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- Multimedia (3)
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Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(261)
- News (41)
- Research (185)
- Events (2)
- Multimedia (3)
- Faculty Publications (75)
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- March 2010 (Revised December 2010)
- Case
The Market for Prisoners: Business, Crime and Punishment in the "American Dream"
By: Rafael M. Di Tella and Laura Winig
In 2010, Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), the largest private prison operator in the U.S., was considering expansion options. The company's largest customers, federal and state governments, were under economic pressure to reduce the incarceration rate and... View Details
Keywords: For-Profit Firms; Crime and Corruption; Profit; Law Enforcement; Growth and Development Strategy; Demand and Consumers; Business and Government Relations; Competitive Strategy; Expansion; United States
Di Tella, Rafael M., and Laura Winig. The Market for Prisoners: Business, Crime and Punishment in the "American Dream". Harvard Business School Case 710-042, March 2010. (Revised December 2010.)
- 2002
- Working Paper
'Plata o Plomo?': Bribe and Punishment in a Theory of Political Influence
By: Ernesto Dal Bó, Pedro Dal Bó and Rafael Di Tella
Dal Bó, Ernesto, Pedro Dal Bó, and Rafael Di Tella. "'Plata o Plomo?': Bribe and Punishment in a Theory of Political Influence." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 03-060, November 2002.
- July 2022
- Article
When Alterations Are Violations: Moral Outrage and Punishment in Response to (Even Minor) Alterations to Rituals
By: Daniel H. Stein, Juliana Schroeder, Nicholas M. Hobson, Francesca Gino and Michael I. Norton
From Catholics performing the sign of the cross since the 4th century to Americans reciting the Pledge of Allegiance since the 1890s, group rituals (i.e., predefined sequences of symbolic actions) have strikingly consistent features over time. Seven studies (N = 4,213)... View Details
Keywords: Ritual; Morality; Groups; Norms; Commitment; Groups and Teams; Values and Beliefs; Change; Moral Sensibility; Behavior
Stein, Daniel H., Juliana Schroeder, Nicholas M. Hobson, Francesca Gino, and Michael I. Norton. "When Alterations Are Violations: Moral Outrage and Punishment in Response to (Even Minor) Alterations to Rituals." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 123, no. 1 (July 2022): 123–153.
- 2013
- Chapter
Prescriptions and Punishments for Working Moms: How Race and Work Status Affect Judgments of Mothers
By: Amy Cuddy and Elizabeth Baily Wolf
Cuddy, Amy, and Elizabeth Baily Wolf. "Prescriptions and Punishments for Working Moms: How Race and Work Status Affect Judgments of Mothers." In Gender & Work: Challenging Conventional Wisdom, edited by Robin Ely and Amy Cuddy, 35–42. Harvard Business School, 2013.
- 2019
- Chapter
Punishing Robots: Issues in the Economics of Tort Liability and Innovation in Artificial Intelligence
By: Alberto Galasso and Hong Luo
Galasso, Alberto, and Hong Luo. "Punishing Robots: Issues in the Economics of Tort Liability and Innovation in Artificial Intelligence." Chap. 20 in The Economics of Artificial Intelligence, edited by Ajay K. Agrawal, Joshua Gans, and Avi Goldfarb. University of Chicago Press, 2019.
- October 15, 2021
- Article
Virtuous Victims
By: Jillian J. Jordan and Maryam Kouchaki
How do people perceive the moral character of victims? We find, across a range of transgressions, that people frequently see victims of wrongdoing as more moral than non-victims who have behaved identically. Across 15 experiments (total n = 9,355), we document this... View Details
Keywords: Moral Judgment; Restorative Justice; Punishment; Compensation; Person Perception; Moral Sensibility; Judgments; Perception
Jordan, Jillian J., and Maryam Kouchaki. "Virtuous Victims." Science Advances 7, no. 42 (October 15, 2021).
- 2007
- Other Unpublished Work
When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games.
By: Lucy White, George J. Mailath and Volker Nocke
White, Lucy, George J. Mailath, and Volker Nocke. "When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games." October 2007.
- Research Summary
Overview
Erin's research focuses on how organizations can and should respond to employee failures. She is interested in understanding the effects that organizational responses have on subsequent employee behavior, and how organizational policies can be designed to more... View Details
- Article
Statistical Physics of Human Cooperation
By: Matjaž Perc, Jillian J. Jordan, David G. Rand, Zhen Wang, Stefano Boccaletti and Attila Szolnoki
Extensive cooperation among unrelated individuals is unique to humans, who often sacrifice personal benefits for the common good and work together to achieve what they are unable to execute alone. The evolutionary success of our species is indeed due, to a large... View Details
Keywords: Human Cooperation; Evolutionary Game Theory; Public Goods; Reward; Punishment; Tolerance; Self-organization; Pattern Formation; Cooperation; Behavior; Game Theory
Perc, Matjaž, Jillian J. Jordan, David G. Rand, Zhen Wang, Stefano Boccaletti, and Attila Szolnoki. "Statistical Physics of Human Cooperation." Physics Reports 687 (May 8, 2017): 1–51.
