Filter Results:
(47)
Show Results For
- All HBS Web (47)
- Faculty Publications (27)
Show Results For
- All HBS Web (47)
- Faculty Publications (27)
Page 1 of 47
Results →
- 2019
- Working Paper
Collusion in Markets with Syndication
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers, Richard Lowery and Jordan M. Barry
Many markets, including markets for IPOs and debt issuances, are syndicated: each winning bidder invites competitors to join its syndicate to complete production. Using repeated extensive form games, we show that collusion in syndicated markets may become easier as... View Details
Hatfield, John William, Scott Duke Kominers, Richard Lowery, and Jordan M. Barry. "Collusion in Markets with Syndication." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 18-009, July 2017. (Revised June 2019.)
- October 2020
- Article
Collusion in Markets with Syndication
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers, Richard Lowery and Jordan M. Barry
Markets for IPOs and debt issuances are syndicated, in the sense that a bidder who wins a contract may invite losing bidders to join a syndicate that together fulfills the contract. We show that in markets with syndication, standard intuitions from industrial... View Details
Keywords: Collusion; Antitrust; IPO Underwriting; Syndication; ＂Repeated Games＂; Markets; Game Theory
Hatfield, John William, Scott Duke Kominers, Richard Lowery, and Jordan M. Barry. "Collusion in Markets with Syndication." Journal of Political Economy 128, no. 10 (October 2020).
- 2016
- Working Paper
Collusion in Markets with Syndication
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Kominers and Richard Lowery
Markets for IPOs and debt issuances are syndicated, in the sense that a bidder who
wins a contract may invite losing bidders to join a syndicate that together fulfills the
contract. We show that in markets with syndication, standard intuitions from... View Details
Hatfield, John William, Scott Kominers, and Richard Lowery. "Collusion in Markets with Syndication." Working Paper, November 2016.
- 2020
- Working Paper
Collusion in Brokered Markets
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Richard Lowery
The U.S. residential real estate agency market presents a puzzle for economic theory: commissions on real estate transactions have remained high for decades even though entry is frequent and costs are low. We model the real estate agency market, and other brokered... View Details
Keywords: Real Estate; ＂Repeated Games＂; Collusion; Antitrust; Brokered Markets; Game Theory; Real Estate Industry
Hatfield, John William, Scott Duke Kominers, and Richard Lowery. "Collusion in Brokered Markets." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 20-023, September 2019. (Revised July 2020.)
- 2019
- Working Paper
Collusive Investments in Technological Compatibility: Lessons from U.S. Railroads in the Late 19th Century
By: Daniel P. Gross
Collusion is widely condemned for its negative effects on consumer welfare and market efficiency. In this paper, I show that collusion may also in some cases facilitate the creation of unexpected new sources of value. I bring this possibility into focus through the... View Details
Keywords: Collusion; Compatibility; Railroads; Rail Transportation; Standards; Integration; Trade; History; United States
Gross, Daniel P. "Collusive Investments in Technological Compatibility: Lessons from U.S. Railroads in the Late 19th Century." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 17-044, December 2016. (Accepted at Management Science.)
- 2024
- Working Paper
Do Collusive Norms Maximize Profits? Evidence From a Vegetable Market Experiment in India
By: Abhijit Banerjee, Greg Fischer, Dean Karlan, Matt Lowe and Benjamin N. Roth
Social norms have been shown to facilitate anti-competitive behavior in decentralized markets.
We demonstrate that these norms can also reduce aggregate profits. First, we present
descriptive evidence of competition-suppressing norms in Kolkata vegetable markets.... View Details
Banerjee, Abhijit, Greg Fischer, Dean Karlan, Matt Lowe, and Benjamin N. Roth. "Do Collusive Norms Maximize Profits? Evidence From a Vegetable Market Experiment in India." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 23-006, July 2022. (Revise and Resubmit, AEJ: Applied.)
- Research Summary
Multimarket contact, organizational structure, and collusion
This ongoing project with Jordan Siegel investigates multimarket contact among business groups in Brazil, and whether cross-ownership among business groups enhance firms' ability to commit to collusive strategies. View Details
- June 2025
- Article
Collusion in Brokered Markets
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Richard Lowery
High commissions in the U.S. residential real estate agency market present a puzzle for economic theory because brokerage is not a concentrated industry. We model brokered markets as a game in which agents post prices for customers and then choose which other agents to... View Details
Keywords: Real Estate Agents; Real Estate; Realtors; Broker Networks; Brokerage; Brokerage Commissions; ＂Brokerage Industry; Brokered Markets; Brokering; Brokers; Industrial Organization; Repeated Game Framework; ＂Repeated Games＂; Collusion; Antitrust; Microeconomics; Market Design; Theory; Game Theory; Real Estate Industry
Hatfield, John William, Scott Duke Kominers, and Richard Lowery. "Collusion in Brokered Markets." Journal of Finance 80, no. 3 (June 2025): 1417–1462.
- Research Summary
Competition and Collusion in Ocean Shipping
The liner shipping industry has been dominated by cartels since the late 19th century. Rich Sicotte's research builds on his 1997 Ph.D. thesis and employs analytical tools of industrial organization and economic history. He is examining the sources of variation in... View Details
- Article
Collusive Price Leadership
By: J. J. Rotemberg and Garth Saloner
Rotemberg, J. J., and Garth Saloner. "Collusive Price Leadership." Journal of Industrial Economics 39, no. 1 (September 1990): 93–110.
