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- 2018
- Working Paper
Coordination Frictions in Venture Capital Syndicates
By: Ramana Nanda and Matthew Rhodes-Kropf
An extensive literature on venture capital has studied asymmetric information and agency problems between investors and entrepreneurs, examining how separating entrepreneurs from the investor can create frictions that might inhibit the funding of good projects. It has... View Details
Nanda, Ramana, and Matthew Rhodes-Kropf. "Coordination Frictions in Venture Capital Syndicates." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 17-089, April 2017. (Revised January 2019. Published in The Oxford Handbook of Entrepreneurship and Collaboration.)
- 2019
- Working Paper
Collusion in Markets with Syndication
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers, Richard Lowery and Jordan M. Barry
Many markets, including markets for IPOs and debt issuances, are syndicated: each winning bidder invites competitors to join its syndicate to complete production. Using repeated extensive form games, we show that collusion in syndicated markets may become easier as... View Details
Hatfield, John William, Scott Duke Kominers, Richard Lowery, and Jordan M. Barry. "Collusion in Markets with Syndication." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 18-009, July 2017. (Revised June 2019.)
- 2019
- Chapter
Coordination Frictions in Venture Capital Syndicates
By: Ramana Nanda and Matthew Rhodes-Kropf
An extensive literature on venture capital has studied asymmetric information and agency problems between investors and entrepreneurs, examining how separating entrepreneurs from the investor can create frictions that might inhibit the funding of good projects. It has... View Details
Nanda, Ramana, and Matthew Rhodes-Kropf. "Coordination Frictions in Venture Capital Syndicates." In The Oxford Handbook of Entrepreneurship and Collaboration, edited by Jeffrey J. Reuer, Sharon Matusik, and Jessica F. Jones. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019.
- October 2020
- Article
Collusion in Markets with Syndication
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers, Richard Lowery and Jordan M. Barry
Markets for IPOs and debt issuances are syndicated, in the sense that a bidder who wins a contract may invite losing bidders to join a syndicate that together fulfills the contract. We show that in markets with syndication, standard intuitions from industrial... View Details
Keywords: Collusion; Antitrust; IPO Underwriting; Syndication; ＂Repeated Games＂; Markets; Game Theory
Hatfield, John William, Scott Duke Kominers, Richard Lowery, and Jordan M. Barry. "Collusion in Markets with Syndication." Journal of Political Economy 128, no. 10 (October 2020).
- 2016
- Working Paper
Collusion in Markets with Syndication
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Kominers and Richard Lowery
Markets for IPOs and debt issuances are syndicated, in the sense that a bidder who
wins a contract may invite losing bidders to join a syndicate that together fulfills the
contract. We show that in markets with syndication, standard intuitions from... View Details
Hatfield, John William, Scott Kominers, and Richard Lowery. "Collusion in Markets with Syndication." Working Paper, November 2016.
- May 1968 (Revised January 1992)
- Case
Graybar Syndications
A potential investor evaluates a proposed offering—a major office building in downtown Manhattan. View Details
Keywords: Buildings and Facilities; Investment; Construction; City; Valuation; Real Estate Industry; Construction Industry; New York (city, NY)
Poorvu, William J. "Graybar Syndications." Harvard Business School Case 313-324, May 1968. (Revised January 1992.)
- May 2010
- Article
Loan Syndication and Credit Cycles
By: Victoria Ivashina and David Scharfstein
Cyclicality in the supply of business credit has been the focus of a considerable amount of research. This cyclicality can stem from shocks to borrowers' collateral, which affect firms' ability to raise capital if agency and information problems are significant (Ben S.... View Details
Keywords: Business Cycles; Capital; Credit; Banks and Banking; Financing and Loans; System Shocks; Financial Services Industry
Ivashina, Victoria, and David Scharfstein. "Loan Syndication and Credit Cycles." American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 100, no. 2 (May 2010): 57–61.
- 11 May 2017
- Working Paper Summaries
Coordination Frictions in Venture Capital Syndicates
- April 2012
- Article
Corporate Ownership Structure and Bank Loan Syndicate Structure
By: Chen Lin, Yue Ma, Paul Malatesta and Yuhai Xuan
Using a novel data set on corporate ownership and control, we show that the divergence between the control rights and cash-flow rights of a borrowing firm's largest ultimate owner has a significant impact on the concentration and composition of the firm's loan... View Details
Keywords: Ownership; Financing and Loans; Cash Flow; Borrowing and Debt; Accounting; Crisis Management; Relationships; Law; Contracts; Banking Industry
Lin, Chen, Yue Ma, Paul Malatesta, and Yuhai Xuan. "Corporate Ownership Structure and Bank Loan Syndicate Structure." Journal of Financial Economics 104, no. 1 (April 2012): 1–22. (Lead Article.)
