Skip to Main Content
HBS Home
  • About
  • Academic Programs
  • Alumni
  • Faculty & Research
  • Baker Library
  • Giving
  • Harvard Business Review
  • Initiatives
  • News
  • Recruit
  • Map / Directions
Faculty & Research
  • Faculty
  • Research
  • Featured Topics
  • Academic Units
  • …→
  • Harvard Business School→
  • Faculty & Research→
  • Research
    • Research
    • Publications
    • Global Research Centers
    • Case Development
    • Initiatives & Projects
    • Research Services
    • Seminars & Conferences
    →
  • Publications→

Publications

Publications

Filter Results: (15) Arrow Down
Filter Results: (15) Arrow Down Arrow Up

Show Results For

  • All HBS Web  (15)
    • Research  (12)
    • Events  (1)
  • Faculty Publications  (11)

Show Results For

  • All HBS Web  (15)
    • Research  (12)
    • Events  (1)
  • Faculty Publications  (11)
Page 1 of 15 Results
  • 2007
  • Working Paper

Correlated Equilibrium and Nash Equilibrium as an Observer's Assessment of the Game

By: John Hillas, Elon Kohlberg and John W. Pratt
Noncooperative games are examined from the point of view of an outside observer who believes that the players are rational and that they know at least as much as the observer. The observer is assumed to be able to observe many instances of the play of the game; these... View Details
Keywords: Decision Choices and Conditions; Game Theory; Cooperation
Citation
Read Now
Related
Hillas, John, Elon Kohlberg, and John W. Pratt. "Correlated Equilibrium and Nash Equilibrium as an Observer's Assessment of the Game." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 08-005, July 2007.
  • October 2003
  • Article

Capture by Threat

By: Ernesto Dal Bo and Rafael Di Tella
We analyze a simple stochastic environment in which policy makers can be threatened by “nasty” interest groups. In the absence of these groups, the policy maker’s desire for reelection guarantees that good policies are implemented for every realization of the shock.... View Details
Keywords: Political Parties; Politicians; Nash Equilibrium; Political Elections
Citation
Find at Harvard
Read Now
Related
Dal Bo, Ernesto, and Rafael Di Tella. "Capture by Threat." Journal of Political Economy 111, no. 5 (October 2003): 1123–54.
  • November 2006
  • Background Note

Technical Game Theory Note #1: Solving Bi-matrix Games

By: Dennis A. Yao
Explains how to solve bi-matrix games and introduces the Nash Equilibrium concept. View Details
Keywords: Game Theory; Mathematical Methods; Learning; Balance and Stability; Planning; Strategic Planning; Performance Improvement; Strategy; Games, Gaming, and Gambling
Citation
Educators
Related
Yao, Dennis A. "Technical Game Theory Note #1: Solving Bi-matrix Games." Harvard Business School Background Note 707-476, November 2006.
  • 2011
  • Working Paper

Price Competition under Multinomial Logit Demand Functions with Random Coefficients

In this paper, we postulate a general class of price competition models with Mixed Multinomial Logit demand functions under affine cost functions. We first characterize the equilibrium behavior of this class of models in the case where each product in the market is... View Details
Keywords: Customers; Income Characteristics; Price; Product Marketing; Mathematical Methods; Competition; Segmentation
Citation
Read Now
Related
Allon, Gad, Awi Federgruen, and Margaret Pierson. "Price Competition under Multinomial Logit Demand Functions with Random Coefficients." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 12-030, October 2011.
  • Research Summary

Prudence in Bargaining

We investigate the outcome of Rubinstein’s (1982) alternating-offer bargaining game when noise is added to a player’s pay-off. We find that a risk-averse player typically increases his equilibrium receipts when his pay-off is made risky. This is because... View Details

