Filter Results:
(2,405)
Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(2,405)
- People (2)
- News (470)
- Research (1,601)
- Events (17)
- Multimedia (6)
- Faculty Publications (840)
Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(2,405)
- People (2)
- News (470)
- Research (1,601)
- Events (17)
- Multimedia (6)
- Faculty Publications (840)
Page 1 of 2,405
Results →
- 2018
- Working Paper
Bundling Incentives in (Many-to-Many) Matching with Contracts
By: Jonathan Ma and Scott Duke Kominers
In many-to-many matching with contracts, the way in which contracts are specified can affect the set of stable equilibrium outcomes. Consequently, agents may be incentivized to modify the set of contracts upfront. We consider one simple way in which agents may do so:... View Details
Keywords: Matching With Contracts; Contract Design; Bundling-proofness; Substitutability; Mathematical Methods
Ma, Jonathan, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Bundling Incentives in (Many-to-Many) Matching with Contracts." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 19-011, August 2018.
- Article
Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts: Corrigendum
By: John William Hatfield, Ravi Jagadeesan and Scott Duke Kominers
Hatfield and Kominers (2012) introduced a model of matching in networks with bilateral contracts and showed that stable outcomes exist in supply chains when firms' preferences over contracts are fully substitutable. Hatfield and Kominers (2012) also asserted that in... View Details
Hatfield, John William, Ravi Jagadeesan, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts: Corrigendum." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 12, no. 3 (August 2020): 277–285.
- January 2017
- Article
Contract Design and Stability in Many-to-Many Matching
By: John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers
We develop a model of many-to-many matching with contracts that subsumes as special cases many-to-many matching markets and buyer/seller markets with heterogeneous and indivisible goods. In our setting, substitutable preferences are sufficient to guarantee the... View Details
Keywords: Many-to-Many Matching; Stability; Substitutes; Contract Design; Contracts; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
Hatfield, John William, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Contract Design and Stability in Many-to-Many Matching." Games and Economic Behavior 101 (January 2017): 78–97.
- May 2016
- Article
Matching with Slot-Specific Priorities: Theory
By: Scott Duke Kominers and Tayfun Sönmez
We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches that may have multiple slots available to accept contracts. Each slot has its own linear priority order over contracts; a branch chooses contracts by... View Details
Keywords: Matching With Contracts; Stability; Strategy-proofness; School Choice; Affirmative Action; Airline Seat Upgrades; Contracts; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
Kominers, Scott Duke, and Tayfun Sönmez. "Matching with Slot-Specific Priorities: Theory." Theoretical Economics 11, no. 2 (May 2016): 683–710.
- 2008
- Working Paper
Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts
By: Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus and Markus Walzl
We consider several notions of setwise stability for many-to-many matching markets with contracts and provide an analysis of the relations between the resulting sets of stable allocations for general, substitutable, and strongly substitutable preferences. Apart from... View Details
Klaus, Bettina-Elisabeth, and Markus Walzl. "Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-046, September 2008.
- August 2019
- Article
Cadet-Branch Matching in a Kelso-Crawford Economy
By: Ravi Jagadeesan
Sönmez (2013) and Sönmez and Switzer (2013) used matching theory with unilaterally substitutable priorities to propose mechanisms to match cadets to military branches. This paper shows that, alternatively, the Sönmez and Sönmez–Switzer mechanisms can be constructed as... View Details
Jagadeesan, Ravi. "Cadet-Branch Matching in a Kelso-Crawford Economy." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 11, no. 3 (August 2019): 191–224.
- Article
On the Correspondence of Contracts to Salaries in (Many-to-Many) Matching
In this note, I extend the work of Echenique (2012) to show that a model of many-to-many matching with contracts may be embedded into a model of many-to-many matching with wage bargaining whenever (1) all agentsʼ preferences are substitutable and (2) the matching with... View Details
Keywords: Many-to-Many Matching; Stability; Substitutes; Contract Design; Unitarity; Market Design; Contracts; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability; Economics
Kominers, Scott Duke. "On the Correspondence of Contracts to Salaries in (Many-to-Many) Matching." Games and Economic Behavior 75, no. 2 (July 2012): 984–989.
