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- July 2014 (Revised November 2014)
- Module Note
Responsibilities to Society: The Capitalist's Contract
By: Karthik Ramanna
Societies face many pressing challenges with serious implications for business leaders. These include pollution and climate change, poverty and income inequality, obesity and public health, and corruption and regulatory capture. This note presents a way of analyzing... View Details
Ramanna, Karthik. "Responsibilities to Society: The Capitalist's Contract." Harvard Business School Module Note 115-012, July 2014. (Revised November 2014.)
- June 2014
- Article
The Capitalist's Dilemma
By: Clayton M. Christensen and Derek C. M. van Bever
Sixty months after the 2008 recession ended, the economy was still sputtering, producing disappointing growth and job numbers. Corporations seemed stuck: Despite low interest rates, they were sitting on massive piles of cash and failing to invest in new initiatives. In... View Details
Keywords: Capital Investments; Creating Markets; Evaluating Business Investments; Innovation; Emerging Markets; Investment; Economic Growth; Capital; Innovation and Invention
Christensen, Clayton M., and Derek C. M. van Bever. "The Capitalist's Dilemma." Harvard Business Review 92, no. 6 (June 2014): 60–68.
- August 2022
- Article
Contract Duration and the Costs of Market Transactions
By: Alexander MacKay
The optimal duration of a supply contract balances the costs of reselecting a supplier against the costs of being matched to an inefficient supplier when the contract lasts too long. I develop a structural model of contract duration that captures this tradeoff and... View Details
Keywords: Supply Contracts; Intermediate Goods; Switching Costs; Vertical Relationships; Transaction Costs; Contract Duration; Identification; Supply Chain; Cost; Contracts; Auctions; Mathematical Methods
MacKay, Alexander. "Contract Duration and the Costs of Market Transactions." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 14, no. 3 (August 2022): 164–212.
- 2018
- Working Paper
Bundling Incentives in (Many-to-Many) Matching with Contracts
By: Jonathan Ma and Scott Duke Kominers
In many-to-many matching with contracts, the way in which contracts are specified can affect the set of stable equilibrium outcomes. Consequently, agents may be incentivized to modify the set of contracts upfront. We consider one simple way in which agents may do so:... View Details
Keywords: Matching With Contracts; Contract Design; Bundling-proofness; Substitutability; Mathematical Methods
Ma, Jonathan, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Bundling Incentives in (Many-to-Many) Matching with Contracts." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 19-011, August 2018.
- 2020
- Working Paper
Contract Duration and the Costs of Market Transactions
By: Alexander MacKay
The optimal duration of a supply contract balances the costs of reselecting a supplier against the costs of being matched to an inefficient supplier when the contract lasts too long. I develop a structural model of contract duration that captures this tradeoff and... View Details
Keywords: Vertical Relationships; Transaction Costs; Contract Duration; Identification; Supply Chain; Cost; Contracts; Auctions; Mathematical Methods
MacKay, Alexander. "Contract Duration and the Costs of Market Transactions." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 18-058, December 2017. (Revised May 2020. Direct download.)
- August, 2024
- Article
Absenteeism, Productivity, and Relational Contracts Inside the Firm
By: Achyuta Adhvaryu, Jean-François Gauthier, Anant Nyshadham and Jorge Tamayo
We study relational contracts among managers using a unique dataset that tracks transfers of workers across teams in Indian ready-made garment factories. We focus on how relational contracts help managers cope with worker absenteeism shocks, which are frequent, often... View Details
Keywords: Implicit Contracts; Productivity; Misallocation; Absenteeism; Supervisors; Readymade Garments; Performance Productivity; Employees; Relationships; Fashion Industry; India
Adhvaryu, Achyuta, Jean-François Gauthier, Anant Nyshadham, and Jorge Tamayo. "Absenteeism, Productivity, and Relational Contracts Inside the Firm." Journal of the European Economic Association 22, no. 4 (August, 2024): 1628–1677.
