Publications
Publications
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- All HBS Web
(1,097)
- Faculty Publications (248)
- Article
Novelty and Disclosure in Patent Law
By: Suzanne Scotchmer and Jerry R. Green
The stringency of the novelty requirement in patent law affects the pace of innovation because it affects the amount of technical information that is disclosed among firms. It also affects ex ante profitability of research. We compare weak and strong novelty... View Details
- December 1988
- Article
Ordinal Independence in Non-Linear Utility Theory
By: Jerry R. Green and Bruno Jullien
Individual behavior under uncertainty is characterized using a new axiom, ordinal independence, which is a weakened form of the von Neumann-Morgcnslern independence axiom. It states that if two distributions share a tail in common, then this tail can be modified... View Details
Keywords: Preferences
- Article
'Making Book Against Oneself,' the Independence Axiom, and Non-Linear Utility Theory
By: Jerry R. Green
An individual with known preferences over lotteries can be led to accept random wealth distributions different from his initial endowment by a sequential process in which some uncertainty is resolved and he is offered a new lottery in place of the remaining... View Details
- 1987
- Chapter
Limited Communication and Incentive Compatibility
By: Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont
- January 1987
- Article
Posterior Implementability in a Two-person Decision Problem
By: Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont
When a decision rule is implemented using a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism in which the messages are publicly observable, the players' information is augmented by their observation of each others' strategies. In this paper we study the set of Bayesian... View Details
- 1986
- Working Paper
Price Competition with a Distribution of Switch Costs and Reservation Prices
By: Jerry R. Green and Suzanne Scotchmer
When there is a distribution of switch costs and of reservation prices for a good, and marginal cost of producing the good is zero, equilibrium in pure price strategies may (and sometimes must) exhibit price dispersion. Equilibrium may or may not exist, and there may... View Details
- Article
Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
By: Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont
In a principal-agent model with adverse selection, we study the implementation of social choice functions when the agent's message space is a correspondence which depends on this true characteristic. We characterize such correspondence for which the Revelation... View Details
- 1986
- Chapter
Alternative Limited Communication Systems: Centralization vs. Interchange of Information
By: Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont
- 1985
- Working Paper
Sequential Innovation and Market Structure
By: Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont
This paper concerns the introduction of a sequence of new, higher-quality durable products in a market in which there already exists a lower-quality substitute. The product has the further attribute that a real resource cost is incurred at the time a higher-quality... View Details
- Article
Participation Constraints in the Vickrey Auction
By: Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont
Economic agents are characterized by two privately observable parameters: their willingness to pay for an item being auctioned, and their reservation utility level which must be exceeded, in expectation, to induce them to participate in this auction. This creates a... View Details
- June 1983
- Article
A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts
By: Jerry R. Green and Nancy Stokey
Tournaments, reward structures based on rank order, are compared with individual contracts in a model with one risk-neutral principal and many risk-averse agents. Each agent's output is a stochastic function of his effort level plus an additive shock term that is... View Details
- Article
Wage-Employment Contracts
By: Jerry R. Green and Charles M. Kahn
This paper studies the efficient agreements about the dependence of workers' earnings on employment, when the employment level is controlled by firms. The firms' superior information about profitability conditions is responsible for this form of contract governance.... View Details
- Article
Bilateral Contracts
By: Jerry R. Green and Seppo Honkapohja
A mathematical characterization of self-enforcing bilateral contracts is given. Contracts where both parties exercise some control over the quantity traded can sometimes be superior to contracts that rest control entirely with one side. Some qualitative characteristics... View Details