Publications

Educators

Purchase

2020
Article

A Practical Approach to Sales Compensation: What Do We Know Now? What Should We Know in the Future?

By: Doug J. Chung, Byungyeon Kim and Niladri B. Syam

Personal selling represents one of the most important elements in the marketing mix, and appropriate management of the sales force is vital to achieving the organization’s objectives. Among the various instruments of sales management, compensation plays a pivotal role... View Details

Keywords: Sales Compensation; Sales Management; Sales Strategy; Principal-agent Theory; Structural Econometrics; Field Experiments; Machine Learning; Artificial Intelligence; Salesforce Management; Compensation and Benefits; Motivation and Incentives; AI and Machine Learning

April 2024
Article

Decision Authority and the Returns to Algorithms

By: Hyunjin Kim, Edward L. Glaeser, Andrew Hillis, Scott Duke Kominers and Michael Luca

We evaluate a pilot in an Inspections Department to explore the returns to a pair of algorithms that varied in their sophistication. We find that both algorithms provided substantial prediction gains, suggesting that even simple data may be helpful. However, these... View Details

Keywords: Algorithmic Aversion; Algorithmic Decision Making; Algorithms; Public Entrepreneurship; Govenment; Local Government; Crowdsourcing; Crowdsourcing Contests; Inspection; Principal-agent Theory; Government Administration; Decision Making; Public Administration Industry; United States

April 2000
Background Note

Aligning Incentives for Supply Chain Efficiency

By: V.G. Narayanan and Ananth Raman

Introduces students to the basics of principal-agency theory as it applies to supply chains. Operational problems in supply chains can often be traced to incentive issues. Students and managers lack frameworks to analyze incentive problems in supply chains. This note... View Details

Keywords: Supply Chain Management; Motivation and Incentives; Framework; Management Analysis, Tools, and Techniques; Agency Theory

Educators

Purchase

June 2004 (Revised January 2005)
Background Note

Principals, Agents, and Partners

By: Arthur I Segel, Armen Panossian and Jeff Mandelbaum

The establishment of the principal-agent relationship, the duties owed by the agent to the principal, and the principal's liability for illegal actions or representations made by the agent are all examined. Also covers the creation of partnerships and the duties of... View Details

Keywords: Partners and Partnerships; Agency Theory; Legal Liability

Educators

Purchase

2010
Working Paper

Agency Revisited

By: Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and Daniel F. Spulber

The article presents a comprehensive overview of the principal-agent model that emphasizes the role of trust in the agency relationship. The analysis demonstrates that the legal remedy for breach of duty can result in a full-information efficient outcome eliminating... View Details

Keywords: Ethics; Contracts; Agency Theory; Mathematical Methods; Behavior; Trust

March 2007
Article

Authority, Risk, and Performance Incentives: Evidence from Division Manager Positions inside Firms

By: Julie Wulf

I show that performance incentives vary by decision-making authority of division managers. For division managers with broader authority, i.e., those designated as corporate officers, both the sensitivity of pay to global performance measures and the relative importance... View Details

Keywords: Motivation and Incentives; Performance; Risk and Uncertainty; Business Model; Globalization; Measurement and Metrics; Status and Position; Forecasting and Prediction; Business Divisions

August 2013
Article

The Price of Diversifiable Risk in Venture Capital and Private Equity

By: Michael Ewens, Charles Jones and Matthew Rhodes-Kropf

This paper explores the private equity and venture capital (VC) markets and extends the standard principal-agent problem between the investors and venture capitalist to show how it alters the interaction between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur. Since the... View Details

Keywords: Price; Risk and Uncertainty; Venture Capital; Private Equity; Contracts; Investment; Competition; Agency Theory; Investment Return; Forecasting and Prediction; Theory; Diversification

Article

Trust and Incentives in Agency

By: Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and Daniel F Spulber

Contracts between a principal and an agent are not formed in a vacuum. Although formal contracts between a principal and an agent contain explicit incentives for performance, the relationship between a principal and an agent also involves implicit incentives. Three... View Details

Keywords: Trust; Motivation and Incentives; Agency Theory; Contracts; Market Transactions; Performance; Relationships; Societal Protocols; Legal Liability; Cost

September 2004
Article

Trust in Agency

By: Ramon Casadesus-Masanell

Existing models of the principal-agent relationship assume the agent works only under extrinsic incentives. However, many observed agency contracts take the form of a fixed payment. For such contracts to succeed, the principal must trust the agent to work in the... View Details

Keywords: Trust; Agency Theory; Relationships; Behavior; Motivation and Incentives; Contracts; Business Model; Emotions; Forecasting and Prediction; Ethics; Standards; Risk and Uncertainty

Article

Mission-Driven Governance

By: Raymond Fisman, Rakesh Khurana and Edward Martenson

The purpose of this paper is to provide a useful, easily applied theory of governance performance. The existing model is fundamentally adversarial, rooted in the paradigm of principal-agent conflict. At its base is an image of governance as a never-ending struggle... View Details

Keywords: Corporate Governance; Governing and Advisory Boards; Knowledge Management; Standards; Mission and Purpose; Organizational Change and Adaptation; Performance Effectiveness; Performance Evaluation