Jones, Geoffrey, and Mona Rahmani. "In Search of Global Regulation." Harvard Business School Case 822-122, March 2022. (Revised April 2022.)

Childress, Stacey M., and Stig Leschly. "Note on U.S. Public Education Finance (A): Revenues." Harvard Business School Background Note 307-069, October 2006. (Revised December 2012.)

Kanter, Rosabeth M., and Olivia Leskinen. "Robert Whelan and the Student Loan Crisis (A)." Harvard Business School Case 313-009, 2012. (Advanced Leadership Initiative.)

Jones, Geoffrey, Mona Rahmani, and Alexis Gendron. "In Search of Global Regulation." Harvard Business School Case 805-025, October 2004. (Revised October 2013.)

Paine, Lynn S. "Corporate Purpose and Responsibility." Harvard Business School Background Note 396-201, December 1995. (Revised November 1996.)

Kaufmann, Patrick J. "Legal Restrictions on Marketing Management, Introduction." Harvard Business School Background Note 588-009, July 1987. (Revised January 1993.)

McGee, Henry, Nien-hê Hsieh, Sarah McAra, and Christian Godwin. "Apple: Privacy vs. Safety (A)." Harvard Business School Case 321-004, February 2021.

Lorsch, Jay W., and Kaitlyn Simpson. "The Role of the Audit Committee in Risk Oversight." Harvard Business School Case 409-016, June 2009.

Segel, Arthur I., A. Eugene Kohn, and Nhat Minh Nguyen. "Clifford Chance: Repotting the Tree." Harvard Business School Case 207-073, October 2006. (Revised March 2009.)

Edelman, Benjamin, and Damien Geradin. "Android and Competition Law: Exploring and Assessing Google's Practices in Mobile." European Competition Journal 12, nos. 2-3 (2016): 159–194.

Reiling, Henry B. "The Carried Interest." Harvard Business School Case 293-043, September 1992. (Revised August 2010.)

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Roe, Mark J., and Jordan I. Siegel. "Finance and Politics: A Review Essay Based on Kenneth Dam's Analysis of Legal Traditions in The Law-Growth Nexus." Journal of Economic Literature 47, no. 3 (September 2009): 781–800. (Strong financial markets are widely thought to propel economic development, with many in finance seeing legal tradition as fundamental to protecting investors sufficiently for finance to flourish. Kenneth Dam finds that the legal tradition view inaccurately portrays how legal systems work, how laws developed historically, and how government power is allocated in the various legal traditions. Yet, after probing the legal origins' literature for inaccuracies, Dam does not deeply develop an alternative hypothesis to explain the world's differences in financial development. Nor does he challenge the origins core data, which could be origins' trump card. Hence, his analysis will not convince many economists, despite that his legal learning suggests conceptual and factual difficulties for the legal origins explanations. Yet, a dense political economy explanation is already out there and the origins-based data has unexplored weaknesses consistent with Dam's contentions. Knowing if the origins view is truly fundamental, flawed, or secondary is vital for financial development policy making because policymakers who believe it will pick policies that imitate what they think to be the core institutions of the preferred legal tradition. But if they have mistaken views, as Dam indicates they might, as to what the legal traditions' institutions really are and which types of laws are effective, or what is really most important to financial development, they will make policy mistakes—potentially serious ones.)