Publications
Publications
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- All HBS Web
(219)
- Faculty Publications (158)
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- March 2001
- Case
Corruption in International Business (A)
By: Robert E. Kennedy and Rafael M. Di Tella
Explores various aspects of corruption in international business, in two sections. The first section provides a broad discussion of the ethical, business, and legal aspects of corruption. The second section provides a series of "caselets" that are designed to promote... View Details
- 2001
- Book
Diagnosis Corruption: Fraud in Latin America's Public Hospitals
By: Rafael Di Tella and William D. Savedoff
- 2000
- Working Paper
Empirical Determinants of Chief Political Officer Pay
By: Rafael Di Tella and Ray Fisman
- 2000
- Working Paper
Unemployment Benefits as a Substitute for a Conservative Central Banker
By: Rafael Di Tella and Robert MacCulloch
- March 2000 (Revised April 2001)
- Case
Menem and the Populist Tradition in Argentina
By: Rafael M. Di Tella and Eliseo Neuman
Argentina has flourished under a fixed exchange rate system, yet there are large income and employment fluctuations. The social cost of unemployment is threatening the viability of the economic model. Building a welfare state is one alternative, but this may be a... View Details
- 2000
- Working Paper
The Role of Wages and Auditing during a Crackdown on Corruption in the City of Buenos Aires
By: Rafael Di Tella and Ernesto Schargrodsky
- November 1999 (Revised February 2001)
- Teaching Note
Menem and the Populist Tradition in Argentina TN
By: Rafael M. Di Tella and Eliseo Neuman
Teaching Note for (9-700-061). View Details
- 1999
- Working Paper
Unemployment Shocks and Endogenous Labor Market Institutions
By: Rafael Di Tella and Robert MacCulloch
- 1998
- Working Paper
The Consequences of Labour Market Flexibility: Panel Evidence Based on Survey Data
By: Rafael Di Tella and Robert MacCulloch
- 1998
- Working Paper
Some Evidence on the Optimal Welfare State Based on Subjective Data
By: Rafael Di Tella and Robert MacCulloch
It is often difficult to evaluate all the costs and benefits of the welfare state. This paper suggests an alternative approach based on surveys of citizen satisfaction with welfare programs. In the first part of the paper we estimate the level of unemployment benefits... View Details
- October 1997
- Article
Does Competition Kill Corruption?
By: Christopher Bliss and Rafael Di Tella
Corrupt agents (officials or gangsters) exact money from firms. Corruption affects the number of firms in a free-entry equilibrium. The degree of deep competition in the economy increases with lower overhead costs relative to profits and with a tendency toward similar... View Details
- July 1997
- Article
National Champions and Corruption: Some Unpleasant Interventionist Arithmetic
By: Alberto Ades and Rafael Di Tella
We present a hold-up model of investment where active industrial policy promotes both corruption and investment. Since corruption deters investment, the effect of industrial policy on investment is lower than when corruption is absent. We find evidence suggesting that... View Details
Keywords: Crime and Corruption
- summer 1997
- Article
The New Economics of Corruption: A Survey and Some New Results
By: Alberto Ades and Rafael Di Tella
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