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- All HBS Web (13)
- Faculty Publications (9)
Show Results For
- All HBS Web (13)
- Faculty Publications (9)
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Results
- 2007
- Working Paper
Correlated Equilibrium and Nash Equilibrium as an Observer's Assessment of the Game
By: John Hillas, Elon Kohlberg and John W. Pratt
Noncooperative games are examined from the point of view of an outside observer who believes that the players are rational and that they know at least as much as the observer. The observer is assumed to be able to observe many instances of the play of the game; these... View Details
Hillas, John, Elon Kohlberg, and John W. Pratt. "Correlated Equilibrium and Nash Equilibrium as an Observer's Assessment of the Game." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 08-005, July 2007.
- October 2003
- Article
Capture by Threat
By: Ernesto Dal Bo and Rafael Di Tella
We analyze a simple stochastic environment in which policy makers can be threatened by “nasty” interest groups. In the absence of these groups, the policy maker’s desire for reelection guarantees that good policies are implemented for every realization of the shock.... View Details
Dal Bo, Ernesto, and Rafael Di Tella. "Capture by Threat." Journal of Political Economy 111, no. 5 (October 2003): 1123–54.
- November 2006
- Background Note
Technical Game Theory Note #1: Solving Bi-matrix Games
By: Dennis A. Yao
Explains how to solve bi-matrix games and introduces the Nash Equilibrium concept. View Details
- 2011
- Working Paper
Price Competition under Multinomial Logit Demand Functions with Random Coefficients
In this paper, we postulate a general class of price competition models with Mixed Multinomial Logit demand functions under affine cost functions. We first characterize the equilibrium behavior of this class of models in the case where each product in the market is... View Details
Keywords: Customers; Income Characteristics; Price; Product Marketing; Mathematical Methods; Competition; Segmentation
Allon, Gad, Awi Federgruen, and Margaret Pierson. "Price Competition under Multinomial Logit Demand Functions with Random Coefficients." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 12-030, October 2011.
- 2014
- Working Paper
The NTU-Value of Stochastic Games
By: Elon Kohlberg and Abraham Neyman
Since the seminal paper of Shapley, the theory of stochastic games has been developed in many different directions. However, there has been practically no work on the interplay between stochastic games and cooperative game theory. Our purpose here is to make a first... View Details
Kohlberg, Elon, and Abraham Neyman. "The NTU-Value of Stochastic Games." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 15-014, September 2014.
- Research Summary
Prudence in Bargaining
We investigate the outcome of Rubinstein’s (1982) alternating-offer bargaining game when noise is added to a player’s pay-off. We find that a risk-averse player typically increases his equilibrium receipts when his pay-off is made risky. This is because... View Details
- Article
The Price of Anarchy of Self-Selection in Tullock Contests
By: Hau Chan, David C. Parkes and Karim R. Lakhani
Crowdsourcing platforms operate by offering their clients the ability to obtain cost-effective solutions for their problems through contests. The top contestants with the best solutions are rewarded, and the submitted solutions are provided to the clients. Within the... View Details
Chan, Hau, David C. Parkes, and Karim R. Lakhani. "The Price of Anarchy of Self-Selection in Tullock Contests." Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS) 19th (2020): 1795–1797.
- Forthcoming
- Article
Dynamic Competition for Customer Memberships
By: Cristian Chica, Julian Jimenez-Cardenas and Jorge Tamayo
A competitive two-period membership (subscription) market is analyzed. Two symmetric firms charge a “membership” fee that allows consumers to buy products or services at a given unit price for both periods. Firms can choose between long- or short-term memberships. When... View Details
Keywords: Competitive Price Discrimination; Membership; Dynamic Competition; Competition; Price; Consumer Behavior; Business Model
Chica, Cristian, Julian Jimenez-Cardenas, and Jorge Tamayo. "Dynamic Competition for Customer Memberships." Journal of Economics & Management Strategy (forthcoming). (Pre-published online August 12, 2024.)
- Article
Non-verifiability, Costly Renegotiation, and Efficiency
By: Jerry R. Green and J. J. Laffont
We study the implications of the non verifiability of information for the allocation of resources and the bearing of risk in a two party relationship. We consider a two step approach. In step one the two parties define a non contingent contract which will be executed... View Details
Keywords: Negotiation
Green, Jerry R., and J. J. Laffont. "Non-verifiability, Costly Renegotiation, and Efficiency." Annales d'économie et de statistique, no. 36 (October–December 1994): 81–95.
- 08 Dec 2016
- HBS Seminar
Joel Waldfogel, University of Minnesota, Carlson School of Management
- 08 Nov 2011
- First Look
First Look: Nov. 8
which a Nash equilibrium exists while the set of Nash equilibria coincides with the solutions of the system of first order condition equations, a property of essential... View Details
Keywords: Sean Silverthorne
- 14 Aug 2007
- First Look
First Look: August 14, 2007
prompting a takeover, than at engaging in long-term corporate governance or operating issues. Download the paper: http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/08-004.pdf Correlated Equilibrium and Nash View Details
Keywords: Martha Lagace
- 09 Dec 2008
- First Look
First Look: December 9, 2008
Correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1974) generalizes Nash equilibrium to allow correlation devices. Aumann showed an example of a game, and of a correlated View Details
Keywords: Martha Lagace