Negotiation, Organizations & Markets - Publications - Faculty & Research

This paper concerns the introduction of a sequence of new, higher-quality durable products in a market in which there already exists a lower-quality substitute. The product has the further attribute that a real resource cost is incurred at the time a higher-quality... View Details

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1985
Chapter

Differential Information, the Market and Incentive Compatibility

By: Jerry Green

Keywords: Game Theory; Economics

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1985
Chapter

The Riskiness of Private Pensions

By: Jerry R. Green

Keywords: Retirement; Compensation and Benefits; Employee Relationship Management; Risk and Uncertainty

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1984
Book

Negotiating the Law of the Sea: Lessons in the Art and Science of Reaching Agreement

By: James K. Sebenius

Keywords: Law; Agreements and Arrangements

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Article

Participation Constraints in the Vickrey Auction

By: Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont

Economic agents are characterized by two privately observable parameters: their willingness to pay for an item being auctioned, and their reservation utility level which must be exceeded, in expectation, to induce them to participate in this auction. This creates a... View Details

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1983
Book

Negotiating in Organizations

By: M. H. Bazerman and R.J. Lewicki

Keywords: Negotiation; Organizations

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June 1983
Article

A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts

By: Jerry R. Green and Nancy Stokey

Tournaments, reward structures based on rank order, are compared with individual contracts in a model with one risk-neutral principal and many risk-averse agents. Each agent's output is a stochastic function of his effort level plus an additive shock term that is... View Details

Keywords: Tournaments; Contracts

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June 1983
Article

Don't Bet on It: Contingent Agreements with Asymmetric Information

By: James K. Sebenius and John Geanakoplos

Keywords: Information; Agreements and Arrangements

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Article

Wage-Employment Contracts

By: Jerry R. Green and Charles M. Kahn

This paper studies the efficient agreements about the dependence of workers' earnings on employment, when the employment level is controlled by firms. The firms' superior information about profitability conditions is responsible for this form of contract governance.... View Details

Keywords: Labor; Wages; Contracts

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Article

Bilateral Contracts

By: Jerry R. Green and Seppo Honkapohja

A mathematical characterization of self-enforcing bilateral contracts is given. Contracts where both parties exercise some control over the quantity traded can sometimes be superior to contracts that rest control entirely with one side. Some qualitative characteristics... View Details

Keywords: Contracts; Mathematical Methods

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