- Working Paper
Covenant-Light Contracts and Creditor Coordination
By: Bo Becker and Victoria Ivashina
In 2015, 70% of newly issued leveraged loans had weaker enforcement features, called covenant-light or "cov-lite"; this is nearly a three-time increase in cov-lite issuance compared to a previous peak in 2007. We evaluate whether this development can be attributed to... View Details
Keywords: Credit Cycles; Loan Contracts; Debt Covenants; Contracts; Financing and Loans; Credit; Borrowing and Debt
Becker, Bo, and Victoria Ivashina. "Covenant-Light Contracts and Creditor Coordination." Swedish House of Finance Research Paper, No. 16-09, March 2016.
- Article
Trust and Collaboration in the Aftermath of Conflict: The Effects of Contract Structure
By: Deepak Malhotra and Fabrice Lumineau
Leveraging a longitudinal dataset concerning 102 inter-firm disputes, we evaluate the effects of contract structure on trust and on the likelihood of continued collaboration. We theoretically refine and empirically extend prior research by (a) distinguishing between... View Details
Malhotra, Deepak, and Fabrice Lumineau. "Trust and Collaboration in the Aftermath of Conflict: The Effects of Contract Structure." Academy of Management Journal 54, no. 5 (October 2011): 981–998.
- June 2019
- Article
Fraud Allegations and Government Contracting
By: Jonas Heese and Gerardo Pérez Cavazos
This paper examines whether fraud allegations affect firms’ contracting with the government. Using a dataset of whistleblower allegations brought under the False Claims Act against firms accused of defrauding the government, we find that federal agencies do not reduce... View Details
Keywords: Whistleblower; Fraud Allegations; False Claims Act; Government Contracting; Risk Allocation; Government and Politics; Contracts; Crime and Corruption; Risk and Uncertainty; Business and Government Relations
Heese, Jonas, and Gerardo Pérez Cavazos. "Fraud Allegations and Government Contracting." Journal of Accounting Research 57, no. 3 (June 2019): 675–719.
- January 2017
- Article
Contract Design and Stability in Many-to-Many Matching
By: John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers
We develop a model of many-to-many matching with contracts that subsumes as special cases many-to-many matching markets and buyer/seller markets with heterogeneous and indivisible goods. In our setting, substitutable preferences are sufficient to guarantee the... View Details
Keywords: Many-to-Many Matching; Stability; Substitutes; Contract Design; Contracts; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
Hatfield, John William, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Contract Design and Stability in Many-to-Many Matching." Games and Economic Behavior 101 (January 2017): 78–97.
- Article
On the Correspondence of Contracts to Salaries in (Many-to-Many) Matching
In this note, I extend the work of Echenique (2012) to show that a model of many-to-many matching with contracts may be embedded into a model of many-to-many matching with wage bargaining whenever (1) all agentsʼ preferences are substitutable and (2) the matching with... View Details
Keywords: Many-to-Many Matching; Stability; Substitutes; Contract Design; Unitarity; Market Design; Contracts; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability; Economics
Kominers, Scott Duke. "On the Correspondence of Contracts to Salaries in (Many-to-Many) Matching." Games and Economic Behavior 75, no. 2 (July 2012): 984–989.
- Spring 2023
- Article
Incentive Contract Design and Employee-Initiated Innovation: Evidence from the Field
By: Wei Cai, Susanna Gallani and Jee-Eun Shin
This study examines how the design of incentive contracts for tasks defined as workers’ official responsibilities (i.e., standard tasks) influences workers’ propensity to engage in employee-initiated innovation (EII). EII corresponds to innovation activities that are... View Details
Keywords: Employee-initiated Innovation; Contract Design; Rank-and-file; Extra-role Behaviors; Compensation and Benefits; Motivation and Incentives; Innovation and Management
Cai, Wei, Susanna Gallani, and Jee-Eun Shin. "Incentive Contract Design and Employee-Initiated Innovation: Evidence from the Field." Contemporary Accounting Research 40, no. 1 (Spring 2023): 292–323.
