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- All HBS Web
(257)
- News (40)
- Research (193)
- Events (2)
- Multimedia (3)
- Faculty Publications (82)
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- December 2019
- Article
When Do We Punish People Who Don't?
By: Justin W. Martin, Jillian J. Jordan, David G. Rand and Fiery Cushman
People often punish norm violations. In what cases is such punishment viewed as normative—a behavior that we “should”or even“must”engage in? We approach this question by asking when people who fail to punish a norm violator are, themselves, punished. (For instance, a... View Details
Martin, Justin W., Jillian J. Jordan, David G. Rand, and Fiery Cushman. "When Do We Punish People Who Don't?" Cognition 193 (December 2019).
- Article
Third-party Punishment as a Costly Signal of Trustworthiness
By: Jillian J. Jordan, Moshe Hoffman, Paul Bloom and David G. Rand
Third-party punishment (TPP), in which unaffected observers punish selfishness, promotes cooperation by deterring defection. But why should individuals choose to bear the costs of punishing? We present a game theoretic model of TPP as a costly signal of... View Details
Jordan, Jillian J., Moshe Hoffman, Paul Bloom, and David G. Rand. "Third-party Punishment as a Costly Signal of Trustworthiness." Nature 530, no. 7591 (2016): 473–476.
- January 2015
- Article
Costly Third-party Punishment in Young Children
By: Katherine McAuliffe, Jillian J. Jordan and Felix Warneken
Human adults engage in costly third-party punishment of unfair behavior, but the developmental origins of this behavior are unknown. Here we investigate costly third-partypunishment in 5- and 6-year-old children. Participants were asked to accept (enact) or reject... View Details
Keywords: Third-party Punishment; Inequity Aversion; Social Cognition; Cooperation; Fairness; Behavior
McAuliffe, Katherine, Jillian J. Jordan, and Felix Warneken. "Costly Third-party Punishment in Young Children." Cognition 134 (January 2015): 1–10.
- July 11, 2023
- Article
How Reputation Does (and Does Not) Drive People to Punish Without Looking
By: Jillian J. Jordan and Nour S. Kteily
Punishing wrongdoers can confer reputational benefits, and people sometimes punish without careful consideration. But are these observations related? Does reputation drive people to people to “punish without looking”? And if so, is this because unquestioning... View Details
Keywords: Opposing Perspectives; Outrage Culture; Signaling; Ideology; Moralistic Punishment; Perspective; Behavior; Reputation; Decision Making
Jordan, Jillian J., and Nour S. Kteily. "How Reputation Does (and Does Not) Drive People to Punish Without Looking." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 120, no. 28 (July 11, 2023).
- Article
Signaling When Nobody Is Watching: A Reputation Heuristics Account of Outrage and Punishment in One-shot Anonymous Interactions
By: Jillian J. Jordan and David G. Rand
Moralistic punishment can confer reputation benefits by signaling trustworthiness to observers. However, why do people punish even when nobody is watching? We argue that people often rely on the heuristic that reputation is typically at stake, such that reputation... View Details
Keywords: Signaling; Morality; Trustworthiness; Anger; Third-party Punishment; Moral Sensibility; Behavior; Trust; Reputation
Jordan, Jillian J., and David G. Rand. "Signaling When Nobody Is Watching: A Reputation Heuristics Account of Outrage and Punishment in One-shot Anonymous Interactions." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 118, no. 1 (January 2020).
- December 2016
- Article
The Effects of Endowment Size and Strategy Method on Third Party Punishment
By: Jillian J. Jordan, Katherine McAuliffe and David G. Rand
Numerous experiments have shown that people often engage in third-party punishment (3PP) of selfish behavior. This evidence has been used to argue that people respond to selfishness with anger, and get utility from punishing those who mistreat others. Elements of the... View Details
Keywords: Third-party Punishment; Norm-enforcement; Strategy Method; Economic Games; Cooperation; Emotions; Fairness
Jordan, Jillian J., Katherine McAuliffe, and David G. Rand. "The Effects of Endowment Size and Strategy Method on Third Party Punishment." Experimental Economics 19, no. 4 (December 2016): 741–763.
- 28 Apr 2022
- News
Florida’s Punishment of Disney World
- January 2019
- Technical Note
The Punishment of Business
By: Rafael Di Tella, Jose Liberti and James Weber
Di Tella, Rafael, Jose Liberti, and James Weber. "The Punishment of Business." Harvard Business School Technical Note 719-048, January 2019.
