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- Faculty Publications (102)
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- 2010
- Article
Budgeting, Psychological Contracts, and Budgetary Misreporting
By: Susanna Gallani, Ranjani Krishnan, Eric J. Marinich and Michael D. Shields
This study examines the effect of psychological contract breach on budgetary misreporting. Psychological contracts are mental models or schemas that govern how employees understand their exchange relationships with their employers. Psychological contract breach leads... View Details
Gallani, Susanna, Ranjani Krishnan, Eric J. Marinich, and Michael D. Shields. "Budgeting, Psychological Contracts, and Budgetary Misreporting." Management Science 65, no. 6 (June 2019): 2924–2945.
- June 1974 (Revised April 1985)
- Background Note
Note on Managing the Psychological Contract
Thomas, R. Roosevelt, Jr. "Note on Managing the Psychological Contract." Harvard Business School Background Note 474-159, June 1974. (Revised April 1985.)
- Article
Trust and Collaboration in the Aftermath of Conflict: The Effects of Contract Structure
By: Deepak Malhotra and Fabrice Lumineau
Leveraging a longitudinal dataset concerning 102 inter-firm disputes, we evaluate the effects of contract structure on trust and on the likelihood of continued collaboration. We theoretically refine and empirically extend prior research by (a) distinguishing between... View Details
Malhotra, Deepak, and Fabrice Lumineau. "Trust and Collaboration in the Aftermath of Conflict: The Effects of Contract Structure." Academy of Management Journal 54, no. 5 (October 2011): 981–998.
- Spring 2023
- Article
Incentive Contract Design and Employee-Initiated Innovation: Evidence from the Field
By: Wei Cai, Susanna Gallani and Jee-Eun Shin
This study examines how the design of incentive contracts for tasks defined as workers’ official responsibilities (i.e., standard tasks) influences workers’ propensity to engage in employee-initiated innovation (EII). EII corresponds to innovation activities that are... View Details
Keywords: Employee-initiated Innovation; Contract Design; Rank-and-file; Extra-role Behaviors; Compensation and Benefits; Motivation and Incentives; Innovation and Management
Cai, Wei, Susanna Gallani, and Jee-Eun Shin. "Incentive Contract Design and Employee-Initiated Innovation: Evidence from the Field." Contemporary Accounting Research 40, no. 1 (Spring 2023): 292–323.
- May 2009
- Article
When Contracts Destroy Trust
By: Deepak Malhotra
Contracts exist to foster trust, but they can actually do the opposite. Overly detailed contracts leave no room for spontaneous acts of kindness to create goodwill between parties; too-rigid contracts leave parties unable to respond to the unanticipated; and, strangely... View Details
Malhotra, Deepak. "When Contracts Destroy Trust." Harvard Business Review 87, no. 5 (May 2009): 25.
- 2012
- Working Paper
Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities
By: R. Gibbons and R. Henderson
A large literature identifies unique organizational capabilities as a potent source of competitive advantage, yet our knowledge of why capabilities fail to diffuse more rapidly-particularly in situations in which competitors apparently have strong incentives to adopt... View Details
Keywords: Competitive Advantage; Motivation and Incentives; Management Practices and Processes; Contracts; Competency and Skills; Relationships; Complexity
Gibbons, R., and R. Henderson. "Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 12-061, January 2012.
- February 1998
- Background Note
Contracting and Control in Venture Capital
By: Paul A. Gompers
Discusses the control mechanisms and contracts utilized by venture capitalists. The emphasis is on understanding potential conflicts of interest and how the contracts mitigate those conflicts. View Details
Keywords: Venture Capital; Governance Controls; Contracts; Business or Company Management; Conflict of Interests
Gompers, Paul A. "Contracting and Control in Venture Capital." Harvard Business School Background Note 298-067, February 1998.
- July 31, 2017
- Article
A Commitment Contract to Achieve Virologic Suppression in Poorly Adherent Patients with HIV/AIDS
By: Marcella Alsan, John Beshears, Wendy S. Armstrong, James J. Choi, Brigitte C. Madrian, Minh Ly T. Nguyen, Carlos Del Rio, David Laibson and Vincent C. Marconi
Objective: Assess whether a commitment contract informed by behavioral economics leads to persistent virologic suppression among HIV-positive patients with poor antiretroviral therapy (ART) adherence.
Design: Single-center pilot randomized clinical trial and a... View Details
Keywords: Adherence; Antiretroviral Therapy; Behavioral Economics; Commitment Contract; Financial Incentives; HIV-1 Virologic Suppression; Health Disorders; Motivation and Incentives
Alsan, Marcella, John Beshears, Wendy S. Armstrong, James J. Choi, Brigitte C. Madrian, Minh Ly T. Nguyen, Carlos Del Rio, David Laibson, and Vincent C. Marconi. "A Commitment Contract to Achieve Virologic Suppression in Poorly Adherent Patients with HIV/AIDS." AIDS 31, no. 12 (July 31, 2017): 1765–1769.
