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  • All HBS Web  (973)
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    • Research  (651)
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Show Results For

  • All HBS Web  (973)
    • News  (197)
    • Research  (651)
    • Events  (7)
    • Multimedia  (5)
  • Faculty Publications  (309)
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  • Article

Preference Signaling in Matching Markets

Many labor markets share three stylized facts: employers cannot give full attention to all candidates, candidates are ready to provide information about their preferences for particular employers, and employers value and are prepared to act on this information. In this... View Details
Keywords: Signaling; Matching; Cheap Talk; Congestion; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Communication; Job Search
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Coles, Peter A., Alexey Kushnir, and Muriel Niederle. "Preference Signaling in Matching Markets." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 5, no. 2 (May 2013): 99–134.
  • 2021
  • Working Paper

Investment as the Opportunity Cost of Dividend Signaling

By: Zach Kaplan and Gerardo Pérez Cavazos
We provide evidence that firms with weak investment opportunities (those whose current earnings justify a greater valuation than firms with strong investment opportunities) signal their permanent earnings level through their dividends. In the cross-section, we show... View Details
Keywords: Dividend Signaling; Investment; Opportunities
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Kaplan, Zach, and Gerardo Pérez Cavazos. "Investment as the Opportunity Cost of Dividend Signaling." Working Paper, May 2021. (Forthcoming in The Accounting Review.)
  • May 2022
  • Article

Investment as the Opportunity Cost of Dividend Signaling

By: Zach Kaplan and Gerardo Pérez Cavazos
We provide evidence that firms with weak investment opportunities (those whose current earnings justify a greater valuation than firms with strong investment opportunities) signal their permanent earnings level through their dividends. In the cross-section, we show... View Details
Keywords: Dividends; Earnings; Investment Opportunities; Payout Policy; Signaling; Capital Structure; Business Earnings; Investment; Opportunities
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Kaplan, Zach, and Gerardo Pérez Cavazos. "Investment as the Opportunity Cost of Dividend Signaling." Accounting Review 97, no. 3 (May 2022): 279–308.
  • March 1993 (Revised April 1995)
  • Case

Signalling Costs

NutraSweet's worldwide patent-protected monopoly on aspartame, the low-calorie high-intensity sweetener, ended with the 1987 entry of the Holland Sweetener Co. (HSC) into the European market. Following the arrival of a challenger, NutraSweet acted to reduce sharply the... View Details
Keywords: Patents; Competition; Price; Market Entry and Exit; Food and Beverage Industry; United States; Europe
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Brandenburger, Adam M. "Signalling Costs." Harvard Business School Case 793-125, March 1993. (Revised April 1995.)
  • Article

Signaling When Nobody Is Watching: A Reputation Heuristics Account of Outrage and Punishment in One-shot Anonymous Interactions

By: Jillian J. Jordan and David G. Rand
Moralistic punishment can confer reputation benefits by signaling trustworthiness to observers. However, why do people punish even when nobody is watching? We argue that people often rely on the heuristic that reputation is typically at stake, such that reputation... View Details
Keywords: Signaling; Morality; Trustworthiness; Anger; Third-party Punishment; Moral Sensibility; Behavior; Trust; Reputation
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Jordan, Jillian J., and David G. Rand. "Signaling When Nobody Is Watching: A Reputation Heuristics Account of Outrage and Punishment in One-shot Anonymous Interactions." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 118, no. 1 (January 2020).
  • March 2017
  • Article

Why Do We Hate Hypocrites? Evidence for a Theory of False Signaling

By: Jillian J. Jordan, Roseanna Sommers, Paul Bloom and David G. Rand
Why do people judge hypocrites, who condemn immoral behaviors that they in fact engage in, so negatively? We propose that hypocrites are disliked because their condemnation sends a false signal about their personal conduct, deceptively suggesting that they behave... View Details
Keywords: Moral Psychology; Condemnation; Vignettes; Deception; Social Signaling; Open Data; Open Materials; Moral Sensibility; Behavior; Perception
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Jordan, Jillian J., Roseanna Sommers, Paul Bloom, and David G. Rand. "Why Do We Hate Hypocrites? Evidence for a Theory of False Signaling." Psychological Science 28, no. 3 (March 2017): 356–368.
  • March 1990 (Revised March 1993)
  • Case