- 26 Mar 2018
- Research & Ideas
To Motivate Employees, Give an Unexpected Bonus (or Penalty)
happens about 50 percent of the time. In cases where employees thought they would be rewarded but weren’t, Gallani and Cai called that an “implicit punishment,” while in the opposite case, in which employees thought they would be punished... View Details
- 22 Jul 2016
- Working Paper Summaries
Who Pays for White-Collar Crime?
Keywords: by Paul Healy and George Serafeim
- 2013
- Working Paper
Testing Coleman's Social-Norm Enforcement Mechanism: Evidence from Wikipedia
By: Mikolaj J. Piskorski and Andreea Gorbatai
Since Durkheim, sociologists have believed that dense network structures lead to fewer norm violations. Coleman (1990) proposed one mechanism generating this relationship and argued that dense networks provide an opportunity structure to reward those who punish norm... View Details
Keywords: Governance Compliance; Governance Controls; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Information Publishing; Social and Collaborative Networks; Social Issues; Societal Protocols
Piskorski, Mikolaj J., and Andreea Gorbatai. "Testing Coleman's Social-Norm Enforcement Mechanism: Evidence from Wikipedia." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 11-055, December 2010. (Revised September 2011, March 2013.)
- 30 Oct 2008
- Working Paper Summaries
Do Voters Appreciate Responsive Governments? Evidence from Indian Disaster Relief
- 2016
- Working Paper
Who Pays for White-Collar Crime?
By: Paul Healy and George Serafeim
Using a proprietary dataset of 667 companies around the world that experienced white-collar crime, we investigate what drives punishment of perpetrators of crime. We find a significantly lower propensity to punish crime in our sample, where most crimes are not reported... View Details
Keywords: Crime; Gender Bias; Women; Women Executives; Corruption; Legal Aspects Of Business; Firing; Human Capital; Human Resource Management; Prejudice and Bias; Crime and Corruption; Judgments; Law Enforcement; Human Resources; Corporate Governance; Gender
Healy, Paul, and George Serafeim. "Who Pays for White-Collar Crime?" Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 16-148, June 2016.
- 2011
- Article
Free to Punish? The American Dream and the Harsh Treatment of Criminals
By: Rafael Di Tella
We describe the evolution of selective aspects of punishment in the U.S. over the period 1980-2004. We note that imprisonment increased around 1980, a period that coincides with the "Reagan revolution" in economic matters. We build an economic model where beliefs about... View Details
Keywords: Crime and Corruption
Di Tella, Rafael. "Free to Punish? The American Dream and the Harsh Treatment of Criminals." Cato Papers on Public Policy 1 (2011).
- May 2023
- Article
Incentive Effects of Subjective Allocations of Rewards and Penalties
By: Wei Cai, Susanna Gallani and Jee-Eun Shin
We examine the incentive effects of subjectivity in allocating tournament-based rewards and punishments. We use data from a company where reward and punishment decisions are based on a combination of objective metrics and subjective performance assessments. Rankings... View Details
Keywords: Subjectivity; Tournament-based Incentives; Rewards; Penalties; Expectancy Theory; Employees; Compensation and Benefits; Management; Decisions; Performance; Measurement and Metrics
Cai, Wei, Susanna Gallani, and Jee-Eun Shin. "Incentive Effects of Subjective Allocations of Rewards and Penalties." Management Science 69, no. 5 (May 2023): 3121–3139.
- 2011
- Working Paper
Free to Punish? The American Dream and the Harsh Treatment of Criminals
By: Rafael Di Tella and Juan Dubra
We describe the evolution of selective aspects of punishment in the U.S. over the period 1980-2004. We note that imprisonment increased around 1980, a period that coincides with the "Reagan revolution" in economic matters. We build an economic model where beliefs about... View Details
Keywords: Crime and Corruption; Economy; Moral Sensibility; Mathematical Methods; Opportunities; Behavior; United States
Di Tella, Rafael, and Juan Dubra. "Free to Punish? The American Dream and the Harsh Treatment of Criminals." NBER Working Paper Series, No. 17309, August 2011.
- 20 Jan 2011
- Working Paper Summaries
Testing Coleman’s Social-Norm Enforcement Mechanism: Evidence from Wikipedia
- Research Summary
Do Vertical Mergers facilitate Collusion?
Joint work with Volker Nocke, University of Pennsylvania In this paper we investigate the impact of vertical mergers on upstream firms' ability to sustain collusion. We show in a number of models that the net effect of vertical integration is to facilitate... View Details
- Forthcoming
- Chapter
Intermediation and Diffusion of Responsibility in Negotiation: A Case of Bounded Ethicality
By: Neeru Paharia, Lucas Clayton Coffman and Max Bazerman
This article compares direct deception with deception via an intermediary in the bargaining context. It describes a growing experimental literature that suggests how perceived ethics surrounding transactions with multiple partners can encourage misbehavior. It is noted... View Details
Paharia, Neeru, Lucas Clayton Coffman, and Max Bazerman. "Intermediation and Diffusion of Responsibility in Negotiation: A Case of Bounded Ethicality." In The Oxford Handbook of Economic Conflict Resolution, edited by Gary E. Bolton and Rachel T.A. Croson, 37–46. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.