Publications

August 2020
Article

Lone Wolves in Competitive Equilibria

By: Ravi Jagadeesan, Scott Duke Kominers and Ross Rheingans-Yoo

This paper develops a class of equilibrium-independent predictions of competitive equilibrium with indivisibilities. Specifically, we prove an analogue of the “Lone Wolf Theorem” of classical matching theory, showing that when utility is perfectly transferable, any... View Details

Keywords: Indivisibilities; Matching; Lone Wolf Theorem; Marketplace Matching; Theory

2017
Working Paper

Lone Wolves in Competitive Equilibria

By: Ravi Jagadeesan, Scott Duke Kominers and Ross Rheingans-Yoo

This paper develops a class of equilibrium-independent predictions of competitive equilibrium with indivisibilities. Specifically, we prove an analogue of the “Lone Wolf Theorem” of classical matching theory, showing that when utility is perfectly transferable, any... View Details

Keywords: Indivisibilities; Matching; Lone Wolf Theorem; Marketplace Matching; Theory

SSRN

Article

Deposit Competition and Financial Fragility: Evidence from the U.S. Banking Sector

By: Mark Egan, Ali Hortaçsu and Gregor Matvos

We develop a structural empirical model of the US banking sector. Insured depositors and run-prone uninsured depositors choose between differentiated banks. Banks compete for deposits and endogenously default. The estimated demand for uninsured deposits declines with... View Details

Keywords: Banks and Banking; Financial Condition; United States

Purchase

Article

Multilateral Matching

By: John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers

We introduce a matching model in which agents engage in joint ventures via multilateral contracts. This approach allows us to consider production complementarities previously outside the scope of matching theory. We show analogues of the first and second welfare... View Details

Keywords: Matching; Stability; Competitive Equilibrium; Core; Networks; Competition; Joint Ventures; Balance and Stability; Groups and Teams; Entrepreneurship

Purchase

Article

Stability and Competitive Equilibrium in Trading Networks

By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers, Alexandru Nichifor, Michael Ostrovsky and Alexander Westkamp

We introduce a model in which agents in a network can trade via bilateral contracts. We find that when continuous transfers are allowed and utilities are quasi-linear, the full substitutability of preferences is sufficient to guarantee the existence of stable outcomes... View Details

Keywords: Balance and Stability; Markets

Purchase

2009
Working Paper

Anger and Regulation

By: Rafael Di Tella and Juan Dubra

We propose a model where voters experience an emotional cost when they observe a firm that has displayed insufficient concern for other people's welfare (altruism) in the process of making high profits. Even with few truly altruistic firms, an equilibrium may emerge... View Details

Keywords: Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Consumer Behavior; Monopoly; Corporate Social Responsibility and Impact; Emotions; Welfare

2008
Working Paper

Platform Competition, Compatibility, and Social Efficiency

By: Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and Francisco Ruiz-Aliseda

Katz and Shapiro (1985) study systems compatibility in settings with one-sided plat- forms and direct network effects. We consider systems compatibility in settings with two-sided platforms and indirect network effects to develop an explanation why markets with... View Details

Keywords: Network Effects; One-Sided Platforms; Two-Sided Platforms; Competition

spring 1995
Article

Competitive Response and Equilibria

By: R. Lal and V. Padmanabhan

Keywords: Competition

September 1990
Article

Competition on Many Fronts: A Stackelberg Signaling Equilibrium

By: Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont

An economic agent, the incumbent, is operating in many environments at the same time. These may be locations, markets, or specific activities. He is informed of the particular conditions relevant to each situation. His action in each case is observable by another... View Details