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- 2010
- Working Paper
Overconfidence by Bayesian Rational Agents
This paper derives two mechanisms through which Bayesian-rational individuals with differing priors will tend to be relatively overconfident about their estimates and predictions, in the sense of overestimating the precision of these estimates. The intuition behind one... View Details
Van den Steen, Eric. "Overconfidence by Bayesian Rational Agents." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 11-049, November 2010.
- Program
Changing the Game
maximum results for your side Build advantage through better decision-making Recognize and overcome obstacles to rational decision-making Craft competitive and cooperative business strategies Predict the outcomes of strategic interactions... View Details
- 2011
- Working Paper
Better-reply Dynamics in Deferred Acceptance Games
In this paper we address the question of learning in a two-sided matching mechanism that utilizes the deferred acceptance algorithm. We consider a repeated matching game where at each period agents observe their match and have the opportunity to revise their strategy... View Details
Keywords: Learning; Marketplace Matching; Outcome or Result; Game Theory; Mathematical Methods; Strategy
Haeringer, Guillaume, and Hanna Halaburda. "Better-reply Dynamics in Deferred Acceptance Games." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 11-126, June 2011.
- 2020
- Working Paper
Reverse Information Sharing: Reducing Costs in Supply Chains with Yield Uncertainty
By: Pavithra Harsha, Ashish Jagmohan, Retsef Levi, Elisabeth Paulson and Georgia Perakis
Supply uncertainty in produce supply chains presents major challenges to retailers. Supply shortages create frequent disruptions in terms of promised delivery times, quantity and quality delivered. To alleviate these challenges, dual sourcing--a strategy in which... View Details
Keywords: Information Sharing; Yield Uncertainty; Ration Gaming; Blockchain; Supply Chain; Risk and Uncertainty
Harsha, Pavithra, Ashish Jagmohan, Retsef Levi, Elisabeth Paulson, and Georgia Perakis. "Reverse Information Sharing: Reducing Costs in Supply Chains with Yield Uncertainty." MIT Sloan Research Paper, No. 6172-20, October 2020.
- 2007
- Working Paper
Correlated Equilibrium and Nash Equilibrium as an Observer's Assessment of the Game
By: John Hillas, Elon Kohlberg and John W. Pratt
Noncooperative games are examined from the point of view of an outside observer who believes that the players are rational and that they know at least as much as the observer. The observer is assumed to be able to observe many instances of the play of the game; these... View Details
Hillas, John, Elon Kohlberg, and John W. Pratt. "Correlated Equilibrium and Nash Equilibrium as an Observer's Assessment of the Game." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 08-005, July 2007.
- 09 May 2011
- Research & Ideas
Moving From Bean Counter to Game Changer
complicated high-risk operations. In discussing the March earthquake/tsunami disaster in Japan (a "Black Swan" event, as risk managers call any surprise event that has a major impact and is rationalized by hindsight), Mikes sees a crucial... View Details
- Research Summary
Why Do Consumers Contribute to Connected Goods? A Dynamic Game of Competition and Cooperation in Social Networks
Social network platforms and media rely on the voluntary contributions of individual users to stay relevant. Consumers (users) contribute content such as photographs, videos, tweets etc.: these are available to any of their friends or peers, but not... View Details
- Research Summary
Epistemic Conditions for Iterated Admissibility (with H. Jerome Keisler)
Iterated weak dominance, also called iterated admissibility (IA), has long been known as a powerful but conceptually puzzling solution concept. We give an epistemic foundation for IA. That is, we give conditions on the rationality of the players in the game, on what... View Details
- 2011
- Article
A Choice Prediction Competition for Social Preferences in Simple Extensive Form Games: An Introduction
By: Eyal Ert, Ido Erev and Alvin E. Roth
Two independent, but related, choice prediction competitions are organized that focus on behavior in simple two-person extensive form games: one focuses on predicting the choices of the first mover and the other on predicting the choices of the second mover. The... View Details
Keywords: Forecasting and Prediction; Behavior; Decision Choices and Conditions; Competition; Motivation and Incentives; Game Theory; Fairness
Ert, Eyal, Ido Erev, and Alvin E. Roth. "A Choice Prediction Competition for Social Preferences in Simple Extensive Form Games: An Introduction." Special Issue on Predicting Behavior in Games. Games 2, no. 3 (September 2011): 257–276.