- 2014
- Working Paper
The Contract Year Phenomenon in the Corner Office: An Analysis of Firm Behavior During CEO Contract Renewals
By: Ping Liu and Yuhai Xuan
This paper investigates how executive employment contracts influence corporate financial policies during the final year of the contract term, using a new, hand-collected data set of CEO employment agreements. On the one hand, the impending expiration of fixed-term... View Details
Liu, Ping, and Yuhai Xuan. "The Contract Year Phenomenon in the Corner Office: An Analysis of Firm Behavior During CEO Contract Renewals." Working Paper, April 2014.
- June 1992
- Article
Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement
By: George P. Baker
Baker, George P. "Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement." Journal of Political Economy (June 1992).
- 2006
- Article
Performance Measure Properties and the Effect of Incentive Contracts
By: J. Bouwens and L. van Lent
Using data from a third-party survey on compensation practices at 151 Dutch firms, we show that less noisy or distorted performance measures and higher cash bonuses are associated with improved employee selection and better-directed effort. Specifically, (1) an... View Details
Keywords: Motivation and Incentives; Data and Data Sets; Problems and Challenges; Performance Evaluation; Compensation and Benefits; Netherlands
Bouwens, J., and L. van Lent. "Performance Measure Properties and the Effect of Incentive Contracts." Journal of Management Accounting Research 18 (2006): 55–75.
- Article
Shadow of the Contract: How Contract Structure Shapes Inter-Firm Dispute Resolution
By: Fabrice Lumineau and Deepak Malhotra
This paper investigates how contract structure influences inter-firm dispute resolution processes and outcomes by examining a unique dataset consisting of over 150,000 pages of documents relating to 102 business disputes. We find that the level of contractual detail... View Details
Keywords: Governance Controls; Contracts; Rights; Negotiation; Conflict and Resolution; Power and Influence
Lumineau, Fabrice, and Deepak Malhotra. "Shadow of the Contract: How Contract Structure Shapes Inter-Firm Dispute Resolution." Strategic Management Journal 32, no. 5 (May 2011): 532–555.
- September 2002
- Article
The Effects of Contracts on Interpersonal Trust
By: Deepak Malhotra and J. Keith Murnighan
Malhotra, Deepak, and J. Keith Murnighan. "The Effects of Contracts on Interpersonal Trust." Administrative Science Quarterly 47, no. 3 (September 2002): 534–559.
- Article
Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
By: George P. Baker, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy
Baker, George P., Robert Gibbons, and Kevin J. Murphy. "Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts." Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, no. 4 (November 1994).
- fall 2002
- Article
Distortion and Risk in Optimal Incentive Contracts
By: George P. Baker
Baker, George P. "Distortion and Risk in Optimal Incentive Contracts." Journal of Human Resources 37, no. 4 (fall 2002).
- May 2000
- Article
The Use of Performance Measures in Incentive Contracting
By: George P. Baker
Baker, George P. "The Use of Performance Measures in Incentive Contracting." American Economic Review 90, no. 2 (May 2000).
- June 2013
- Supplement
Multiasistencia: Redefining the Relationship with its Service Professionals. Spreadsheet Supplement
By: Francisco de Asis Martinez-Jerez
Multiasistencia, a major Spanish BPO of insurance repairs, is changing the relational contract with its service profesionals from a referral model to a guaranteed workload one. View Details
- October 2022
- Article
A Structural Model of Organizational Buying for Business-to-Business Markets: Innovation Adoption with Share-of-Wallet Contracts
By: Navid Mojir and K. Sudhir
The paper develops the first structural model of organizational buying to study innovation diffusion in a B2B market. Our model is particularly applicable for routinized exchange relationships, whereby centralized buyers periodically evaluate and choose contracts,... View Details
Keywords: Organizational Buying Behavior; Healthcare Marketing; B2B Markets; B2B Innovation; New Product Diffusion; New Product Adoption; Organizations; Acquisition; Behavior; Health Care and Treatment; Marketing; Innovation and Invention
Mojir, Navid, and K. Sudhir. "A Structural Model of Organizational Buying for Business-to-Business Markets: Innovation Adoption with Share-of-Wallet Contracts." Journal of Marketing Research (JMR) 59, no. 5 (October 2022): 883–907.
- 2025
- Working Paper
Unwinding Loan Prospecting Pressure Through Renegotiation: The Role of Loan Officer Changes in Debt Contracting
By: Jung Koo Kang, Regina Wittenberg Moerman and Jessie Cheong
We examine the impact of loan officer changes on debt contract design. Loan officers play a critical role in initiating and maintaining lending relationships but also face pressure to originate more loans, incentivizing them to offer loan terms more favorable than... View Details
Keywords: Financing and Loans; Borrowing and Debt; Contracts; Negotiation; Motivation and Incentives
Kang, Jung Koo, Regina Wittenberg Moerman, and Jessie Cheong. "Unwinding Loan Prospecting Pressure Through Renegotiation: The Role of Loan Officer Changes in Debt Contracting." Working Paper, March 2025.
- August 2013
- Teaching Note
Multiasistencia: Redefining the Relationship with Its Service Professionals
By: F. Asis Martinez-Jerez
Multiasistencia, a major Spanish BPO of insurance repairs, is changing the relational contract with its service profesionals from a referral model to a guaranteed workload one. View Details