Publications

December 2021
Article

Auctioneers Sometimes Prefer Entry Fees to Extra Bidders

By: Jiafeng Chen and Scott Duke Kominers

We investigate a market thickness–market power tradeoff in an auction setting with endogenous entry. We find that charging admission fees can sometimes dominate the benefit of recruiting additional bidders, even though the fees themselves implicitly reduce competition... View Details

Keywords: Entry; Reserve Prices; Entry Fees; Auctions; Design

June 2002
Article

The Timing of Bids in Internet Auctions: Market Design, Bidder Behavior, and Artificial Agents

By: Axel Ockenfels and Alvin E. Roth

Keywords: Auctions; Bids and Bidding; Internet and the Web; Markets; Design; Behavior; Internet and the Web

February 2016 (Revised January 2017)
Case

Bidding for Finansbank

By: David Scharfstein and Esel Çekin

Because of the deepening Greek crisis, in October 2015, National Bank of Greece (NBG) was required to sell one of its most valuable assets, Finansbank, the eighth largest Turkish bank. There were three potential buyers: Garanti Bank, Turkey's second largest private... View Details

Keywords: Banking; Acquisitions; International Acquisition; Cross-border Investment; Bidding; Bidders; Regulations; ROE; Cost Synergies; Regional Growth; Emerging Market; Sales Process; Valuation; Mergers and Acquisitions; Banking Industry; Turkey; Europe

Educators

Purchase

05 Aug 2014
News

What Business Owners Can Learn From T-Mobile's Bidding War

winter 2005
Article

Financing Auction Bids

By: Matthew Rhodes-Kropf and S. Viswanathan

In many auctions, bidders do not have enough cash to pay their bid. If bidders have asymmetric cash positions and independent private values then auctions will be inefficient. However, what happens if bidders have access to financial markets? We characterize efficient... View Details

Keywords: Financing and Loans; Auctions; Bids and Bidding; Financial Markets; Valuation; Cash; Capital Markets; Profit; Competition

Research Summary

Precautionary Bidding in Auctions

Joint work with Peter Esö, MEDS Department, Kellogg School of Management

We analyze bidding behavior in auctions when risk-averse bidders bid for an object whose value is risky. We show... View Details

28 Feb 2005
Research & Ideas

How to Harness Auction Fever

phenomena differ in that each proposes a different underlying mechanism: The winner's curse is an information story. When bidders lack perfect information regarding the true value of an item, they must act on whatever "noisy... View Details

Keywords: by Manda Salls; Web Services; Technology

2021
Working Paper

Quantifying the Inefficiency of Multi-unit Auctions for Normal Goods

By: Brian Baisa and Simon Essig Aberg

We study multi-unit auctions for homogenous goods in a private value setting where bidders have non-quasilinear preferences. Several recent impossibility results study this setting and find there is no mechanism that retains the Vickrey auction’s desired incentive and... View Details

Keywords: Multi-unit Auctions; Auctions; Bids and Bidding; Value

SSRN

2014
Article

Delaware's Choice

By: Guhan Subramanian

This article first documents the shift to annual elections of all directors at most U.S. corporations and argues that the alternative of "ineffective" staggered boards would have been more desirable, as a policy matter, but is now a missed opportunity. Using this... View Details

Keywords: Governing and Advisory Boards; Laws and Statutes; Policy; Delaware

August 2000
Article

Corporate Reorganizations and Non-Cash Auctions

By: Matthew Rhodes-Kropf and S. Viswanathan

This paper extends the theory of non-cash auctions by considering the revenue and efficiency of using different securities. Research on bankruptcy and privatization suggests using non-cash auctions to increase cash-constrained bidder participation. We examine this... View Details

Keywords: Auctions; Revenue; Debt Securities; Insolvency and Bankruptcy; Privatization; Capital Structure; Bids and Bidding; Motivation and Incentives; Performance Efficiency; Contracts

Prior stock price peaks of targets affect several aspects of merger and acquisition activity. Offer prices are biased toward recent peak prices although they are economically unremarkable. An offer's probability of acceptance jumps discontinuously when it exceeds a... View Details

October 2012
Article

The Effect of Reference Point Prices on Mergers and Acquisitions

By: Malcolm Baker, Xin Pan and Jeffrey Wurgler

Prior stock price peaks of targets affect several aspects of merger and acquisition activity. Offer prices are biased toward recent peak prices although they are economically unremarkable. An offer's probability of acceptance jumps discontinuously when it exceeds a... View Details

Keywords: Mergers and Acquisitions; Stocks; Price; Valuation; Negotiation

April 2005 (Revised August 2011)
Case

Berkshire Partners: Bidding for Carter's

By: Malcolm P. Baker and James Quinn

A five-member team from Berkshire Partners must recommend a final bid and financial structure for a leveraged buyout of William Carter Co., a leading producer of children's apparel. Investorcorp, a global investment group, has put the company up for auction. Goldman... View Details

Keywords: Leveraged Buyouts; Capital Structure; Private Equity; Financing and Loans; Auctions; Bids and Bidding; Valuation; Apparel and Accessories Industry

Educators

Purchase

March 2000
Case

Spec's Music (B)

By: John A. Davis and Susan Harmeling

Explores the reasoning behind the final decision to sell and the decision-making process that leads to the final question of "if so, to whom?" Four of the bidders are music retailers and the fifth is a Tampa entrepreneur. View Details

Keywords: Decision Making; Decision Choices and Conditions; Entrepreneurship; Bids and Bidding

Educators

Purchase

Awards

Emerald Management Reviews. Citation of Excellence

Recipient of a 2011 Emerald Management Review Citation of Excellence Award for his paper with Michael Ostrovsky, “Strategic Bidder Behavior in Sponsored Search Auctions” (Decision Support Systems, 2007). The award honors the 50 best articles published by the... View Details

October 2020
Article

Collusion in Markets with Syndication

By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers, Richard Lowery and Jordan M. Barry

Markets for IPOs and debt issuances are syndicated, in the sense that a bidder who wins a contract may invite losing bidders to join a syndicate that together fulfills the contract. We show that in markets with syndication, standard intuitions from industrial... View Details

Keywords: Collusion; Antitrust; IPO Underwriting; Syndication; ＂Repeated Games＂; Markets; Game Theory

SSRN

2016
Working Paper

Collusion in Markets with Syndication

By: John William Hatfield, Scott Kominers and Richard Lowery

Markets for IPOs and debt issuances are syndicated, in the sense that a bidder who wins a contract may invite losing bidders to join a syndicate that together fulfills the contract. We show that in markets with syndication, standard intuitions from... View Details

Keywords: Collusion; Antitrust; IPO Underwriting; Syndication; ＂Repeated Games＂