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- Faculty Publications (34)
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- 2021
- Working Paper
Deep Learning for Two-Sided Matching
By: Sai Srivatsa Ravindranatha, Zhe Feng, Shira Li, Jonathan Ma, Scott Duke Kominers and David Parkes
We initiate the use of a multi-layer neural network to model two-sided matching and to explore the design space between strategy-proofness and stability. It is well known that both properties cannot be achieved simultaneously but the efficient frontier in this design... View Details
Keywords: Strategy-proofness; Deep Learning; Two-Sided Platforms; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
Srivatsa Ravindranatha, Sai, Zhe Feng, Shira Li, Jonathan Ma, Scott Duke Kominers, and David Parkes. "Deep Learning for Two-Sided Matching." Working Paper, July 2021.
- 2008
- Working Paper
Unravelling in Two-Sided Matching Markets and Similarity of Preferences
By: Hanna Halaburda
This paper investigates the causes and welfare consequences of unravelling in two-sided matching markets. It shows that similarity of preferences is an important factor driving unravelling. In particular, it shows that under the ex-post stable mechanism (the mechanism... View Details
Halaburda, Hanna. "Unravelling in Two-Sided Matching Markets and Similarity of Preferences." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-068, November 2008.
- Article
Unravelling in Two-Sided Matching Markets and Similarity of Preferences
This paper investigates the causes and welfare consequences of unravelling in two-sided matching markets. It shows that similarity of preferences is an important factor driving unravelling. In particular, it shows that under the ex-post stable mechanism (the mechanism... View Details
Halaburda, Hanna. "Unravelling in Two-Sided Matching Markets and Similarity of Preferences." Games and Economic Behavior 69, no. 2 (July 2010): 365–393.
- 04 Feb 2009
- Working Paper Summaries
Unravelling in Two-Sided Matching Markets and Similarity of Preferences
Keywords: by Hanna Halaburda
- November 2020
- Article
Taxation in Matching Markets
By: Arnaud Dupuy, Alfred Galichon, Sonia Jaffe and Scott Duke Kominers
We analyze the effects of taxation in two-sided matching markets, i.e., markets in which all agents have heterogeneous preferences over potential partners. In matching markets, taxes can generate inefficiency on the allocative margin by changing who is matched to whom,... View Details
Dupuy, Arnaud, Alfred Galichon, Sonia Jaffe, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Taxation in Matching Markets." International Economic Review 61, no. 4 (November 2020): 1591–1634.
- January 1991
- Article
Sorority Rush as a Two-Sided Matching Mechanism
By: S. Mongell and A. E. Roth
Keywords: Groups and Teams
Mongell, S., and A. E. Roth. "Sorority Rush as a Two-Sided Matching Mechanism." American Economic Review 81, no. 3 (January 1991): 441–464.
- November 1990
- Journal Article
Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
By: A. E. Roth and J. H. Vande Vate
Roth, A. E., and J. H. Vande Vate. "Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching." Econometrica 58, no. 6 (November 1990): 1475–1480.
- June 1989
- Article
Two-Sided Matching with Incomplete Information about Others' Preferences
By: A. E. Roth
Roth, A. E. "Two-Sided Matching with Incomplete Information about Others' Preferences." Games and Economic Behavior 1, no. 2 (June 1989): 191–209.
- February 1985
- Article
Common and Conflicting Interests in Two-Sided Matching Markets
By: A. E. Roth
Roth, A. E. "Common and Conflicting Interests in Two-Sided Matching Markets." European Economic Review 27, no. 1 (February 1985): 75–96.
- March 1991
- Article
Incentives in Two-Sided Matching with Random Stable Mechanisms
By: A. E. Roth and J. H. Vande Vate
Keywords: Motivation and Incentives
Roth, A. E., and J. H. Vande Vate. "Incentives in Two-Sided Matching with Random Stable Mechanisms." Economic Theory 1, no. 1 (March 1991): 31–44.
- August 1988
- Article
Interior Points in the Core of Two-Sided Matching Markets
By: A. E. Roth and M. Sotomayor
Keywords: Markets
Roth, A. E., and M. Sotomayor. "Interior Points in the Core of Two-Sided Matching Markets." Journal of Economic Theory 45 (August 1988): 85–101.
