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- Article
Trust and Collaboration in the Aftermath of Conflict: The Effects of Contract Structure
By: Deepak Malhotra and Fabrice Lumineau
Leveraging a longitudinal dataset concerning 102 inter-firm disputes, we evaluate the effects of contract structure on trust and on the likelihood of continued collaboration. We theoretically refine and empirically extend prior research by (a) distinguishing between... View Details
Malhotra, Deepak, and Fabrice Lumineau. "Trust and Collaboration in the Aftermath of Conflict: The Effects of Contract Structure." Academy of Management Journal 54, no. 5 (October 2011): 981–998.
- March 2000
- Article
The Structure of Licensing Contracts
Keywords: Contracts
Anand, B., and T. Khanna. "The Structure of Licensing Contracts." Journal of Industrial Economics 48, no. 1 (March 2000): 103–35. (Formerly titled "Intellectual Property Rights and Contract Structure.")
- Article
Shadow of the Contract: How Contract Structure Shapes Inter-Firm Dispute Resolution
By: Fabrice Lumineau and Deepak Malhotra
This paper investigates how contract structure influences inter-firm dispute resolution processes and outcomes by examining a unique dataset consisting of over 150,000 pages of documents relating to 102 business disputes. We find that the level of contractual detail... View Details
Keywords: Governance Controls; Contracts; Rights; Negotiation; Conflict and Resolution; Power and Influence
Lumineau, Fabrice, and Deepak Malhotra. "Shadow of the Contract: How Contract Structure Shapes Inter-Firm Dispute Resolution." Strategic Management Journal 32, no. 5 (May 2011): 532–555.
- Working Paper
Covenant-Light Contracts and Creditor Coordination
By: Bo Becker and Victoria Ivashina
In 2015, 70% of newly issued leveraged loans had weaker enforcement features, called covenant-light or "cov-lite"; this is nearly a three-time increase in cov-lite issuance compared to a previous peak in 2007. We evaluate whether this development can be attributed to... View Details
Keywords: Credit Cycles; Loan Contracts; Debt Covenants; Contracts; Financing and Loans; Credit; Borrowing and Debt
Becker, Bo, and Victoria Ivashina. "Covenant-Light Contracts and Creditor Coordination." Swedish House of Finance Research Paper, No. 16-09, March 2016.
- August 2022
- Article
Contract Duration and the Costs of Market Transactions
By: Alexander MacKay
The optimal duration of a supply contract balances the costs of reselecting a supplier against the costs of being matched to an inefficient supplier when the contract lasts too long. I develop a structural model of contract duration that captures this tradeoff and... View Details
Keywords: Supply Contracts; Intermediate Goods; Switching Costs; Vertical Relationships; Transaction Costs; Contract Duration; Identification; Supply Chain; Cost; Contracts; Auctions; Mathematical Methods
MacKay, Alexander. "Contract Duration and the Costs of Market Transactions." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 14, no. 3 (August 2022): 164–212.
- 1999
- Working Paper
Enterprise Design: A Task Structure Plus a Contract Structure - Chapter 8
By: Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim Clark
- 2020
- Working Paper
Contract Duration and the Costs of Market Transactions
By: Alexander MacKay
The optimal duration of a supply contract balances the costs of reselecting a supplier against the costs of being matched to an inefficient supplier when the contract lasts too long. I develop a structural model of contract duration that captures this tradeoff and... View Details
Keywords: Vertical Relationships; Transaction Costs; Contract Duration; Identification; Supply Chain; Cost; Contracts; Auctions; Mathematical Methods
MacKay, Alexander. "Contract Duration and the Costs of Market Transactions." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 18-058, December 2017. (Revised May 2020. Direct download.)
- 1998
- Working Paper
System/360: A New Design Creates New Contract Structure Possibilities
By: Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim Clark
- October 2022
- Article
A Structural Model of Organizational Buying for Business-to-Business Markets: Innovation Adoption with Share-of-Wallet Contracts
By: Navid Mojir and K. Sudhir
The paper develops the first structural model of organizational buying to study innovation diffusion in a B2B market. Our model is particularly applicable for routinized exchange relationships, whereby centralized buyers periodically evaluate and choose contracts,... View Details
Keywords: Organizational Buying Behavior; Healthcare Marketing; B2B Markets; B2B Innovation; New Product Diffusion; New Product Adoption; Organizations; Acquisition; Behavior; Health Care and Treatment; Marketing; Innovation and Invention
Mojir, Navid, and K. Sudhir. "A Structural Model of Organizational Buying for Business-to-Business Markets: Innovation Adoption with Share-of-Wallet Contracts." Journal of Marketing Research (JMR) 59, no. 5 (October 2022): 883–907.
- 2023
- Working Paper
Pulp Friction: The Value of Quantity Contracts in Decentralized Markets
By: Olivier Darmouni, Simon Essig Aberg and Juha Tolvanen
Firms in decentralized markets often trade using quantity contracts, agreements that specify quantity prior to the point of sale. These contracts are valuable because they provide quantity assurance, as trading frictions could prevent a buyer and seller from matching... View Details
Keywords: Decentralized Markets; Trading Frictions; Market Structure; Transaction Costs; Contracts; Market Transactions; Pulp and Paper Industry
Darmouni, Olivier, Simon Essig Aberg, and Juha Tolvanen. "Pulp Friction: The Value of Quantity Contracts in Decentralized Markets." Working Paper, December 2023.