- May 2022
- Article
When Harry Fired Sally: The Double Standard in Punishing Misconduct
By: Mark Egan, Gregor Matvos and Amit Seru
We examine gender differences in misconduct punishment in the financial advisory industry. We find evidence of a “gender punishment gap”: following an incident of misconduct, female advisers are 20% more likely to lose their jobs and 30% less likely to find new jobs... View Details
Keywords: Financial Advisers; Brokers; Gender Discrimination; Consumer Finance; Financial Misconduct And Fraud; FINRA; Financial Institutions; Employees; Crime and Corruption; Gender; Prejudice and Bias; Personal Finance; Financial Services Industry
Egan, Mark, Gregor Matvos, and Amit Seru. "When Harry Fired Sally: The Double Standard in Punishing Misconduct." Journal of Political Economy 130, no. 5 (May 2022): 1184–1248.
- July 2008
- Article
Crime and Punishment in the 'American Dream'
By: Rafael Di Tella and Juan Dubra
We observe that countries where belief in the "American dream" (i.e., effort pays) prevails also set harsher punishment for criminals. We know that beliefs are also correlated with several features of the economic system (taxation, social insurance, etc). Our objective... View Details
Keywords: Crime and Corruption; Economic Systems; Values and Beliefs; Law Enforcement; Mathematical Methods; Personal Characteristics; United States
Di Tella, Rafael, and Juan Dubra. "Crime and Punishment in the 'American Dream'." Journal of Public Economics 92, no. 7 (July 2008).
- 14 Mar 2023
- News
On Background: White-Collar Crime and Punishment
- September 2, 2014
- Article
Development of In-Group Favoritism in Children's Third-Party Punishment of Selfishness
By: Jillian J. Jordan, Katherine McAuliffe and Felix Warneken
When enforcing norms for cooperative behavior, human adults sometimes exhibit in-group bias. For example, third-party observers punish selfish behaviors committed by out-group members more harshly than similar behaviors committed by in-group members. Although evidence... View Details
Jordan, Jillian J., Katherine McAuliffe, and Felix Warneken. "Development of In-Group Favoritism in Children's Third-Party Punishment of Selfishness." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 111, no. 35 (September 2, 2014): 12710–12715.
- 08 Nov 2018
- Working Paper Summaries
When Harry Fired Sally: The Double Standard in Punishing Misconduct
- 17 Dec 2018
- Research & Ideas
Women Receive Harsher Punishment at Work Than Men
The evidence has long shown that women are discriminated against in the workplace. Now it appears that they are even punished more harshly than men when they are in the wrong. A new research paper reveals that when women at Wells Fargo engaged in misconduct, “they were... View Details
- 27 Jun 2013
- Working Paper Summaries
Social Norms Versus Social Responsibility: Punishing Transgressions Under Conflicting Obligations
- Article
Third-Party Punishment as a Costly Signal of High Continuation Probabilities in Repeated Games
By: Jillian J. Jordan and David G. Rand
Why do individuals pay costs to punish selfish behavior, even as third-party observers? A large body of research suggests that reputation plays an important role in motivating such third-party punishment (TPP). Here we focus on a recently proposed reputation-based... View Details
Jordan, Jillian J., and David G. Rand. "Third-Party Punishment as a Costly Signal of High Continuation Probabilities in Repeated Games." Journal of Theoretical Biology 421 (May 21, 2017): 189–202.
- July 2021
- Article
Invisible Inequality Leads to Punishing the Poor and Rewarding the Rich
By: Oliver P. Hauser, Gordon T. Kraft-Todd, David Rand, Martin A. Nowak and Michael I. Norton
Four experiments examine how the lack of awareness of inequality affects behaviour towards the rich and poor. In Experiment 1, participants who became aware that wealthy individuals donated a smaller percentage of their income switched from rewarding the wealthy to... View Details
Keywords: Income Transparency; Income; Wealth; Equality and Inequality; Knowledge; Behavior; Outcome or Result; Society; Policy
Hauser, Oliver P., Gordon T. Kraft-Todd, David Rand, Martin A. Nowak, and Michael I. Norton. "Invisible Inequality Leads to Punishing the Poor and Rewarding the Rich." Behavioural Public Policy 5, no. 3 (July 2021): 333–353.
Personal Relationships and Enforcement of Management Controls: An Analysis of Punishments for Perpetrators of Economic Crimes
To explore how companies enforce management control systems, we examine whether social relationships influence the severity and consistency of punishments for main perpetrators of corporate economic crimes. We find wide variation in rates of dismissal and... View Details
- 2020
- Working Paper
Consumers Punish Firms That Cut Employee Pay in Response to COVID-19
By: Bhavya Mohan, Serena Hagerty and Michael Norton
Two experiments, including one incentive compatible study, examine the impact of cutting pay for executives versus employees in response to COVID-19 on consumer behavior. Study 1 explores the effect of announcing cuts or no cuts to CEO and employee pay, and shows that... View Details
Keywords: Employee Furloughs; CEO Pay Cuts; Pay Ratios; Purchase Intention; Health Pandemics; Employees; Wages; Executive Compensation; Consumer Behavior
Mohan, Bhavya, Serena Hagerty, and Michael Norton. "Consumers Punish Firms That Cut Employee Pay in Response to COVID-19." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 21-020, August 2020.