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  • All HBS Web  (1,789)
    • People  (1)
    • News  (224)
    • Research  (1,308)
    • Events  (20)
    • Multimedia  (6)
  • Faculty Publications  (817)
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  • November 2023
  • Article

Algorithmic Mechanism Design with Investment

By: Mohammad Akbarpour, Scott Duke Kominers, Kevin Michael Li, Shengwu Li and Paul Milgrom
We study the investment incentives created by truthful mechanisms that allocate resources using approximation algorithms. Some approximation algorithms guarantee nearly 100% of the optimal welfare, but have only a zero guarantee when one bidder can invest before... View Details
Keywords: Mechanism Design; Market Design; Auctions
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Akbarpour, Mohammad, Scott Duke Kominers, Kevin Michael Li, Shengwu Li, and Paul Milgrom. "Algorithmic Mechanism Design with Investment." Econometrica 91, no. 6 (November 2023): 1969–2003.
  • Article

Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods

By: Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont
Social decision mechanisms that admit dominant strategies and result in Pareto optima are characterized by the class of mechanisms proposed by Groves. The concept of decision mechanisms is generalized and the characterization is shown to extend to these cases. View Details
Keywords: Decision Mechanisms; Game Theory; Economics
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Green, Jerry R., and Jean-Jacques Laffont. "Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods." Econometrica 45, no. 2 (March 1977): 427–438.
  • July 2021
  • Article

Augmenting Markets with Mechanisms

By: Samuel Antill and Darrell Duffie
We explain how the common practice of size-discovery trade detracts from overall financial market efficiency. At each of a series of size-discovery sessions, traders report their desired trades, generating allocations of the asset and cash that rely on the most recent... View Details
Keywords: Mechanism Design; Price Impact; Size Discovery; Allocative Efficiency; Workup; Dark Pool; Financial Markets; Market Design; Performance Efficiency
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Antill, Samuel, and Darrell Duffie. "Augmenting Markets with Mechanisms." Review of Economic Studies 88, no. 4 (July 2021): 1665–1719.
  • May 2021
  • Article

Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms

By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Westkamp
We consider the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts, where firms may demand multiple contracts, but each worker desires at most one contract. We introduce three novel conditions—observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity, and... View Details
Keywords: Matching With Contracts; Stability; Strategy-proofness; Substitutability; Size Monotonicity; Cumulative Offer Mechanism; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
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Hatfield, John William, Scott Duke Kominers, and Alexander Westkamp. "Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms." Review of Economic Studies 88, no. 3 (May 2021): 1457–1502.
  • 2015
  • Working Paper

Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms

By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Westkamp
We consider the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts, where firms may demand multiple contracts but each worker desires at most one contract. We introduce three novel conditions—observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity,... View Details
Keywords: Matching With Contracts; Stability; Strategy-proofness; Substitutability; Size Monotonicity; Cumulative Offer Mechanism; Contracts; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
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Hatfield, John William, Scott Duke Kominers, and Alexander Westkamp. "Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms." Working Paper, July 2015.
  • January 2015 (Revised March 2017)
  • Case

New Urban Mechanics

By: Mitchell Weiss
Funding to scale Citizens Connect, Boston's 311 app, is both a blessing and a burden and tests two public entrepreneurs. In 2012, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts provides Boston's Mayor's Office of New Urban Mechanics with a grant to scale Citizens Connect across the... View Details
Keywords: Public Entrepreneurship; Civic Technology; Government Innovation; Civic Innovation; Cities; New Urban Mechanics; Thomas. M. Menino; Chris Osgood; Nigel Jacob; Connected Bits; SeeClickFix; Ben Berkowitz; Eric Carlson; Dave Mitchell; Government Technology; Open Innovation; Open Source Software; Citizens Connect; Commonwealth Connect; Entrepreneurship; Innovation and Invention; Innovation Leadership; Innovation and Management; Open Source Distribution; Public Administration Industry; Information Technology Industry; Boston
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Weiss, Mitchell. "New Urban Mechanics." Harvard Business School Case 315-075, January 2015. (Revised March 2017.)
  • June 2024
  • Article

Redistributive Allocation Mechanisms

By: Mohammad Akbarpour, Piotr Dworczak and Scott Duke Kominers
Many scarce public resources are allocated at below-market-clearing prices, and sometimes for free. Such "non-market" mechanisms sacrifice some surplus, yet they can potentially improve equity. We develop a model of mechanism design with redistributive concerns. Agents... View Details
Keywords: Equality and Inequality; Welfare; Mathematical Methods; Market Design; Cost vs Benefits
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Akbarpour, Mohammad, Piotr Dworczak, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Redistributive Allocation Mechanisms." Journal of Political Economy 132, no. 6 (June 2024): 1831–1875. (Authors' names are in certified random order.)
  • February 2005 (Revised January 2012)
  • Case

Liston Mechanics Corporation

By: Marc L. Bertoneche
Reviews, through a rather simple and straightforward situation, the various methods of valuation--free cash flow, weighted average cost of capital, equity cash flow, adjusted present value, multiples, etc. View Details
Keywords: Valuation; Cost of Capital; Equity; Cash Flow; Value; Financial Management
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Bertoneche, Marc L. "Liston Mechanics Corporation." Harvard Business School Case 205-070, February 2005. (Revised January 2012.)
  • August 1980 (Revised November 1982)
  • Case

