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- Faculty Publications (7)
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- All HBS Web (9)
- Faculty Publications (7)
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- April 2015
- Case
Who Owns the Whale?
By: Thales S. Teixeira and David E. Bell
Judge William Wright considers the case of the dispute of a whale carcass wherein several whaling ships claim ownership based on each one's contribution to its killing. The judge must weigh in the differing efforts and costs of three ships who each played a role at... View Details
Keywords: Whaling; Attribution; Norms-of-ownership; Transaction Costs; Deadweight Losses; Free-rider Problem; Advertising; History; Advertising Industry; North America; Europe
Teixeira, Thales S., and David E. Bell. "Who Owns the Whale?" Harvard Business School Case 515-107, April 2015.
- April 2015
- Case
Who Owns the Whale? (Abridged)
By: Thales S. Teixeira and David E. Bell
Judge William Wright considers the case of the dispute of a whale carcass wherein several whaling ships claim ownership based on each one's contribution to its killing. The judge must weigh in the differing efforts and costs of three ships who each played a role at... View Details
Keywords: Whaling; Attribution; Norms-of-ownership; Transaction Costs; Deadweight Losses; Free-rider Problem; Advertising; History; United States; United Kingdom
Teixeira, Thales S., and David E. Bell. "Who Owns the Whale? (Abridged)." Harvard Business School Case 515-108, April 2015.
- August 2023
- Article
Financing the Litigation Arms Race
By: Samuel Antill and Steven R. Grenadier
Using a dynamic real-option model of litigation, we show that the increasingly popular practice of third-party litigation financing has ambiguous implications for total ex-post litigant surplus. A defendant and a plaintiff bargain over a settlement payment. The... View Details
Keywords: Litigation Financing; Dynamic Bargaining; Real Options; Lawsuits and Litigation; Financing and Loans
Antill, Samuel, and Steven R. Grenadier. "Financing the Litigation Arms Race." Journal of Financial Economics 149, no. 2 (August 2023): 218–234.
- 2021
- Working Paper
Closing Costs, Refinancing, and Inefficiencies in the Mortgage Market
By: David Hao Zhang
In the US, borrowers often finance the price of mortgage origination by agreeing to higher mortgage rates for a given principal amount. I show that for standard fixed-rate, prepayable mortgages this contractual feature has two consequences. First, it leads to increased... View Details
- 2007
- Working Paper
Proprietary vs. Open Two-Sided Platforms and Social Efficiency
By: Andrei Hagiu
This paper identifies a fundamental economic welfare tradeoff between two-sided open platforms and two-sided proprietary (closed) platforms connecting consumers and producers. Proprietary platforms create two-sided deadweight losses through monopoly pricing but at the... View Details
Keywords: Two-Sided Markets; Platforms; Indirect Network Effects; Product Variety; Social Efficiency; Two-Sided Platforms; Network Effects; Welfare or Wellbeing
Hagiu, Andrei. "Proprietary vs. Open Two-Sided Platforms and Social Efficiency." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 07-095, May 2007.
- 26 Oct 2017
- News
Will corporate tax cuts boost workers’ wages?
- 2021
- Working Paper
Quantifying the Inefficiency of Multi-unit Auctions for Normal Goods
By: Brian Baisa and Simon Essig Aberg
We study multi-unit auctions for homogenous goods in a private value setting where bidders have non-quasilinear preferences. Several recent impossibility results study this setting and find there is no mechanism that retains the Vickrey auction’s desired incentive and... View Details
Baisa, Brian, and Simon Essig Aberg. "Quantifying the Inefficiency of Multi-unit Auctions for Normal Goods." Working Paper, August 2021.
- November 2020
- Article
Taxation in Matching Markets
By: Arnaud Dupuy, Alfred Galichon, Sonia Jaffe and Scott Duke Kominers
We analyze the effects of taxation in two-sided matching markets, i.e., markets in which all agents have heterogeneous preferences over potential partners. In matching markets, taxes can generate inefficiency on the allocative margin by changing who is matched to whom,... View Details
Dupuy, Arnaud, Alfred Galichon, Sonia Jaffe, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Taxation in Matching Markets." International Economic Review 61, no. 4 (November 2020): 1591–1634.
- 21 Apr 2009
- First Look
First Look: April 21, 2009
two-sided proprietary (closed) platforms connecting consumers and producers. Proprietary platforms create two-sided deadweight losses through monopoly pricing but at the same time, precisely because they set... View Details
Keywords: Martha Lagace