- October 2015
- Article
Managing the Performance Tradeoffs from Partner Integration: Implications of Contract Choice in R&D Projects
By: Alan MacCormack and Anant Mishra
Formal contracts represent an important governance instrument with which firms exercise control of and compensate partners in R&D projects. The specific type of contract used, however, can vary significantly across projects. In some, firms govern partnering... View Details
Keywords: ＂＂Partner Integration; Contract Choice; R＆D Project Management; Relational Contracts; Partnering Performance; Research and Development; Projects; Partners and Partnerships; Performance; Contracts
MacCormack, Alan, and Anant Mishra. "Managing the Performance Tradeoffs from Partner Integration: Implications of Contract Choice in R&D Projects." Production and Operations Management 24, no. 10 (October 2015): 1552–1569.
- October 2020
- Article
Corporate Legal Structure and Bank Loan Spread
By: Anywhere (Siko) Sikochi
This study examines how a corporate legal structure may affect borrowing costs. Corporate legal structure refers to the legal fragmentation of a firm into multiple, separately incorporated entities. This fragmentation is bound to be a factor when lenders determine the... View Details
Keywords: Corporate Legal Structure; Subsidiaries; Bank Loans; Minority Interest; Credit Risk; Organizational Structure; Business Subsidiaries; Financing and Loans
Sikochi, Anywhere (Siko). "Corporate Legal Structure and Bank Loan Spread." Journal of Corporate Finance 64 (October 2020).
- Article
Real Effects of Relational Contracts
By: Steven Blader, Claudine Gartenberg, Rebecca Henderson and Andrea Pratt
How important are factors such as "firm culture" and "employee engagement" in driving firm performance? Increasing evidence from a wide range of fields suggests that productivity differs widely across firms, even after the inclusion of careful controls for factors such... View Details
Blader, Steven, Claudine Gartenberg, Rebecca Henderson, and Andrea Pratt. "Real Effects of Relational Contracts." American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 105, no. 5 (May 2015): 452–456.
- Research Summary
Optimal Contracting with Reciprocal Agents
(with Florian Englmaier) (Job Market Paper)
Abstract: Empirically, compensation systems often seem to generate substantial effort despite weak incentives. We consider reciprocal motivations as a source of incentives. We solve for the optimal... View Details
- June 1983
- Article
A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts
By: Jerry R. Green and Nancy Stokey
Tournaments, reward structures based on rank order, are compared with individual contracts in a model with one risk-neutral principal and many risk-averse agents. Each agent's output is a stochastic function of his effort level plus an additive shock term that is... View Details
Green, Jerry R., and Nancy Stokey. "A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts." Journal of Political Economy 91, no. 3 (June 1983): 349–364.
- Article
Renegotiation and the Form of Efficient Contracts
By: Jerry R. Green and J. J. Laffont
Two parties may agree to a mutually binding contract that will govern their behavior after an uncertain event becomes known. As there is no agent who can both observe this uncertain outcome and enforce the contract, contingent agreements are precluded. However, the... View Details
Green, Jerry R., and J. J. Laffont. "Renegotiation and the Form of Efficient Contracts." Annales d'économie et de statistique, nos. 25-26 (January–June 1992): 123–150.
- August 2003 (Revised December 2003)
- Background Note
Formalizing Business Relationships: Note on Contract Formation for Managers
Equips managers with a basic understanding of how to use contracts to define, formalize, and strengthen business relationships. Explains how managers can use properly structured contracts to increase predictability; to create or preserve valuable legal, financial, and... View Details
Bagley, Constance E. "Formalizing Business Relationships: Note on Contract Formation for Managers." Harvard Business School Background Note 804-004, August 2003. (Revised December 2003.)
- April 2012
- Article
Corporate Ownership Structure and Bank Loan Syndicate Structure
By: Chen Lin, Yue Ma, Paul Malatesta and Yuhai Xuan
Using a novel data set on corporate ownership and control, we show that the divergence between the control rights and cash-flow rights of a borrowing firm's largest ultimate owner has a significant impact on the concentration and composition of the firm's loan... View Details
Keywords: Ownership; Financing and Loans; Cash Flow; Borrowing and Debt; Accounting; Crisis Management; Relationships; Law; Contracts; Banking Industry
Lin, Chen, Yue Ma, Paul Malatesta, and Yuhai Xuan. "Corporate Ownership Structure and Bank Loan Syndicate Structure." Journal of Financial Economics 104, no. 1 (April 2012): 1–22. (Lead Article.)
- Article
Liability Structure in Small-Scale Finance
By: Fenella Carpena, Shawn Cole, Jeremy Shapiro and Bilal Zia
Microfinance, the provision of small individual and business loans, has experienced dramatic growth, reaching over 150 million borrowers worldwide. Much of the success of microfinance has been attributed to attempts to overcome the challenges of information asymmetries... View Details
Keywords: Microfinance; Emerging Markets; Financial Markets; Legal Liability; Banks and Banking; Banking Industry; India
Carpena, Fenella, Shawn Cole, Jeremy Shapiro, and Bilal Zia. "Liability Structure in Small-Scale Finance." World Bank Economic Review 27, no. 3 (2013): 437–469.