Mechanical Hand

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Bonoma, Thomas V. "Mechanical Hand." Harvard Business School Case 381-021, August 1980. (Revised November 1982.)
  • October 1981
  • Background Note

Trigger Price Mechanism

By: J. Ronald Fox
Keywords: Price
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Fox, J. Ronald. "Trigger Price Mechanism." Harvard Business School Background Note 382-033, October 1981.
  • 1 Aug 1990
  • Conference Presentation

Mechanisms of Creativity

By: Teresa M. Amabile
Keywords: Creativity
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Amabile, Teresa M. "Mechanisms of Creativity." Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, Boston, MA, August 01, 1990.
  • October 2023
  • Article

Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement

By: David Delacrétaz, Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Teytelboym
Current refugee resettlement processes account for neither the preferences of refugees nor the priorities of hosting communities. We introduce a new framework for matching with multidimensional knapsack constraints that captures the (possibly multidimensional) sizes of... View Details
Keywords: Refugee Resettlement; Matching; Matching Markets; Matching Platform; Matching With Contracts; Algorithms; Refugees; Market Design
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Delacrétaz, David, Scott Duke Kominers, and Alexander Teytelboym. "Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement." American Economic Review 113, no. 10 (October 2023): 2689–2717.
  • January 2004 (Revised March 2004)
  • Case

Redesigning Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanisms

By: Mihir A. Desai, Christina Pham, Julia Stevens and Kathleen Luchs
How should the debt of sovereign countries be restructured when countries approach default? Anne O. Krueger of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is proposing a new approach to sovereign defaults: the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM). The SDRM would... View Details
Keywords: Sovereign Finance; Insolvency and Bankruptcy; Globalized Economies and Regions; International Finance; Laws and Statutes; Latin America; Asia; Mexico
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Desai, Mihir A., Christina Pham, Julia Stevens, and Kathleen Luchs. "Redesigning Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanisms." Harvard Business School Case 204-110, January 2004. (Revised March 2004.)
  • 03 Mar 2008
  • Working Paper Summaries

Testing a Purportedly More Learnable Auction Mechanism

Keywords: by Katherine L. Milkman, James Burns, David C. Parkes, Gregory M. Barron & Kagan Tumer; Web Services
  • October 2019
  • Teaching Note

New Urban Mechanics

By: Mitchell Weiss and Matthew Piltch
Teaching Note for HBS No. 315-075. View Details
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Weiss, Mitchell, and Matthew Piltch. "New Urban Mechanics." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 320-036, October 2019.
  • March 2008
  • Article

Testing a Purportedly More Learnable Auction Mechanism

We describe an auction mechanism in the class of Groves mechanisms that has received attention in the computer science literature because of its theoretical property of being more "learnable" than the standard second price auction mechanism. We bring this mechanism,... View Details
Keywords: Market Design; Auctions; Learning; Economics
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Milkman, Katherine L., James Burns, David Parkes, Gregory M. Barron, and Kagan Tumer. "Testing a Purportedly More Learnable Auction Mechanism." Special Issue on Theoretical, Empirical and Experimental Research on Auctions. Applied Economics Research Bulletin 2 (March 2008): 106–141. (Earlier version distributed as Harvard Business School Working Paper 08-064.)
  • November 2009
  • Article

Neural Mechanisms of Social Influence

By: Malia Mason, Rebecca Dyer and Michael I. Norton
The present investigation explores the neural mechanisms underlying the impact of social influence on preferences. We socially tagged symbols as valued or not-by exposing participants to the preferences of their peers-and assessed subsequent brain activity during an... View Details
Keywords: Power and Influence; Value; Information; Outcome or Result
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Mason, Malia, Rebecca Dyer, and Michael I. Norton. "Neural Mechanisms of Social Influence." Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 110, no. 2 (November 2009): 152–159.
  • June 2001 (Revised January 2006)
  • Background Note

Mechanics of Financial Accounting, The

By: David F. Hawkins and Jacob Cohen
Explains in simple terms and numerical examples how the language of accounting is spoken and communicated to financial statement users. Describes terms such as "debits," "credits," "journal entries," "t-accounts," and "financial statements." View Details
Keywords: Accounting; Financial Statements
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Hawkins, David F., and Jacob Cohen. "Mechanics of Financial Accounting, The." Harvard Business School Background Note 101-119, June 2001. (Revised January 2006.)
  • June 2006
  • Article

Understanding Mechanisms in Organizational Research

By: Peter J. Anderson, Ruth Blatt, Marlys K. Christianson, Adam M. Grant, Christopher Marquis, Eric J. Newman, Scott Sonenshein and Kathleen M. Sutcliffe
Keywords: Organizations; Research
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Anderson, Peter J., Ruth Blatt, Marlys K. Christianson, Adam M. Grant, Christopher Marquis, Eric J. Newman, Scott Sonenshein, and Kathleen M. Sutcliffe. "Understanding Mechanisms in Organizational Research." Journal of Management Inquiry 15, no. 2 (June 2006): 102–113.
  • 01 Aug 1967
  • Conference Presentation

Commitment Mechanisms in Utopian Communities

By: R. M. Kanter
Keywords: Civil Society or Community
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Kanter, R. M. "Commitment Mechanisms in Utopian Communities." Paper presented at the American Sociological Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, CA, August 01, 1967.
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