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- 2015
- Chapter
Is Experimental Economics Living Up to Its Promise?
By: Alvin E. Roth
The question that is the title of this essay already suggests that experimental economics has at least reached a sufficient state of maturity that we can try to take stock of its progress and consider how that progress matches the anticipations we may have had for the... View Details
- 2014
- Working Paper
College Admissions as Non-Price Competition: The Case of South Korea
By: Christopher Avery, Alvin E. Roth and Soohyung Lee
This paper examines non-price competition among colleges to attract highly qualified students, exploiting the South Korean setting where the national government sets rules governing applications. We identify some basic facts about the behavior of colleges before and... View Details
- Article
Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation
By: Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and M. Utku Ünver
Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms... View Details
- August 2012
- Article
Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate
By: Judd B. Kessler and Alvin E. Roth
Organ donations from deceased donors (cadavers) provide the majority of transplanted organs in the United States, and one deceased donor can save numerous lives by providing multiple organs. Nevertheless, most Americans are not registered organ donors despite the... View Details
- 2012
- Working Paper
The Need for (long) Chains in Kidney Exchange
By: Itai Ashlagi, David Gamarnik, Michael A. Rees and Alvin E. Roth
It has been previously shown that for sufficiently large pools of patient-donor pairs, (almost) efficient kidney exchange can be achieved by using at most 3-way cycles, i.e., by using cycles among no more than 3 patient-donor pairs. However, as kidney exchange has... View Details
- July 2011
- Article
Kidney Paired Donation
By: C. Bradley Wallis, Kannan P. Samy, Alvin E. Roth and Michael A. Rees
Kidney paired donation (KPD) was first suggested in 1986, but it was not until 2000 when the first paired donation transplant was performed in the U.S. In the past decade, KPD has become the fastest growing source of transplantable kidneys, overcoming the barrier faced... View Details
- May 2011
- Article
Nonsimultaneous Chains and Dominos in Kidney Paired Donation—Revisited
By: Itai Ashlagi, Duncan S. Gilchrist, Alvin E. Roth and Michael A. Rees
Since 2008 kidney exchange in America has grown in part from the incorporation of non-directed donors in transplant chains rather than simple exchanges. It is controversial whether these chains should be performed simultaneously ("domino paired donation," DPD) or... View Details
- 2010
- Working Paper
Marketplace Institutions Related to the Timing of Transactions
By: Alvin E. Roth
This paper describes the unraveling of transaction dates in several markets, including the labor markets for new lawyers hired by large law firms and for gastroenterology fellows, and the market for post-season college football bowls. Together these will illustrate... View Details
- Article
The Job Market for New Economists: A Market Design Perspective
By: Peter A. Coles, John Cawley, Phillip B. Levine, Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and John J. Siegfried
This paper, written by the members of the American Economic Association (AEA) Ad Hoc Committee on the Job Market, provides an overview of the market for new Ph.D. economists. It describes the role of the AEA in the market and focuses in particular on two mechanisms... View Details
- 2010
- Working Paper
The Job Market for New Economists: A Market Design Perspective
By: Peter A. Coles, John Cawley, Phillip B. Levine, Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and John J. Siegfried
This paper provides an overview of the market for new Ph.D. economists. It describes the role of the American Economic Association (AEA) in the market and focuses in particular on two mechanisms adopted in recent years at the suggestion of our committee. First, job... View Details
- Article
Kidneys for Sale: Who Disapproves, and Why?
By: Stephen Leider and Alvin E. Roth
The shortage of transplant kidneys has spurred debate about legalizing monetary payments to donors to increase the number of available kidneys. However, buying and selling organs faces widespread disapproval. We survey a representative sample of Americans to assess... View Details
- 2010
- Working Paper
Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation
By: Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and M. Utku Unver
Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms... View Details
- 2010
- Chapter
Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice
By: Alvin E. Roth
The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching mechanisms, and indirectly, by raising new theoretical questions. Deferred acceptance algorithms... View Details
- 2009
- Chapter
The Effects of a Central Clearinghouse on Job Placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices
By: Muriel Niederle and Alvin E. Roth
New gastroenterologists participated in a labor market clearinghouse (a "match") from 1986 through the late 1990s, after which the match was abandoned. This provides an opportunity to study the effects of a match by observing the differences in the outcomes and... View Details
- August 2009
- Article
Market Culture: How Rules Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market Performance
By: Muriel Niederle and Alvin E. Roth
- 2009
- Working Paper
Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation
By: Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and M. Utku Unver
Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms... View Details
- August 2008
- Article
The Gastroenterology Fellowship Match: The First Two Years
By: Muriel Niederle, Deborah D. Proctor and Alvin E. Roth
- 2008
- Working Paper
Unraveling Yields Inefficient Matchings: Evidence from Post-season College Football Bowls
By: Guillaume R. Frechette, Alvin E. Roth and M. Utku Unver
Many markets have "unraveled" and experienced inefficient, early, dispersed transactions, and subsequently developed institutions to delay transaction timing. However, it has previously proved difficult to measure and identify the resulting efficiency gains. Prior to... View Details
- June 2008
- Article
Current State of Fellowship Hiring: Is a Universal Match Necessary? Is It Possible?
By: Christopher D. Harner, Anil S. Ranawat, Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth, Peter J. Stern, Shepard R. Hurwitz, William Levine, G. Paul DeRosa and Serena S. Hu
Currently, approximately ninety percent of the six hundred twenty graduating orthopaedic residents are planning on entering a post-graduate fellowship. Since January of 2005, two of the largest fellowship match programs, Sports Medicine and Spine Surgery, were... View Details
- March 2008
- Article
Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions
By: Alvin E. Roth
The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching mechanisms, and, indirectly, by raising new theoretical questions. Deferred acceptance... View Details
Keywords: History; Market Design; Labor; System; Practice; Performance; Theory; Boston; New York (city, NY)