Signalling Quality Through Advertising

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Brandenburger, Adam M., and Vijay Krishna. "Signalling Quality Through Advertising." Harvard Business School Case 190-147, March 1990. (Revised March 1993.)
  • August 2, 2016
  • Article

Uncalculating Cooperation Is Used to Signal Trustworthiness

By: Jillian J. Jordan, Moshe Hoffman, Martin A. Nowak and David G. Rand
Humans frequently cooperate without carefully weighing the costs and benefits. As a result, people may wind up cooperating when it is not worthwhile to do so. Why risk making costly mistakes? Here, we present experimental evidence that reputation concerns provide an... View Details
Keywords: Social Evaluation; Experimental Economics; Moral Psychology; Cooperation; Reputation; Decision Making
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Jordan, Jillian J., Moshe Hoffman, Martin A. Nowak, and David G. Rand. "Uncalculating Cooperation Is Used to Signal Trustworthiness." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113, no. 31 (August 2, 2016): 8658–8663.
  • Article

Handshaking Promotes Deal-Making by Signaling Cooperative Intent

By: Juliana Schroeder, Jane L. Risen, Francesca Gino and Michael I. Norton
We examine how a simple handshake—a gesture that often occurs at the outset of social interactions—can influence deal-making. Because handshakes are social rituals, they are imbued with meaning beyond their physical features. We propose that during mixed-motive... View Details
Keywords: Handshake; Cooperation; Affiliation; Competition; Negotiation; Nonverbal Communication; Negotiation Participants; Behavior; Communication Intention and Meaning; Negotiation Deal
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Schroeder, Juliana, Jane L. Risen, Francesca Gino, and Michael I. Norton. "Handshaking Promotes Deal-Making by Signaling Cooperative Intent." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 116, no. 5 (May 2019): 743–768.
  • 17 Aug 2012
  • Working Paper Summaries

Dividends as Reference Points: A Behavioral Signaling Approach

Keywords: by Malcolm Baker & Jeffrey Wurgler
  • September 2023 (Revised December 2023)
  • Case

TetraScience: Noise and Signal

By: Thomas R. Eisenmann and Tom Quinn
In 2019, TetraScience CEO “Spin” Wang needed advice. Five years earlier, he had cofounded a startup that saw early success with a hardware product designed to help laboratory scientists in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical spaces more easily collect data from... View Details
Keywords: Entrepreneurship; Business Growth and Maturation; Business Organization; Restructuring; Forecasting and Prediction; Digital Platforms; Analytics and Data Science; AI and Machine Learning; Organizational Structure; Network Effects; Competitive Strategy; Biotechnology Industry; Pharmaceutical Industry; United States; Boston
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Eisenmann, Thomas R., and Tom Quinn. "TetraScience: Noise and Signal." Harvard Business School Case 824-024, September 2023. (Revised December 2023.)
  • Article

Third-party Punishment as a Costly Signal of Trustworthiness

By: Jillian J. Jordan, Moshe Hoffman, Paul Bloom and David G. Rand
Third-party punishment (TPP), in which unaffected observers punish selfishness, promotes cooperation by deterring defection. But why should individuals choose to bear the costs of punishing? We present a game theoretic model of TPP as a costly signal of... View Details
Keywords: Third-party Punishment; Trustworthiness; Behavior; Trust; Game Theory
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Jordan, Jillian J., Moshe Hoffman, Paul Bloom, and David G. Rand. "Third-party Punishment as a Costly Signal of Trustworthiness." Nature 530, no. 7591 (2016): 473–476.
  • Article

