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- summer 1994
- Article
Self-interest, Altruism, Incentives, and Agency Theory
By: Michael C. Jensen
Keywords: Theory
Jensen, Michael C. "Self-interest, Altruism, Incentives, and Agency Theory." Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 7, no. 2 (summer 1994): 40–45. (Reprinted in Michael C. Jensen, Foundations of Organizational Strategy, (Harvard University Press, 1998).)
- September–October 2021
- Article
Internalization of Advertising Services: Testing a Theory of the Firm
By: Alvin J. Silk, Birger Wernerfelt and Shuyi Yu
In 1956, a group of trade associations representing publishers and independent advertising agencies signed a consent decree aimed at ending a set of trade practices that for half a century effectively precluded advertisers from owning and operating in-house agencies.... View Details
Keywords: Internationalization; Specialization; Theory Of The Firm; Advertising Agencies; Advertising; Organizational Structure; Theory
Silk, Alvin J., Birger Wernerfelt, and Shuyi Yu. "Internalization of Advertising Services: Testing a Theory of the Firm." Marketing Science 40, no. 5 (September–October 2021): 946–963.
- 1985
- Chapter
Stockholder, Manager, and Creditor Interests: Applications of Agency Theory
By: Michael Jensen and Clifford W. Smith Jr.
Keywords: Agency Theory; Business and Shareholder Relations; Financing and Loans; Credit; Borrowing and Debt
Jensen, Michael, and Clifford W. Smith Jr. "Stockholder, Manager, and Creditor Interests: Applications of Agency Theory." In Recent Advances in Corporate Finance, edited by E. I. Altman and M. G. Subrahmanyam. Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, 1985. (Reprinted in Theory of the Firm: Governance, Residual Claims, and Organizational Forms, (Harvard University Press, 2000).)
- 1984
- Chapter
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure
By: Michael Jensen and William H. Meckling
Jensen, Michael, and William H. Meckling. "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure." In The Modern Theory of Corporate Finance, edited by Michael C. Jensen and Clifford H. Smith Jr.. McGraw-Hill, 1984. (Also in Economics of Corporation Law & Securities Regulation, Posner & Scott, Eds, (Little Brown,1980); Jensen, Foundations of Organizational Strategy, (HUP, 1998); & Theory of the Firm. . . (HUP, 2000) and JFE.)
- 2010
- Working Paper
Agency Revisited
By: Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and Daniel F. Spulber
The article presents a comprehensive overview of the principal-agent model that emphasizes the role of trust in the agency relationship. The analysis demonstrates that the legal remedy for breach of duty can result in a full-information efficient outcome eliminating... View Details
Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Daniel F. Spulber. "Agency Revisited." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 10-082, March 2010.
- Article
A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting
By: David S. Scharfstein and Patrick Bolton
Scharfstein, David S., and Patrick Bolton. "A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting." American Economic Review 80, no. 1 (March 1990).
- December 2008
- Article
Corporate Governance and Agency Conflicts
By: Aiyesha Dey
I investigate whether corporate governance is associated with the level of agency conflicts in firms. I employ exploratory principal components analysis on 22 individual governance variables to obtain seven factors that represent the different dimensions of governance... View Details
Dey, Aiyesha. "Corporate Governance and Agency Conflicts." Journal of Accounting Research 46, no. 5 (December 2008): 1143–1181.
- September 2004
- Article
Trust in Agency
Existing models of the principal-agent relationship assume the agent works only under extrinsic incentives. However, many observed agency contracts take the form of a fixed payment. For such contracts to succeed, the principal must trust the agent to work in the... View Details
Keywords: Trust; Agency Theory; Relationships; Behavior; Motivation and Incentives; Contracts; Business Model; Emotions; Forecasting and Prediction; Ethics; Standards; Risk and Uncertainty
Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon. "Trust in Agency." Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 13, no. 3 (September 2004): 375–404.
- 2017
- Chapter
Institutional Theory and the Natural Environment: Building Research Through Tensions and Paradox
By: P. Devereaux Jennings and Andrew J. Hoffman
The focus of institutional theory is directed towards an understanding of situations where context is strong and binding, yet subtly experienced; where agency is often diffuse, embodied in an arrangement or system of actors rather than in an individual; and where... View Details
Jennings, P. Devereaux, and Andrew J. Hoffman. "Institutional Theory and the Natural Environment: Building Research Through Tensions and Paradox." Chap. 29 in The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism. 2nd ed. Edited by Royston Greenwood, Christine Oliver, Thomas B. Lawrence, and Renate E. Meyer, 759–785. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2017.