- March 2023
- Article
Not from Concentrate: Collusion in Collaborative Industries
By: Jordan M. Barry, John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Richard Lowery
The chief principle of antitrust law and theory is that reducing market concentration—having more, smaller firms instead of fewer, bigger ones—reduces anticompetitive behavior. We demonstrate that this principle is fundamentally incomplete.
In many... View Details
In many... View Details
Keywords: Antitrust; Antitrust Law; Antitrust Theory; Law And Economics; Collusion; Collaboration; Collaborative Industries; Regulation; ＂Repeated Games＂; IPOs; Initial Public Offerings; Underwriters; Real Estate; Real Estate Agents; Realtors; Syndicated Markets; Syndication; Brokers; Market Concentration; Competition; Law; Economics; Collaborative Innovation and Invention; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Game Theory; Initial Public Offering
Barry, Jordan M., John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers, and Richard Lowery. "Not from Concentrate: Collusion in Collaborative Industries." Iowa Law Review 108, no. 3 (March 2023): 1089–1148.
- 29 Aug 2018
- HBS Conference
Economic Models of Competition and Collusion
- May 1989
- Article
Tariffs vs. Quotas with Implicit Collusion
By: J. J. Rotemberg and Garth Saloner
Keywords: Taxation
Rotemberg, J. J., and Garth Saloner. "Tariffs vs. Quotas with Implicit Collusion." Canadian Journal of Economics 22 (May 1989): 237–244.
- Article
Game Theory and the Legal Analysis of Tacit Collusion
By: Dennis Yao and Susan DeSanti
Yao, Dennis, and Susan DeSanti. "Game Theory and the Legal Analysis of Tacit Collusion." Antitrust Bulletin 38, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 113–141.
- 2015
- Working Paper
Do People Who Care About Others Cooperate More? Experimental Evidence from Relative Incentive Pay
By: Pablo Hernandez, Dylan B. Minor and Dana Sisak
We experimentally study ways in which the social preferences of individuals and groups affect performance when faced with relative incentives. We also identify the mediating role that communication and leadership play in generating these effects. We find... View Details
Keywords: Social Preferences; Relative Performance; Collusion; Motivation and Incentives; Leadership; Attitudes; Performance
Hernandez, Pablo, Dylan B. Minor, and Dana Sisak. "Do People Who Care About Others Cooperate More? Experimental Evidence from Relative Incentive Pay." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 16-040, October 2015.
- Article
Vertical Merger, Collusion, and Disruptive Buyers
By: Volker Nocke and Lucy White
In a repeated game setting of a vertically related industry, we study the collusive effects of vertical mergers. We show that any vertical merger facilitates upstream collusion, no matter how large (in terms of capacity or size of product portfolio) the integrated... View Details
Nocke, Volker, and Lucy White. "Vertical Merger, Collusion, and Disruptive Buyers." International Journal of Industrial Organization 28, no. 4 (July 2010): 350–354.
- Research Summary
Do Vertical Mergers facilitate Collusion?
Joint work with Volker Nocke, University of Pennsylvania In this paper we investigate the impact of vertical mergers on upstream firms' ability to sustain collusion. We show in a number of models that the net effect of vertical integration is to facilitate... View Details
- 2022
- Chapter
When Fifth Columns Fall: Religious Groups and Loyalty-Signaling in Erdoğan's Turkey
By: Kristin Fabbe and Efe Murat Balıkçıoğlu
This chapter investigates the role that fifth-column claims play in authoritarian politics. Specifically, it examines how fifth-column claims against the Gülen Movement have transformed the relationship between the Turkish state and both official (state-sanctioned)... View Details
Keywords: Fifth Columns; Gülen Movement; Political Islam; Government and Politics; Religion; Turkey
Fabbe, Kristin, and Efe Murat Balıkçıoğlu. "When Fifth Columns Fall: Religious Groups and Loyalty-Signaling in Erdoğan's Turkey." Chap. 10 in Enemies Within: The Global Politics of Fifth Columns, edited by Harris Mylonas and Scott Radnitz, 248–270. New York: Oxford University Press, 2022.
- 2004
- Article
Sources of Structural Inequality in Managerial Labor Markets
By: Rakesh Khurana and Mikolaj Jan Piskorski
This article proposes two mechanisms that allow actors to obtain unearned advantages in labor markets. The first mechanism is consistent with collusive closure arguments. However, it questions the assumption that those who seek to benefit from collusive closure will... View Details
Khurana, Rakesh, and Mikolaj Jan Piskorski. "Sources of Structural Inequality in Managerial Labor Markets." Research in Social Stratification and Mobility 21 (2004): 169–187.
- winter 1989
- Article
Split-Awards Procurement and Innovation
By: James J. Anton and Dennis A. Yao
In many procurement settings, it is possible for a buyer to split a production award between suppliers. In this article, we develop a model of split-award procurement auctions in which the split choice is endogenous. We characterize the set of equilibrium bids and... View Details
Keywords: Innovation and Invention; Auctions; Bids and Bidding; Cost; Supply Chain; Investment; Balance and Stability
Anton, James J., and Dennis A. Yao. "Split-Awards Procurement and Innovation." RAND Journal of Economics 20, no. 4 (winter 1989): 538–552. (Harvard users click here for full text.)