A Collective Biological Processing Algorithm for EKG Signals

By: Mike Horia Teodorescu
We establish and explore an analogy between hunting by packs of agents and signal processing. We present a version of adaptive ‘Hunting Swarm’ algorithm (HSA), apply it to EKG signals, and investigate the influence of the model parameters on the filtering of stationary... View Details
Keywords: Artificial Intelligence; Technological Innovation; Health Care and Treatment
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Teodorescu, Mike Horia. "A Collective Biological Processing Algorithm for EKG Signals." Proceedings of the International Conference on Bio-inspired Systems and Signal Processing 4th (2011): 413–420. (IEEE BIOSIGNALS 2011.)
  • Article

Forgoing Earned Incentives to Signal Pure Motives

By: Erika L. Kirgios, Edward H. Chang, Emma E. Levine, Katherine L. Milkman and Judd B. Kessler
Policy makers, employers, and insurers often provide financial incentives to encourage citizens, employees, and customers to take actions that are good for them or for society (e.g., energy conservation, healthy living, safe driving). Although financial incentives are... View Details
Keywords: Incentives; Motivation Laundering; Self-signaling; Motivation and Incentives; Behavior; Perception
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Kirgios, Erika L., Edward H. Chang, Emma E. Levine, Katherine L. Milkman, and Judd B. Kessler. "Forgoing Earned Incentives to Signal Pure Motives." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 117, no. 29 (July 21, 2020): 16891–16897.
  • September 2009
  • Article

Targeted Advertising as a Signal

By: Bharat Anand and Ron Shachar
Keywords: Advertising
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Anand, Bharat, and Ron Shachar. "Targeted Advertising as a Signal." Quantitative Marketing and Economics 7, no. 3 (September 2009): 237–266. (Lead Article.)
  • Article

A Review of Swarm-Based 1D/2D Signal Processing

By: Mike Horia Teodorescu
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Teodorescu, Mike Horia. "A Review of Swarm-Based 1D/2D Signal Processing." Memoriile secţiilor ştiinţifice [Memoirs of the Scientific Sections of the Romanian Academy] Tome 35 (2012): 145–173.
  • March 2016
  • Article

Dividends as Reference Points: A Behavioral Signaling Approach

By: Malcolm Baker, Brock Mendel and Jeffrey Wurgler
We outline a dividend signaling model that features investors who are averse to dividend cuts. Managers with strong unobservable cash earnings separate by paying high dividends but retain enough to be likely not to fall short next period. The model is consistent with a... View Details
Keywords: Investment
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Baker, Malcolm, Brock Mendel, and Jeffrey Wurgler. "Dividends as Reference Points: A Behavioral Signaling Approach." Review of Financial Studies 29, no. 3 (March 2016): 697–738.
  • 2016
  • Working Paper

Signaling without Certification: The Critical Role of Civil Society Scrutiny

By: Susan A. Kayser, John W. Maxwell and Michael W. Toffel
In response to stakeholders' growing concerns, companies are joining voluntary environmental programs to signal their superior environmental management capabilities. In contrast to the literature's focus on certification programs that require a third-party audit, we... View Details
Keywords: United Nations; Labor Standards; Supplier Relationship; Procurement; Sustainability; Sustainability Management; Quality And Safety; Risk; Globalization; Globalized Markets and Industries; Governance; Working Conditions; Supply Chain Management; Supply Chain; Corporate Social Responsibility and Impact; Quality; Risk and Uncertainty; Safety; Reputation
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Kayser, Susan A., John W. Maxwell, and Michael W. Toffel. "Signaling without Certification: The Critical Role of Civil Society Scrutiny." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 15-009, August 2014. (Revised July 2016.)
  • Research Summary

Optimal Signaling Policy with Rational and Irrational Agents (with James Burns)

We examine situations in which a single informed agent signals a group of uniformed agents. The uniformed agents must then take an action based on this signal. The motivation for our work comes from real world examples such as terrorist alerts or job safety... View Details
  • 19 Jul 2011
  • Working Paper Summaries

Signaling to Partially Informed Investors in the Newsvendor Model

Keywords: by Vishal Gaur, Richard Lai, Ananth Raman & William Schmidt
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