- 2014
- Chapter
Bringing Agency Back Into Network Research: Constrained Agency and Network Action
By: Ranjay Gulati and Sameer Srivastava
We propose a framework of constrained agency grounded in the actors' resources and motivations within their structurally constrained context. Structural positions influence the resources available to actors and color the motivations that shape their actions. Resources... View Details
Gulati, Ranjay, and Sameer Srivastava. "Bringing Agency Back Into Network Research: Constrained Agency and Network Action." In Contemporary Perspectives on Organizational Social Networks. Vol. 40, edited by Dan Brass, Giuseppe Labianca, Ajay Mehra, Daniel S. Halgin, and Stephen P. Borgatti, 73–94. Research in the Sociology of Organizations. Emerald Group Publishing, 2014.
- Apr 2004 - 2004
- Conference Presentation
Foundations for a Theory of Institutional Entrepreneurship: Solving the Paradox of Embedded Agency
By: Julie Battilana
- September 2004
- Article
Relative Explanatory Power of Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Analysis in German Salesforces
By: Manfred Krafft, Sönke Albers and Rajiv Lal
Krafft, Manfred, Sönke Albers, and Rajiv Lal. "Relative Explanatory Power of Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Analysis in German Salesforces." International Journal of Research in Marketing 21, no. 3 (September 2004): 265–283.
- Jul 2004 - 2004
- Conference Presentation
Foundations for a Theory of Institutional Entrepreneurship: Solving the Paradox of Embedded Agency
By: Julie Battilana
- Article
Agency Costs, Mispricing, and Ownership Structure
By: Sergey Chernenko, C. Fritz Foley and Robin Greenwood
Standard theories of corporate ownership assume that because markets are efficient, insiders ultimately bear all agency costs that they create and therefore have a strong incentive to minimize conflicts of interest with outside investors. We argue that if equity is... View Details
Keywords: Business and Shareholder Relations; Ownership; Conflict of Interests; Investment; Valuation
Chernenko, Sergey, C. Fritz Foley, and Robin Greenwood. "Agency Costs, Mispricing, and Ownership Structure." Financial Management 41, no. 4 (Winter 2012): 885–914.
- February 2021
- Article
A Dynamic Theory of Multiple Borrowing
By: Daniel Green and Ernest Liu
Multiple borrowing—a borrower obtains overlapping loans from multiple lenders—is a common phenomenon in many credit markets. We build a highly tractable, dynamic model of multiple borrowing and show that, because overlapping creditors may impose default externalities... View Details
Keywords: Commitment; Multiple Borrowing; Common Agency; Misallocation; Microfinance; Investment; Mathematical Methods
Green, Daniel, and Ernest Liu. "A Dynamic Theory of Multiple Borrowing." Journal of Financial Economics 139, no. 2 (February 2021): 389–404.
- Teaching Interest
Organization and Management Theory
This doctoral seminar explores fundamental aspects of organizations and organization theory. This seminar will cover various approaches to organizations and the institutional contexts within which they operate. We will pay particular attention to innovation and... View Details
- 2010
- Working Paper
The Unbundling of Advertising Agency Services: An Economic Analysis
By: Mohammad Arzaghi, Ernst R. Berndt, James C. Davis and Alvin J. Silk
We address a longstanding puzzle surrounding the unbundling of services occurring over several decades in the U.S. advertising agency industry: What accounts for the shift from bundling to unbundling of services and the slow pace of change? Using Evans and Salinger's... View Details
Keywords: Advertising; Change; Forecasting and Prediction; Cost; Price; Analytics and Data Science; Surveys; Marketing Strategy; Media; Service Operations; Agency Theory; Mathematical Methods; Advertising Industry; United States
Arzaghi, Mohammad, Ernst R. Berndt, James C. Davis, and Alvin J. Silk. "The Unbundling of Advertising Agency Services: An Economic Analysis." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 11-039, September 2010.
- Article
Trust and Incentives in Agency
By: Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and Daniel F Spulber
Contracts between a principal and an agent are not formed in a vacuum. Although formal contracts between a principal and an agent contain explicit incentives for performance, the relationship between a principal and an agent also involves implicit incentives. Three... View Details
Keywords: Trust; Motivation and Incentives; Agency Theory; Contracts; Market Transactions; Performance; Relationships; Societal Protocols; Legal Liability; Cost
Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Daniel F Spulber. "Trust and Incentives in Agency." Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 15, no. 1 (Fall 2005): 45–104.
- 09 Nov 2010
- Working Paper Summaries
The Unbundling of Advertising Agency Services: An Economic Analysis
- 1991
- Chapter
Transfer Pricing as a Problem of Agency
By: Robert G. Eccles Jr.
Eccles, Robert G., Jr. "Transfer Pricing as a Problem of Agency." In Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business, edited by John W. Pratt and Richard Zeckhauser, 151–186. Harvard Business School Press, 1991.