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- All HBS Web
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- Research (4)
- Faculty Publications (3)
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Results
- 2021
- Working Paper
Quantifying the Inefficiency of Multi-unit Auctions for Normal Goods
By: Brian Baisa and Simon Essig Aberg
We study multi-unit auctions for homogenous goods in a private value setting where bidders have non-quasilinear preferences. Several recent impossibility results study this setting and find there is no mechanism that retains the Vickrey auction’s desired incentive and... View Details
Baisa, Brian, and Simon Essig Aberg. "Quantifying the Inefficiency of Multi-unit Auctions for Normal Goods." Working Paper, August 2021.
- Research Summary
The Chopstick Auction - An Experimental Study of the Exposure Problem in Auctions (with P. Guillen, L. Llorente, S. Onderstal, R. Sausgruber), 2002
Multi-unit auctions are sometimes plagued by the so-called exposure problem. In this paper, we analyze a simple game called the "chopstick auction" in which bidders are confronted with the exposure problem. We analyze the chopstick auction with incomplete information... View Details
- 2022
- Working Paper
Consumer Demand with Social Influences: Evidence from an E-Commerce Platform
By: El Hadi Caoui, Chiara Farronato, John J. Horton and Robert Schultz
For some kinds of goods, rarity itself is valued. "Fashionable'" goods are demanded in part because they are unique. In this paper, we explore the economics of rare goods using auctions of limited-edition shoes held by an e-commerce platform. We model endogenous entry... View Details
Caoui, El Hadi, Chiara Farronato, John J. Horton, and Robert Schultz. "Consumer Demand with Social Influences: Evidence from an E-Commerce Platform." NBER Working Paper Series, No. 30351, August 2022.
- 12 Aug 2008
- Op-Ed
Google-Yahoo Ad Deal is Bad for Online Advertising
take the next-to-last slot. In Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction 2 my coauthors and I develop this envy-free condition. In Optimal Auction Design in a View Details