- February 2016
- Article
After The Break-Up: The Relational and Reputational Consequences of Withdrawals from Venture Capital Syndicates
By: Pavel Zhelyazkov and Ranjay Gulati
Traditional research has long treated reputation as an egocentric attribute, typically described as an intangible asset directly shaped by the focal actor's track record. We argue, however, that reputation is dyadic: that an actor can have different reputations with... View Details
Zhelyazkov, Pavel, and Ranjay Gulati. "After The Break-Up: The Relational and Reputational Consequences of Withdrawals from Venture Capital Syndicates." Academy of Management Journal 59, no. 1 (February 2016): 277–301.
- September 1984
- Background Note
Note on Real Estate Syndication
Keywords: Real Estate Industry
Poorvu, William J. "Note on Real Estate Syndication." Harvard Business School Background Note 385-152, September 1984.
- Article
The Syndication of Venture Capital Investments
By: Josh Lerner
Lerner, Josh. "The Syndication of Venture Capital Investments." Special Issue on Venture Capital. Financial Management 23, no. 3 (Fall 1994): 16–27. (Reprinted in Venture Capital, edited by Michael Wright and Ken Robbie. Aldershot: International Library of Management/Dartmouth Publishing, 1997.)
- March 2001 (Revised April 2003)
- Case
Chase's Strategy for Syndicating the Hong Kong Disneyland Loan (A)
By: Benjamin C. Esty and Michael Kane
In late 1999, the Walt Disney Co. and the Hong Kong government agreed to develop Hong Kong Disneyland, a HK$28 (U.S.$3.6) billion theme park and resort complex planned to open in late 2005. As part of the total financing package, the sponsors decided to raise HK$3.3... View Details
Keywords: Working Capital; Project Finance; Relationships; Financing and Loans; Financial Strategy; Tourism Industry; Hong Kong
Esty, Benjamin C., and Michael Kane. "Chase's Strategy for Syndicating the Hong Kong Disneyland Loan (A)." Harvard Business School Case 201-072, March 2001. (Revised April 2003.)
- Aug 2012
- Conference Presentation
When Does the Glue of Social Ties Dissolve: Syndication Ties and Performance Clues in Withdrawals from Venture Capital Syndicates
By: Pavel Ivanov Zhelyazkov
- March 2001 (Revised March 2003)
- Case
Chase's Strategy for Syndicating the Hong Kong Disneyland Loan (B)
By: Benjamin C. Esty and Michael Kane
Supplements the (A) case. View Details
Keywords: Working Capital; Project Finance; Relationships; Financing and Loans; Financial Strategy; Tourism Industry; Hong Kong
Esty, Benjamin C., and Michael Kane. "Chase's Strategy for Syndicating the Hong Kong Disneyland Loan (B)." Harvard Business School Case 201-086, March 2001. (Revised March 2003.)
- Article
Syndication Networks and the Spatial Distribution of Venture Capital Investments
By: Olav Sorenson and Toby E. Stuart
Sorenson, Olav, and Toby E. Stuart. "Syndication Networks and the Spatial Distribution of Venture Capital Investments." American Journal of Sociology 106, no. 5 (March 2001): 1546–1586.
- October 2019
- Article
Does Political Uncertainty Increase External Financing Costs? Measuring the Electoral Premium in Syndicated Lending
By: Olivia S. Kim
This article investigates the impact of political uncertainty on contractual lending terms using a large sample of syndicated loans and a within-firm estimation approach to achieve identification. Firms pay 7 basis points (bps) more on loans originated when their... View Details
Keywords: Risk and Uncertainty; Political Elections; Financing and Loans; Developing Countries and Economies
Kim, Olivia S. "Does Political Uncertainty Increase External Financing Costs? Measuring the Electoral Premium in Syndicated Lending." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 54, no. 5 (October 2019): 2141–2178.
- 9 Aug 2013 - 13 Aug 2013
- Conference Presentation
Crime and Punishment: The Reputational Consequences of Withdrawals from VC syndicates
By: Pavel Ivanov Zhelyazkov and Ranjay Gulati
- June 2008
- Article
Bringing the Context Back In: Settings and the Search for Syndicate Partners in Venture Capital Investment Networks
Most existing network-based theories of relationship formation, whether based on homophily or structural constraint, imply that actors form highly cohesive, homogenous clusters. Yet real networks also include many "bridging" ties—isolated links between parties that... View Details
Keywords: Venture Capital; Networks; Theory; Partners and Partnerships; Investment; Risk and Uncertainty; Business Growth and Maturation; Size; Geographic Location
Sorenson, Olav, and Toby E. Stuart. "Bringing the Context Back In: Settings and the Search for Syndicate Partners in Venture Capital Investment Networks." Administrative Science Quarterly 53, no. 2 (June 2008).
- 2020
- Working Paper
The Myth of the Lead Arranger’s Share
By: Kristian Blickle, Quirin Fleckenstein, Sebastian Hillenbrand and Anthony Saunders
We make use of Shared National Credit Program (SNC) data to examine syndicated loans in which the lead arranger retains no stake. We find that the lead arranger sells its entire loan share for 27 percent of term loans and 48 percent of Term B loans, typically shortly... View Details
Blickle, Kristian, Quirin Fleckenstein, Sebastian Hillenbrand, and Anthony Saunders. "The Myth of the Lead Arranger’s Share." Working Paper, May 2020.