; Punishment; Tolerance; Self-organization; Pattern Formation; Cooperation; Behavior; Game Theory
Perc, Matjaž, Jillian J. Jordan, David G. Rand, Zhen Wang, Stefano Boccaletti, and Attila Szolnoki. "Statistical Physics of Human Cooperation." Physics Reports 687 (May 8, 2017): 1–51.
- July– September 2002
- Article
Predictive Value and the Usefulness of Game Theoretic Models
By: Ido Erev, Alvin E. Roth, Robert L. Slonim and Greg Barron
Erev, Ido, Alvin E. Roth, Robert L. Slonim, and Greg Barron. "Predictive Value and the Usefulness of Game Theoretic Models." International Journal of Forecasting 18, no. 3 (July– September 2002): 359–368.
- 14 Jun 2007
- Working Paper Summaries
Evolution Analysis of Large-Scale Software Systems Using Design Structure Matrices and Design Rule Theory
- 2020
- Working Paper
To Infinity and Beyond: Scaling Economic Theories via Logical Compactness
By: Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Scott Duke Kominers and Ran I. Shorrer
Many economic-theoretic models incorporate finiteness assumptions that, while introduced for simplicity, play a real role in the analysis. Such assumptions introduce a conceptual problem, as results that rely on finiteness are often implicitly nonrobust; for example,... View Details
Gonczarowski, Yannai A., Scott Duke Kominers, and Ran I. Shorrer. "To Infinity and Beyond: Scaling Economic Theories via Logical Compactness." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 19-127, June 2019. (Revised November 2020.)
- Article
Third-Party Punishment as a Costly Signal of High Continuation Probabilities in Repeated Games
By: Jillian J. Jordan and David G. Rand
Why do individuals pay costs to punish selfish behavior, even as third-party observers? A large body of research suggests that reputation plays an important role in motivating such third-party punishment (TPP). Here we focus on a recently proposed reputation-based... View Details
Jordan, Jillian J., and David G. Rand. "Third-Party Punishment as a Costly Signal of High Continuation Probabilities in Repeated Games." Journal of Theoretical Biology 421 (May 21, 2017): 189–202.
- July 2002
- Article
The Economist As Engineer: Game Theory, Experimental Economics and Computation As Tools of Design Economics
By: Alvin E Roth
Roth, Alvin E. "The Economist As Engineer: Game Theory, Experimental Economics and Computation As Tools of Design Economics." Econometrica 70, no. 4 (July 2002): 1341–1378.
- June 2025
- Article
Collusion in Brokered Markets
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Richard Lowery
High commissions in the U.S. residential real estate agency market present a puzzle for economic theory because brokerage is not a concentrated industry. We model brokered markets as a game in which agents post prices for customers and then choose which other agents to... View Details
Keywords: Real Estate Agents; Real Estate; Realtors; Broker Networks; Brokerage; Brokerage Commissions; ＂Brokerage Industry; Brokered Markets; Brokering; Brokers; Industrial Organization; Repeated Game Framework; ＂Repeated Games＂; Collusion; Antitrust; Microeconomics; Market Design; Theory; Game Theory; Real Estate Industry
Hatfield, John William, Scott Duke Kominers, and Richard Lowery. "Collusion in Brokered Markets." Journal of Finance 80, no. 3 (June 2025): 1417–1462.
- Article
Analyzing Scrip Systems
By: Kris Johnson, David Simchi-Levi and Peng Sun
Scrip systems provide a nonmonetary trade economy for exchange of resources. We model a scrip system as a stochastic game and study system design issues on selection rules to match potential trade partners over time. We show the optimality of one particular rule in... View Details
Keywords: ＂Repeated Games＂; Stochastic Trust Game; Dynamic Program; P2P Lending; Scrip Systems; Artificial Currency; Non-monetary Trade Economies; Marketplace Matching; Currency; Operations; Game Theory
Johnson, Kris, David Simchi-Levi, and Peng Sun. "Analyzing Scrip Systems." Operations Research 62, no. 3 (May–June 2014): 524–534.
- November 2006 (Revised November 2009)
- Course Overview Note
Introduction to Competitive Dynamics: Strategy and Tactics
By: Dennis A. Yao
Provides an overview of the course Competitive Dynamics: Strategy and Tactics and discusses challenges facing those who wish to use game theory to assist in strategic and tactical decision making. View Details
Yao, Dennis A. "Introduction to Competitive Dynamics: Strategy and Tactics." Harvard Business School Course Overview Note 707-475, November 2006. (Revised November 2009.)
- Research Summary
FOUNDATIONS OF BUSINESS STRATEGY
Pankaj Ghemawat is involved in an ongoing stream of research and course development on the foundations of business strategy. Recent work has included the application of game theory to business strategy, as reported in the book Games Businesses Play, and the... View Details