- October 2023
- Article
Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement
By: David Delacrétaz, Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Teytelboym
Current refugee resettlement processes account for neither the preferences of refugees nor the priorities of hosting communities. We introduce a new framework for matching with multidimensional knapsack constraints that captures the (possibly multidimensional) sizes of... View Details
Keywords: Refugee Resettlement; Matching; Matching Markets; Matching Platform; Matching With Contracts; Algorithms; Refugees; Market Design
Delacrétaz, David, Scott Duke Kominers, and Alexander Teytelboym. "Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement." American Economic Review 113, no. 10 (October 2023): 2689–2717.
- Article
Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts
By: John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers
We introduce a model in which firms trade goods via bilateral contracts which specify a buyer, a seller, and the terms of the exchange. This setting subsumes (many-to-many) matching with contracts, as well as supply chain matching. When firms' relationships do not... View Details
Hatfield, John William, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 4, no. 1 (February 2012): 176–208.
- 2023
- Chapter
Generalized Matching: Contracts and Networks
By: John William Hatfield, Ravi Jagadeesan, Scott Duke Kominers, Alexandru Nichifor, Michael Ostrovsky, Alexander Teytelboym and Alexander Westkamp
Keywords: Matching; Matching With Contracts; Matching Markets; Matching Platform; Market Design; Digital Platforms; Economics; Networks
Hatfield, John William, Ravi Jagadeesan, Scott Duke Kominers, Alexandru Nichifor, Michael Ostrovsky, Alexander Teytelboym, and Alexander Westkamp. "Generalized Matching: Contracts and Networks." Chap. 14 in Online and Matching-Based Market Design, edited by Federico Echenique, Nicole Immorlica, and Vijay Vazirani, 303–322. Cambridge University Press, 2023.
- November 2020
- Article
Taxation in Matching Markets
By: Arnaud Dupuy, Alfred Galichon, Sonia Jaffe and Scott Duke Kominers
We analyze the effects of taxation in two-sided matching markets, i.e., markets in which all agents have heterogeneous preferences over potential partners. In matching markets, taxes can generate inefficiency on the allocative margin by changing who is matched to whom,... View Details
Dupuy, Arnaud, Alfred Galichon, Sonia Jaffe, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Taxation in Matching Markets." International Economic Review 61, no. 4 (November 2020): 1591–1634.
- September 2019
- Article
Trading Networks with Frictions
By: Tamás Fleiner, Ravi Jagadeesan, Zsuzsanna Jankó and Alexander Teytelboym
We show how frictions and continuous transfers jointly affect equilibria in a model of matching in trading networks. Our model incorporates distortionary frictions such as transaction taxes and commissions. When contracts are fully substitutable for firms, competitive... View Details
Keywords: Trading Networks; Frictions; Competitive Equilibrium; Matching With Contracts; Stability; Trail Stability
Fleiner, Tamás, Ravi Jagadeesan, Zsuzsanna Jankó, and Alexander Teytelboym. "Trading Networks with Frictions." Econometrica 87, no. 5 (September 2019): 1633–1661.
- Article
Strategy-Proofness of Worker-Optimal Matching with Continuously Transferable Utility
By: Ravi Jagadeesan, Scott Duke Kominers and Ross Rheingans-Yoo
We give a direct proof of one-sided strategy-proofness for worker-firm matching under continuously transferable utility. A new “Lone Wolf” theorem (Jagadeesan et al., 2017) for settings with transferable utility allows us to adapt the method of proving one-sided... View Details
Keywords: Matching; Strategy-proofness; Lone Wolf Theorem; Rural Hospitals Theorem; Mechanism Design; Marketplace Matching
Jagadeesan, Ravi, Scott Duke Kominers, and Ross Rheingans-Yoo. "Strategy-Proofness of Worker-Optimal Matching with Continuously Transferable Utility." Games and Economic Behavior 108 (March 2018): 287–294.
