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- All HBS Web
(424)
- News (54)
- Research (320)
- Multimedia (1)
- Faculty Publications (106)
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- January 2017
- Article
Contract Design and Stability in Many-to-Many Matching
By: John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers
We develop a model of many-to-many matching with contracts that subsumes as special cases many-to-many matching markets and buyer/seller markets with heterogeneous and indivisible goods. In our setting, substitutable preferences are sufficient to guarantee the... View Details
Keywords: Many-to-Many Matching; Stability; Substitutes; Contract Design; Contracts; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
Hatfield, John William, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Contract Design and Stability in Many-to-Many Matching." Games and Economic Behavior 101 (January 2017): 78–97.
- Spring 2023
- Article
Incentive Contract Design and Employee-Initiated Innovation: Evidence from the Field
By: Wei Cai, Susanna Gallani and Jee-Eun Shin
This study examines how the design of incentive contracts for tasks defined as workers’ official responsibilities (i.e., standard tasks) influences workers’ propensity to engage in employee-initiated innovation (EII). EII corresponds to innovation activities that are... View Details
Keywords: Employee-initiated Innovation; Contract Design; Rank-and-file; Extra-role Behaviors; Compensation and Benefits; Motivation and Incentives; Innovation and Management
Cai, Wei, Susanna Gallani, and Jee-Eun Shin. "Incentive Contract Design and Employee-Initiated Innovation: Evidence from the Field." Contemporary Accounting Research 40, no. 1 (Spring 2023): 292–323.
- 2018
- Working Paper
Bundling Incentives in (Many-to-Many) Matching with Contracts
By: Jonathan Ma and Scott Duke Kominers
In many-to-many matching with contracts, the way in which contracts are specified can affect the set of stable equilibrium outcomes. Consequently, agents may be incentivized to modify the set of contracts upfront. We consider one simple way in which agents may do so:... View Details
Keywords: Matching With Contracts; Contract Design; Bundling-proofness; Substitutability; Mathematical Methods
Ma, Jonathan, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Bundling Incentives in (Many-to-Many) Matching with Contracts." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 19-011, August 2018.
- 2024
- Working Paper
Transitory and Permanent Cash Flow Shocks in Debt Contract Design
By: Le Ma, Anywhere Sikochi and Yajun Xiao
We examine how lenders design contracts to account for transitory and permanent cash flow shocks facing borrowers. We find that volatile transitory cash flow shocks are associated with fewer liquidity covenants, indicating financial flexibility that enables firms to... View Details
Keywords: Debt Covenants; Cash Flow Shocks; Debt Contracting; Likelihood Of Default; Cash Flow; System Shocks
Ma, Le, Anywhere Sikochi, and Yajun Xiao. "Transitory and Permanent Cash Flow Shocks in Debt Contract Design." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 22-026, October 2021. (Revised February 2024. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Conditional Accept.)
- Forthcoming
- Article
Transitory and Permanent Cash Flow Shocks in Debt Contract Design
By: Le Ma, Anywhere Sikochi and Yajun Xiao
We examine how lenders design contracts to account for transitory and permanent cash flow shocks facing borrowers. We find that volatile transitory cash flow shocks are associated with fewer liquidity covenants, indicating financial flexibility that enables firms to... View Details
Keywords: Debt Covenants; Cash Flow Shocks; Debt Contracting; Likelihood Of Default; Cash Flow; System Shocks
Ma, Le, Anywhere Sikochi, and Yajun Xiao. "Transitory and Permanent Cash Flow Shocks in Debt Contract Design." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (forthcoming). (Pre-published online February 25, 2025.)
- March 2010
- Article
Contractibility and Contract Design in Strategic Alliances
By: Josh Lerner and Ulrike Malmendier
Earlier version distributed as National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 11292. View Details
Lerner, Josh, and Ulrike Malmendier. "Contractibility and Contract Design in Strategic Alliances." American Economic Review 100, no. 1 (March 2010): 214–246.
- 2016
- Working Paper
Through the Grapevine: Network Effects on the Design of Executive Compensation Contracts
By: Susanna Gallani
Effective design of executive compensation contracts involves choosing and weighting performance measures, as well as defining the mix between fixed and incentive-based pay components, with a view to fostering talent retention and goal congruence. The variability in... View Details
Keywords: Compensation Design; Board Interlocks; Compensation Consultants; Network Centrality; Homophily; Quadratic Assignment Procedure; Blockholders; Executive Compensation
Gallani, Susanna. "Through the Grapevine: Network Effects on the Design of Executive Compensation Contracts." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 16-019, August 2015. (Revised December, 2016.)
- Article
On the Correspondence of Contracts to Salaries in (Many-to-Many) Matching
In this note, I extend the work of Echenique (2012) to show that a model of many-to-many matching with contracts may be embedded into a model of many-to-many matching with wage bargaining whenever (1) all agentsʼ preferences are substitutable and (2) the matching with... View Details
Keywords: Many-to-Many Matching; Stability; Substitutes; Contract Design; Unitarity; Market Design; Contracts; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability; Economics
Kominers, Scott Duke. "On the Correspondence of Contracts to Salaries in (Many-to-Many) Matching." Games and Economic Behavior 75, no. 2 (July 2012): 984–989.