- Research Summary
Interviewing and Dating in Two-Sided Matching Markets: Coordination and Communication (joint with M. Schwarz)
We introduce the interview assignment problem, which generalizes the one-to-one matching model of Gale Shapley (1962) by including a stage of costly information acquisition. Agents do not know their preferences over potential partners unless they choose to conduct... View Details
- June 2016 (Revised March 2017)
- Technical Note
Disintermediation in Two-Sided Marketplaces
By: Benjamin Edelman and Philip Hu
Two-sided marketplaces often risk disintermediation: users may rely on the marketplace to find each other but then perform related future transactions—or even the current transaction—without the platform’s involvement and without paying any fees the platform may... View Details
Keywords: Disintermediation; Strategic Behavior; Circumvention; Undercutting; Uber; Airbnb; Handy; Upwork; Etsy; eBay; Monster.com; Google; Competitive Strategy; Multi-Sided Platforms; Marketplace Matching; Transportation Industry; Accommodations Industry; Service Industry; Advertising Industry
Edelman, Benjamin, and Philip Hu. "Disintermediation in Two-Sided Marketplaces." Harvard Business School Technical Note 917-004, June 2016. (Revised March 2017.) (request a courtesy copy.)
- July 2021
- Article
Outsourcing Tasks Online: Matching Supply and Demand on Peer-to-Peer Internet Platforms
By: Zoë Cullen and Chiara Farronato
We study the growth of online peer-to-peer markets. Using data from TaskRabbit, an expanding marketplace for domestic tasks at the time of our study, we show that growth varies considerably across cities. To disentangle the potential drivers of growth, we look... View Details
Keywords: Two-sided Market; Two-sided Platforms; Peer-to-peer Markets; Platform Strategy; Sharing Economy; Platform Growth; Internet and the Web; Digital Platforms; Strategy; Market Design; Network Effects
Cullen, Zoë, and Chiara Farronato. "Outsourcing Tasks Online: Matching Supply and Demand on Peer-to-Peer Internet Platforms." Management Science 67, no. 7 (July 2021): 3985–4003.
- December 2019
- Article
Costly Concessions: An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility
By: Alfred Galichon, Scott Duke Kominers and Simon Weber
We introduce an empirical framework for models of matching with imperfectly transferable utility and unobserved heterogeneity in tastes. Our framework allows us to characterize matching equilibrium in a flexible way that includes as special cases the classic fully- and... View Details
Keywords: Sorting; Matching; Marriage Market; Intrahousehold Allocation; Imperfectly Transferable Utility; Marketplace Matching; Mathematical Methods
Galichon, Alfred, Scott Duke Kominers, and Simon Weber. "Costly Concessions: An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility." Journal of Political Economy 127, no. 6 (December 2019): 2875–2925.
- March 1986
- Article
On the Allocation of Residents to Rural Hospitals: A General Property of Two-Sided Matching Markets
By: A. E. Roth
Roth, A. E. "On the Allocation of Residents to Rural Hospitals: A General Property of Two-Sided Matching Markets." Econometrica 54, no. 2 (March 1986): 425–427.
- Article
Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation
By: Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and M. Utku Ünver
Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms... View Details
Niederle, Muriel, Alvin E. Roth, and M. Utku Ünver. "Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation." Games 4, no. 2 (June 2013): 243–282. (Special Issue on Games and Matching Markets.)
- Article
Lone Wolves in Infinite, Discrete Matching Markets
By: Ravi Jagadeesan
In finite two-sided matching markets, the Lone Wolf Theorem guarantees that the same set of agents remains unmatched in all stable outcomes. I show by example that this assertion is not true in infinite, discrete markets. However, despite the fact that the Lone Wolf... View Details
Jagadeesan, Ravi. "Lone Wolves in Infinite, Discrete Matching Markets." Games and Economic Behavior 108 (March 2018): 275–286.
- 2008
- Working Paper
Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples
By: Claus-Jochen Haake and Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus
We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples... View Details
Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus. "Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-017, August 2008.