  • 2014
  • Working Paper

The NTU-Value of Stochastic Games

By: Elon Kohlberg and Abraham Neyman
Since the seminal paper of Shapley, the theory of stochastic games has been developed in many different directions. However, there has been practically no work on the interplay between stochastic games and cooperative game theory. Our purpose here is to make a first... View Details
Keywords: Strategy; Game Theory
Citation
Read Now
Related
Kohlberg, Elon, and Abraham Neyman. "The NTU-Value of Stochastic Games." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 15-014, September 2014.
  • Article

The Price of Anarchy of Self-Selection in Tullock Contests

By: Hau Chan, David C. Parkes and Karim R. Lakhani
Crowdsourcing platforms operate by offering their clients the ability to obtain cost-effective solutions for their problems through contests. The top contestants with the best solutions are rewarded, and the submitted solutions are provided to the clients. Within the... View Details
Keywords: Crowdsourcing Contests; Game Theory
Citation
Register to Read
Related
Chan, Hau, David C. Parkes, and Karim R. Lakhani. "The Price of Anarchy of Self-Selection in Tullock Contests." Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS) 19th (2020): 1795–1797.
  • Summer 2025
  • Article

Dynamic Competition for Customer Memberships

By: Cristian Chica, Julian Jimenez-Cardenas and Jorge Tamayo
A competitive two-period membership (subscription) market is analyzed. Two symmetric firms charge a “membership” fee that allows consumers to buy products or services at a given unit price for both periods. Firms can choose between long- or short-term memberships. When... View Details
Keywords: Competitive Price Discrimination; Membership; Dynamic Competition; Competition; Price; Consumer Behavior; Business Model
Citation
Purchase
Related
Chica, Cristian, Julian Jimenez-Cardenas, and Jorge Tamayo. "Dynamic Competition for Customer Memberships." Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 34, no. 2 (Summer 2025): 525–556.
  • Article

Non-verifiability, Costly Renegotiation, and Efficiency

By: Jerry R. Green and J. J. Laffont
We study the implications of the non verifiability of information for the allocation of resources and the bearing of risk in a two party relationship. We consider a two step approach. In step one the two parties define a non contingent contract which will be executed... View Details
Keywords: Negotiation
Citation
Find at Harvard
Read Now
Related
Green, Jerry R., and J. J. Laffont. "Non-verifiability, Costly Renegotiation, and Efficiency." Annales d'économie et de statistique, no. 36 (October–December 1994): 81–95.
  • 08 Dec 2016
  • HBS Seminar

Joel Waldfogel, University of Minnesota, Carlson School of Management

  • Web

Strategy - Faculty & Research

long-term memberships, but the equilibrium profits are higher when firms offer short-term memberships. Moreover, short-term membership is a Nash equilibrium. Keywords: Competitive Price Discrimination ;... View Details
  • Web

Finance - Faculty & Research

but only with their membership fees. Overall, the number of consumers poached is smaller with long-term memberships, but the equilibrium profits are higher when firms offer short-term memberships. Moreover, short-term membership is a... View Details
  • 08 Nov 2011
  • First Look

First Look: Nov. 8

which a Nash equilibrium exists while the set of Nash equilibria coincides with the solutions of the system of first order condition equations, a property of essential... View Details
Keywords: Sean Silverthorne
  • 14 Aug 2007
  • First Look

First Look: August 14, 2007

prompting a takeover, than at engaging in long-term corporate governance or operating issues. Download the paper: http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/08-004.pdf Correlated Equilibrium and Nash View Details
Keywords: Martha Lagace
  • 09 Dec 2008
  • First Look

First Look: December 9, 2008

Correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1974) generalizes Nash equilibrium to allow correlation devices. Aumann showed an example of a game, and of a correlated View Details
Keywords: Martha Lagace
  • 1
ǁ
Campus Map
Harvard Business School
Soldiers Field
Boston, MA 02163
→Map & Directions
→More Contact Information
  • Make a Gift
  • Site Map
  • Jobs
  • Harvard University
  • Trademarks
  • Policies
  • Accessibility
  • Digital Accessibility
Copyright © President & Fellows of Harvard College.