- Article
Stability and Competitive Equilibrium in Matching Markets with Transfers
By: John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers
This note surveys recent work in generalized matching theory, focusing on trading networks with transferable utility. In trading networks with a finite set of contractual opportunities, the substitutability of agents’ preferences is essential for the guaranteed... View Details
Keywords: Matching; Networks; Joint Ventures; Stability; Competitive Equilibrium; Core; Efficiency; Economics; Theory
Hatfield, John William, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Stability and Competitive Equilibrium in Matching Markets with Transfers." ACM SIGecom Exchanges 10, no. 3 (December 2011).
- March 2010
- Article
Matching with Preferences over Colleagues Solves Classical Matching
In this note, we demonstrate that the problem of "many-to-one matching with (strict) preferences over colleagues" is actually more difficult than the classical many-to-one matching problem, "matching without preferences over colleagues." We give an explicit reduction... View Details
Kominers, Scott Duke. "Matching with Preferences over Colleagues Solves Classical Matching." Games and Economic Behavior 68, no. 2 (March 2010): 773–780.
- December 2019
- Article
Costly Concessions: An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility
By: Alfred Galichon, Scott Duke Kominers and Simon Weber
We introduce an empirical framework for models of matching with imperfectly transferable utility and unobserved heterogeneity in tastes. Our framework allows us to characterize matching equilibrium in a flexible way that includes as special cases the classic fully- and... View Details
Keywords: Sorting; Matching; Marriage Market; Intrahousehold Allocation; Imperfectly Transferable Utility; Marketplace Matching; Mathematical Methods
Galichon, Alfred, Scott Duke Kominers, and Simon Weber. "Costly Concessions: An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility." Journal of Political Economy 127, no. 6 (December 2019): 2875–2925.
- 2014
- Working Paper
Hidden Substitutes
By: John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers
In this paper, we show that preferences exhibiting some forms of complementarity
in fact have an underlying substitutable structure. Specifically, we show that some
preferences that are not substitutable in the setting of many-to-one matching with
contracts become... View Details
Keywords: Many-to-One Matching; Many-to-Many Matching; Stability; Substitutes; Matching With Contracts; Slot-Specific Priorities; Sherlock; Market Design; Contracts; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
Hatfield, John William, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Hidden Substitutes." Working Paper, September 2014.
- Research Summary
Optimal Contracting with Reciprocal Agents
(with Florian Englmaier) (Job Market Paper)
Abstract: Empirically, compensation systems often seem to generate substantial effort despite weak incentives. We consider reciprocal motivations as a source of incentives. We solve for the optimal... View Details
- Working Paper
Covenant-Light Contracts and Creditor Coordination
By: Bo Becker and Victoria Ivashina
In 2015, 70% of newly issued leveraged loans had weaker enforcement features, called covenant-light or "cov-lite"; this is nearly a three-time increase in cov-lite issuance compared to a previous peak in 2007. We evaluate whether this development can be attributed to... View Details
Keywords: Credit Cycles; Loan Contracts; Debt Covenants; Contracts; Financing and Loans; Credit; Borrowing and Debt
Becker, Bo, and Victoria Ivashina. "Covenant-Light Contracts and Creditor Coordination." Swedish House of Finance Research Paper, No. 16-09, March 2016.
- August 2022
- Article
Contract Duration and the Costs of Market Transactions
By: Alexander MacKay
The optimal duration of a supply contract balances the costs of reselecting a supplier against the costs of being matched to an inefficient supplier when the contract lasts too long. I develop a structural model of contract duration that captures this tradeoff and... View Details
Keywords: Supply Contracts; Intermediate Goods; Switching Costs; Vertical Relationships; Transaction Costs; Contract Duration; Identification; Supply Chain; Cost; Contracts; Auctions; Mathematical Methods
MacKay, Alexander. "Contract Duration and the Costs of Market Transactions." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 14, no. 3 (August 2022): 164–212.