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  • January 2017
  • Article

Contract Design and Stability in Many-to-Many Matching

By: John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers
We develop a model of many-to-many matching with contracts that subsumes as special cases many-to-many matching markets and buyer/seller markets with heterogeneous and indivisible goods. In our setting, substitutable preferences are sufficient to guarantee the... View Details
Keywords: Many-to-Many Matching; Stability; Substitutes; Contract Design; Contracts; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
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  • 2008
  • Working Paper

Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts

By: Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus and Markus Walzl
We consider several notions of setwise stability for many-to-many matching markets with contracts and provide an analysis of the relations between the resulting sets of stable allocations for general, substitutable, and strongly substitutable preferences. Apart from... View Details
Keywords: Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
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  • Article

On the Correspondence of Contracts to Salaries in (Many-to-Many) Matching

By: Scott Duke Kominers
In this note, I extend the work of Echenique (2012) to show that a model of many-to-many matching with contracts may be embedded into a model of many-to-many matching with wage bargaining whenever (1) all agentsʼ preferences are substitutable and (2) the matching with... View Details
Keywords: Many-to-Many Matching; Stability; Substitutes; Contract Design; Unitarity; Market Design; Contracts; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability; Economics
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  • 2018
  • Working Paper

Bundling Incentives in (Many-to-Many) Matching with Contracts

By: Jonathan Ma and Scott Duke Kominers
In many-to-many matching with contracts, the way in which contracts are specified can affect the set of stable equilibrium outcomes. Consequently, agents may be incentivized to modify the set of contracts upfront. We consider one simple way in which agents may do so:... View Details
Keywords: Matching With Contracts; Contract Design; Bundling-proofness; Substitutability; Mathematical Methods
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  • 2014
  • Working Paper

Hidden Substitutes

By: John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers
In this paper, we show that preferences exhibiting some forms of complementarity in fact have an underlying substitutable structure. Specifically, we show that some preferences that are not substitutable in the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts become... View Details
Keywords: Many-to-One Matching; Many-to-Many Matching; Stability; Substitutes; Matching With Contracts; Slot-Specific Priorities; Sherlock; Market Design; Contracts; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
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  • October 2020
  • Article

Comparative Statics for Size-Dependent Discounts in Matching Markets

By: David Delacretaz, Scott Duke Kominers and Alexandru Nichifor
We prove a natural comparative static for many-to-many matching markets in which agents’ choice functions exhibit size-dependent discounts: reducing the extent to which some agent discounts additional partners leads to improved outcomes for the agents on the other side... View Details
Keywords: Size-dependent Discounts; Path-independence; Respect For Improvements; Market Design; Mathematical Methods
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  • 23 Feb 2016
  • First Look

February 23, 2016

link: https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=50571 February 2016 Games and Economic Behavior Contract Design and Stability in Many-to-Many Matching By: Hatfield, John William, and Scott Duke Kominers... View Details
Keywords: Sean Silverthorne
  • 17 May 2016
  • First Look

May 17, 2016

behavior. Publisher's link: https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=51072 forthcoming Games and Economic Behavior Contract Design and Stability in Many-to-Many Matching By: Hatfield, John William, and... View Details
Keywords: Sean Silverthorne
  • 07 Oct 2008
  • First Look

First Look: October 7, 2008

http://papers.nber.org/papers/w14360 Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts Authors:Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus and Markus Walzl Abstract We consider several notions of setwise stability for View Details
Keywords: Martha Lagace
  • 07 Apr 2009
  • First Look

First Look: April 7, 2009

counterparties located in the same city. Further analyses suggest that location-specific goods such as opera tickets, cultural factors, and the possibility of direct contract enforcement in case of breach may be the main reasons behind the same-city bias. Stable View Details
Keywords: Martha Lagace
  • 21 Aug 2018
  • First Look

New Research and Ideas, August 21, 2018

labor policy and the economy. Download working paper: https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=52552 Bundling Incentives in (Many-to-Many) Matching with Contracts By: Ma, Jonathan, and Scott Duke Kominers Abstract—In View Details
Keywords: Dina Gerdeman