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- Faculty Publications (248)
Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(1,097)
- Faculty Publications (248)
- Article
Révélation des préferences pour les biens publics: Caractérisation des mécanismes satisfaisants
By: Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont
Green, Jerry R., and Jean-Jacques Laffont. "Révélation des préferences pour les biens publics: Caractérisation des mécanismes satisfaisants." Cahiers du Séminaire d'économétrie, no. 19 (1977): 83–103.
- November 1976
- Article
Partial Equilibrium Approach to the Free-Rider Problem
By: Jerry R. Green, Elon Kohlberg and Jean-Jacques Laffont
Groves and others have shown that truthful answers concerning preferences for public goods can be elicited as dominant strategies if appropriate tax-subsidies rules are applied. This paper studies the statistical properties of the total revenues generated by one of the... View Details
Keywords: Problems and Challenges
Green, Jerry R., Elon Kohlberg, and Jean-Jacques Laffont. "Partial Equilibrium Approach to the Free-Rider Problem." Journal of Public Economics 6, no. 4 (November 1976): 375–394.
- Article
A Brief Note on the Efficiency of Equilibria with Costly Transactions
By: Jerry R. Green and Heraklis Polemarchakis
Green, Jerry R., and Heraklis Polemarchakis. "A Brief Note on the Efficiency of Equilibria with Costly Transactions." Review of Economic Studies 43, no. 3 (October 1976): 537–542.
- Article
On the Optimal Structure of Liability Laws
By: Jerry R. Green
We consider the control of tvo-party accidents through the use of liability rules that assign damages according to whether or not predetermined standards for care have been met. Particular emphasis is given to how the differential in the costs of accident avoidance... View Details
Green, Jerry R. "On the Optimal Structure of Liability Laws." Bell Journal of Economics 7, no. 2 (Fall 1976): 553–574.
- Article
Direct vs. Indirect Remedies for Externalities
By: Jerry R. Green and Eytan Sheshinski
Green, Jerry R., and Eytan Sheshinski. "Direct vs. Indirect Remedies for Externalities." Journal of Political Economy 84, no. 4 pt. 1 (1976): 797–808.
- 1975
- Working Paper
Information, Efficiency and Equilibrium
By: Jerry R. Green
When economic agents receive information over time concerning future events it is likely that prices for commodities whose value is influenced by these events will fluctuate in response to changes in the state of knowledge. If such events occur periodically,... View Details
Green, Jerry R. "Information, Efficiency and Equilibrium." Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper, No. 284, December 1975.
- Article
The Nature of Stochastic Equilibria
By: Jerry R. Green and Mukul Majumdar
This paper formulates the notion of stochastic equilibria as invariant probability distributions consistent with the behavior patterns of individuals and the disequilibrium adjustment mechanism of the economy. Conditions for existence, uniqueness, and stability of such... View Details
Green, Jerry R., and Mukul Majumdar. "The Nature of Stochastic Equilibria." Econometrica 43, no. 4 (July 1975): 647–660.
- Article
Competitive Inefficiencies in the Presence of Constrained Transactions
By: Jerry R. Green and Eytan Sheshinski
Green, Jerry R., and Eytan Sheshinski. "Competitive Inefficiencies in the Presence of Constrained Transactions." Journal of Economic Theory 10, no. 3 (June 1975): 343–357.
- Article
A Note on the Progressivity of Optimal Public Expenditures
By: Jerry R. Green and Eytan Sheshinski
Green, Jerry R., and Eytan Sheshinski. "A Note on the Progressivity of Optimal Public Expenditures." Quarterly Journal of Economics 89, no. 1 (February 1975): 138–144.
- Article
The Question of Collective Rationality in Professor Gale's Model of Trade Imbalance
By: Jerry R. Green
Green, Jerry R. "The Question of Collective Rationality in Professor Gale's Model of Trade Imbalance." Journal of International Economics 2, no. 1 (February 1972): 39–55.
- 1974
- Chapter
Pre-existing Contracts and Temporary General Equilibrium
By: Jerry R. Green
Green, Jerry R. "Pre-existing Contracts and Temporary General Equilibrium." In Essays on Economic Behavior Under Uncertainty, edited by M. Balch, D. McFadden, and S. Wu. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1974.
- Article
The Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting Process
By: Jerry R. Green
The core is the set of all unblocked allocations. Implicit in this definition is the idea that if an allocation is proposed which could be blocked, some coalition will form and issue a counterproposal which it can enforce. A process of successive counterproposals based... View Details
Green, Jerry R. "The Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting Process." Econometrica 42, no. 1 (January 1974): 21–34.
- Article
Temporary General Equilibrium in a Sequential Trading Model with Spot and Futures Transactions
By: Jerry R. Green
The existence of an equilibrium is proven for a two-period model in which there are spot transactions and futures transactions in the first period and spot markets in the second period. Prices at that date are viewed with subjective uncertainty by all traders. This... View Details
Green, Jerry R. "Temporary General Equilibrium in a Sequential Trading Model with Spot and Futures Transactions." Econometrica 41, no. 6 (November 1973): 1103–1123.
- 1973
- Working Paper
Notes on Expectations Equilibria in Bayesian Settings
By: Kenneth J. Arrow and Jerry R. Green
Arrow, Kenneth J., and Jerry R. Green. "Notes on Expectations Equilibria in Bayesian Settings." Working Paper, August 1973.
- Article
On the Inequitable Nature of Core Allocations
By: Jerry R. Green
Green, Jerry R. "On the Inequitable Nature of Core Allocations." Journal of Economic Theory 4, no. 2 (April 1972): 132–143.
- 1971
- Working Paper
A Simple General Equilibrium Model of the Term Structure of Interest Rates
By: Jerry R. Green
- Research Summary
Choice, Rationality and Welfare Measurement
By: Jerry R. Green
For the past century, economists have used the hypothesis that individual choice is based on rationality in their calculations of individual and collective welfare. The central ideas are that actual market choice reveal underlying preferences, and with a good set of... View Details
- Research Summary
Compensatory Transfers in Collective Decision Making
By: Jerry R. Green
Jerry R. Green is studying mechanisms that can be employed to promote efficient collective decisions while providing justifiable compensation to participants who favor different, less efficient alternatives. This type of decision problem is pervasive in business,... View Details
- Teaching Interest
Economic Theory
By: Jerry R. Green
Topics include social choice theory, signaling, mechanism design, general equilibrium, the core, externalities, and public goods. View Details