- October 2015
- Article
Managing the Performance Tradeoffs from Partner Integration: Implications of Contract Choice in R&D Projects
By: Alan MacCormack and Anant Mishra
Formal contracts represent an important governance instrument with which firms exercise control of and compensate partners in R&D projects. The specific type of contract used, however, can vary significantly across projects. In some, firms govern partnering... View Details
Keywords: ＂＂Partner Integration; Contract Choice; R＆D Project Management; Relational Contracts; Partnering Performance; Research and Development; Projects; Partners and Partnerships; Performance; Contracts
MacCormack, Alan, and Anant Mishra. "Managing the Performance Tradeoffs from Partner Integration: Implications of Contract Choice in R&D Projects." Production and Operations Management 24, no. 10 (October 2015): 1552–1569.
- Article
Bilateral Contracts
By: Jerry R. Green and Seppo Honkapohja
A mathematical characterization of self-enforcing bilateral contracts is given. Contracts where both parties exercise some control over the quantity traded can sometimes be superior to contracts that rest control entirely with one side. Some qualitative characteristics... View Details
Green, Jerry R., and Seppo Honkapohja. "Bilateral Contracts." Journal of Mathematical Economics 11, no. 2 (1983): 171–187.
- Article
Wage-Employment Contracts
By: Jerry R. Green and Charles M. Kahn
This paper studies the efficient agreements about the dependence of workers' earnings on employment, when the employment level is controlled by firms. The firms' superior information about profitability conditions is responsible for this form of contract governance.... View Details
Green, Jerry R., and Charles M. Kahn. "Wage-Employment Contracts." Quarterly Journal of Economics 98, Suppl., no. 2 (1983): 173–188.
- Research Summary
Relational Contracts
George Baker is exploring (with Robert Gibbons of MIT and Kevin Murphy of the USC) how relational contracts--contracts secured by reputation and trust, rather than by legal enforcement--affect the performance and boundaries of firms. Such relational contracts are... View Details
- May 2009
- Article
When Contracts Destroy Trust
By: Deepak Malhotra
Contracts exist to foster trust, but they can actually do the opposite. Overly detailed contracts leave no room for spontaneous acts of kindness to create goodwill between parties; too-rigid contracts leave parties unable to respond to the unanticipated; and, strangely... View Details
Malhotra, Deepak. "When Contracts Destroy Trust." Harvard Business Review 87, no. 5 (May 2009): 25.
- March 2008 (Revised April 2010)
- Case
Ashdown Contracting
By: Joseph B. Lassiter III and Firas Alkhatib
Ashdown's "growth" plan called for Mustafa Khalaf to leave his job as Chief Operating Officer (COO) of Ashdown Contracting and to focus his attention on the growth of a separate business entity, Ashdown Pipeline, where Ashdown believed the greatest potential for the... View Details
Keywords: Entrepreneurship; Leadership; Growth and Development Strategy; Management Succession; Market Entry and Exit; Business Strategy
Lassiter, Joseph B., III, and Firas Alkhatib. "Ashdown Contracting." Harvard Business School Case 808-120, March 2008. (Revised April 2010.)
- Article
Renegotiation and the Form of Efficient Contracts
By: Jerry R. Green and J. J. Laffont
Two parties may agree to a mutually binding contract that will govern their behavior after an uncertain event becomes known. As there is no agent who can both observe this uncertain outcome and enforce the contract, contingent agreements are precluded. However, the... View Details
Green, Jerry R., and J. J. Laffont. "Renegotiation and the Form of Efficient Contracts." Annales d'économie et de statistique, nos. 25-26 (January–June 1992): 123–150.
- 2024
- Working Paper
Transitory and Permanent Cash Flow Shocks in Debt Contract Design
By: Le Ma, Anywhere Sikochi and Yajun Xiao
We examine how lenders design contracts to account for transitory and permanent cash flow shocks facing borrowers. We find that volatile transitory cash flow shocks are associated with fewer liquidity covenants, indicating financial flexibility that enables firms to... View Details
Keywords: Debt Covenants; Cash Flow Shocks; Debt Contracting; Likelihood Of Default; Cash Flow; System Shocks
Ma, Le, Anywhere Sikochi, and Yajun Xiao. "Transitory and Permanent Cash Flow Shocks in Debt Contract Design." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 22-026, October 2021. (Revised February 2024. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Conditional Accept.)