- January 1994 (Revised August 1998)
- Case
Hold or Fold?: The War of Attrition
Costly "wars of attrition" are common. Examples include: 1) the battle over the business of market-making in British government bonds that took place following the 1986 deregulation of the London financial markets, and 2) the battle that took place in the late 1980s... View Details
Keywords: Competition
Brandenburger, Adam M. "Hold or Fold?: The War of Attrition." Harvard Business School Case 794-092, January 1994. (Revised August 1998.)
- 28 Jun 2007
- Working Paper Summaries
Alignment in Cross-Functional and Cross-Firm Supply Chain Planning
Keywords: by Santiago Kraiselburd & Noel Watson
- 2015
- Chapter
Negotiations: Statistical Aspects
'Negotiation analysis' seeks to develop prescriptive theory and useful advice for negotiators and third parties. It generally emphasizes the parties' underlying interests, alternatives to negotiated agreement, approaches to productively manage the inherent tension... View Details
Sebenius, James K. "Negotiations: Statistical Aspects." In International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences. 2nd ed. Edited by James D. Wright, 430–436. London: Elsevier, 2015.
- 2016
- Other Teaching and Training Material
Organizational Behavior Reading: Decision Making
By: Francesca Gino, Max Bazerman and Katherine Shonk
This Reading argues that decision making is systematically flawed and introduces methods to improve decision-making effectiveness. The Essential Reading section covers the rational decision-making model and three important ideas that challenge it: Herbert Simon's... View Details
Gino, Francesca, Max Bazerman, and Katherine Shonk. "Organizational Behavior Reading: Decision Making." Core Curriculum Readings Series. Boston, MA: Harvard Business Publishing 8383, 2016. Electronic.
Jerry R. Green
Jerry R. Green
David A. Wells Professor of Political Economy
John Leverett Professor in the University
Harvard University
Jerry Green is the John Leverett Professor in the University and the David A. Wells... View Details
- October 2020
- Article
Collusion in Markets with Syndication
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers, Richard Lowery and Jordan M. Barry
Markets for IPOs and debt issuances are syndicated, in the sense that a bidder who wins a contract may invite losing bidders to join a syndicate that together fulfills the contract. We show that in markets with syndication, standard intuitions from industrial... View Details
Keywords: Collusion; Antitrust; IPO Underwriting; Syndication; ＂Repeated Games＂; Markets; Game Theory
Hatfield, John William, Scott Duke Kominers, Richard Lowery, and Jordan M. Barry. "Collusion in Markets with Syndication." Journal of Political Economy 128, no. 10 (October 2020).
- 2024
- Dictionary Entry
Jerry R. Green (1946-)
By: Eddie Dekel, John Geanakoplos and Scott Duke Kominers
Jerry Green has a deep and long-standing connection to Harvard University, and in particular with its Economics Department. This paper begins by reviewing his intellectual background, and then turns to exploring how he has influenced scholars through his wide-ranging... View Details
- September 2011 (Revised July 2012)
- Case
Building Watson: Not So Elementary, My Dear!
By: Willy Shih
This case is set inside IBM Research's efforts to build a computer that can successfully take on human challengers playing the game show Jeopardy! It opens with the machine named Watson offering the incorrect answer "Toronto" to a seemingly simple question during the... View Details
Keywords: Technological Innovation; Standards; Product Development; Organizational Change and Adaptation; Mathematical Methods; Research and Development; Information Technology
Shih, Willy. "Building Watson: Not So Elementary, My Dear!" Harvard Business School Case 612-017, September 2011. (Revised July 2012.)
- 19 Jun 2007
- First Look
First Look: June 19, 2007
Human beings are critical to the functioning of the vast majority of operating systems, influencing both the way these systems work and how they perform. Yet most formal analytical models of operations assume that the people who participate in operating systems are... View Details
Keywords: Martha Lagace
- Article
Heuristics Guide the Implementation of Social Preferences in One-Shot Prisoner's Dilemma Experiments
By: Jillian J. Jordan, Valerio Capraro and David G. Rand
Cooperation in one-shot anonymous interactions is a widely documented aspect of human behavior. Here we shed light on the motivations behind this behavior by experimentally exploring cooperation in a one-shot continuous-strategy Prisoner’s Dilemma (i.e. one-shot... View Details
Jordan, Jillian J., Valerio Capraro, and David G. Rand. "Heuristics Guide the Implementation of Social Preferences in One-Shot Prisoner's Dilemma Experiments." Art. 6790. Scientific Reports 4 (2014).
- 28 May 2008
- First Look
First Look: May 28, 2008
are large. However, the proposed exchange ration values Mellon at a discount to its last closing price, even though it is the smaller and non-surviving bank. Kelly must consider the various dimensions of the deal—specifically the value of... View Details
Keywords: Martha Lagace