- April–May 2021
- Article
The Influence of Loan Officers on Loan Contract Design and Performance
By: Robert Bushman, Janet Gao, Xiumin Martin and Joseph Pacelli
We investigate the extent to which loan officers generate independent, individual effects on the design and performance of syndicated loans. We construct a large database containing the identities of loan officers involved in structuring syndicated loan deals, allowing... View Details
Keywords: Loan Officers; Covenants; Interest Spreads; Syndicated Loans; Banks and Banking; Financing and Loans; Design; Performance
Bushman, Robert, Janet Gao, Xiumin Martin, and Joseph Pacelli. "The Influence of Loan Officers on Loan Contract Design and Performance." Journal of Accounting & Economics 71, nos. 2-3 (April–May 2021).
- 1998
- Working Paper
System/360: A New Design Creates New Contract Structure Possibilities
By: Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim Clark
- 2023
- Chapter
Generalized Matching: Contracts and Networks
By: John William Hatfield, Ravi Jagadeesan, Scott Duke Kominers, Alexandru Nichifor, Michael Ostrovsky, Alexander Teytelboym and Alexander Westkamp
Keywords: Matching; Matching With Contracts; Matching Markets; Matching Platform; Market Design; Digital Platforms; Economics; Networks
Hatfield, John William, Ravi Jagadeesan, Scott Duke Kominers, Alexandru Nichifor, Michael Ostrovsky, Alexander Teytelboym, and Alexander Westkamp. "Generalized Matching: Contracts and Networks." Chap. 14 in Online and Matching-Based Market Design, edited by Federico Echenique, Nicole Immorlica, and Vijay Vazirani, 303–322. Cambridge University Press, 2023.
- October 2015
- Article
Managing the Performance Tradeoffs from Partner Integration: Implications of Contract Choice in R&D Projects
By: Alan MacCormack and Anant Mishra
Formal contracts represent an important governance instrument with which firms exercise control of and compensate partners in R&D projects. The specific type of contract used, however, can vary significantly across projects. In some, firms govern partnering... View Details
Keywords: ＂＂Partner Integration; Contract Choice; R＆D Project Management; Relational Contracts; Partnering Performance; Research and Development; Projects; Partners and Partnerships; Performance; Contracts
MacCormack, Alan, and Anant Mishra. "Managing the Performance Tradeoffs from Partner Integration: Implications of Contract Choice in R&D Projects." Production and Operations Management 24, no. 10 (October 2015): 1552–1569.
- Article
Trust and Collaboration in the Aftermath of Conflict: The Effects of Contract Structure
By: Deepak Malhotra and Fabrice Lumineau
Leveraging a longitudinal dataset concerning 102 inter-firm disputes, we evaluate the effects of contract structure on trust and on the likelihood of continued collaboration. We theoretically refine and empirically extend prior research by (a) distinguishing between... View Details
Malhotra, Deepak, and Fabrice Lumineau. "Trust and Collaboration in the Aftermath of Conflict: The Effects of Contract Structure." Academy of Management Journal 54, no. 5 (October 2011): 981–998.
- 08 Sep 2015
- Working Paper Summaries
Through the Grapevine: Network Effects on the Design of Executive Compensation Contracts
Keywords: by Susanna Gallani
- Aug 2015
- Conference Presentation
Familiar vs. Trusted Partners: Relationship Length and Strength In Interfirm Contract Design
By: Ranjay Gulati, Martina Luetkewitte and Thomas Mellewigt
- Article
Real Effects of Relational Contracts
By: Steven Blader, Claudine Gartenberg, Rebecca Henderson and Andrea Pratt
How important are factors such as "firm culture" and "employee engagement" in driving firm performance? Increasing evidence from a wide range of fields suggests that productivity differs widely across firms, even after the inclusion of careful controls for factors such... View Details
Blader, Steven, Claudine Gartenberg, Rebecca Henderson, and Andrea Pratt. "Real Effects of Relational Contracts." American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 105, no. 5 (May 2015): 452–456.
- Article
Organization Structure, Contract Design and Government Ownership: A Clinical Analysis of German Privatization
Dyck, I. J. A., and K. H. Wruck. "Organization Structure, Contract Design and Government Ownership: A Clinical Analysis of German Privatization." Journal of Corporate Finance 4, no. 3 (September 1998).
- 2022
- Working Paper
The Issuance and Design of Sustainability-linked Loans
By: Maria Loumioti and George Serafeim
Sustainability-linked loans (i.e., syndicated loans for which pricing is linked to a sustainability performance indicator) have rapidly evolved into a significant private debt product. We find that sustainability-linked lending has been available mostly to borrowers... View Details
Keywords: Sustainability; Sustainability Management; Credit Products; Loan Contracts; Loans; Corporate Finance; Credit Risk; Environment; ESG; ESG Ratings; Climate Change; Finance; Borrowing and Debt; Risk and Uncertainty; Credit
Loumioti, Maria, and George Serafeim. "The Issuance and Design of Sustainability-linked Loans." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 23-027, November 2022.
- Article
If You Are Offered the Right of First Refusal, Should You Accept? An Investigation of Contract Design
By: Brit Grosskopf and Alvin E. Roth
Grosskopf, Brit, and Alvin E. Roth. "If You Are Offered the Right of First Refusal, Should You Accept? An Investigation of Contract Design." Games and Economic Behavior 65, no. 1 (January 2009): 176–204. (Special Issue in Honor of Martin Shubik.)
- Article
Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts
By: John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers
We introduce a model in which firms trade goods via bilateral contracts which specify a buyer, a seller, and the terms of the exchange. This setting subsumes (many-to-many) matching with contracts, as well as supply chain matching. When firms' relationships do not... View Details
Hatfield, John William, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 4, no. 1 (February 2012): 176–208.