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(217)
- News (12)
- Research (197)
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- Faculty Publications (162)
Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(217)
- News (12)
- Research (197)
- Events (1)
- Multimedia (1)
- Faculty Publications (162)
- July 2008
- Article
Crime and Punishment in the 'American Dream'
By: Rafael Di Tella and Juan Dubra
We observe that countries where belief in the "American dream" (i.e., effort pays) prevails also set harsher punishment for criminals. We know that beliefs are also correlated with several features of the economic system (taxation, social insurance, etc). Our objective... View Details
Keywords: Crime and Corruption; Economic Systems; Values and Beliefs; Law Enforcement; Mathematical Methods; Personal Characteristics; United States
Di Tella, Rafael, and Juan Dubra. "Crime and Punishment in the 'American Dream'." Journal of Public Economics 92, no. 7 (July 2008).
- October 2004
- Article
Are Politicians Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?
By: Rafael Di Tella and Raymond Fisman
We provide the first empirical analysis of gubernatorial pay. Using U.S. data for 1950-90, we document substantial variation in the wages of politicians, both across states and overtime. Gubernatorial wages respond to changes in state income per capita and taxes. We... View Details
Di Tella, Rafael, and Raymond Fisman. "Are Politicians Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?" Journal of Law & Economics 47, no. 2 (October 2004): 477–514.
- July 2005
- Article
The Consequences of Labor Market Flexibility: Panel Evidence Based on Survey Data
By: Rafael Di Tella and Robert MacCulloch
We introduce a new data set on hiring and firing restrictions for 21 OECD countries for the period 1984 –1990. The data are based on surveys of business people in the countries covered, so the indices we use are subjective in nature. Controlling for country and time... View Details
Keywords: Job Security Provisions; Subjective Data; Unemployment; Employment; Labor; Markets; Data and Data Sets
Di Tella, Rafael, and Robert MacCulloch. "The Consequences of Labor Market Flexibility: Panel Evidence Based on Survey Data." European Economic Review 49, no. 5 (July 2005): 1225–59.
- February 2023
- Teaching Note
The Trouble with TCE
By: Vincent Pons and Rafael Di Tella
Teaching Note for HBS Case No. 721-031. View Details
- June 2015
- Teaching Note
The 'Chinese Dream': Corruption, Inequality, and the Rule of Law
By: Rafael Di Tella and Meg Rithmire
- 2010
- Working Paper
Peronist Beliefs and Interventionist Policies
By: Rafael Di Tella and Juan Dubra
We study the logic of Peronist interventionist polices and the beliefs that support them. Instead of a comprehensive approach, we focus on three elements. First, we study beliefs and values about the economic system present in Peron's speeches during the period... View Details
Keywords: History; Economic Systems; Values and Beliefs; Policy; Business and Government Relations; Argentina
Di Tella, Rafael, and Juan Dubra. "Peronist Beliefs and Interventionist Policies." NBER Working Paper Series, No. 16621, December 2010.
- 2010
- Chapter
Happiness Adaptation to Income beyond 'Basic Needs'
By: Rafael Di Tella and Robert MacCulloch
We test for whether, once "basic needs" are satisfied, there is happiness adaptation to further gains in income using three data sets. Individual German Panel Data from 1985 to 2000, and data on the well-being of over 600,000 people in a panel of European countries... View Details
- 2000
- Working Paper
Unemployment Benefits as a Substitute for a Conservative Central Banker
By: Rafael Di Tella and Robert MacCulloch
- 2000
- Working Paper
Empirical Determinants of Chief Political Officer Pay
By: Rafael Di Tella and Ray Fisman
Di Tella, Rafael, and Ray Fisman. "Empirical Determinants of Chief Political Officer Pay." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 01-040, December 2000.
- November 2004
- Teaching Note
Spain: Straddling the Atlantic (TN)
By: Rafael M. Di Tella and Ingrid Vogel
Teaching Note to (9-705-006). View Details
- May 2004 (Revised June 2005)
- Background Note
Exchange Rate Regimes
By: Rafael M. Di Tella and Ingrid Vogel
There are many options for a country in the management of monetary policy. At the most basic level is the decision of whether to adopt a fixed or a floating exchange rate. Introduces the economics behind exchange rates and the debate between fixed vs. floating regimes. View Details
Di Tella, Rafael M., and Ingrid Vogel. "Exchange Rate Regimes." Harvard Business School Background Note 704-038, May 2004. (Revised June 2005.)
- 2001
- Book
Diagnosis Corruption: Fraud in Latin America's Public Hospitals
By: Rafael Di Tella and William D. Savedoff
Di Tella, Rafael, and William D. Savedoff. Diagnosis Corruption: Fraud in Latin America's Public Hospitals. Inter-American Development Bank, 2001.
- May 2025
- Teaching Note
Brazil's Messias? The Lava Jato Corruption Scandal, the Recession, and the Rise of Bolsonaro
By: Rafael Di Tella and Jose Liberti
Teaching Note for HBS Case 719-069. View Details
- July 2017
- Teaching Plan
Populism in America: Fake News, Alternative Facts and Elite Betrayal in the Trump Era
By: Rafael Di Tella and Sarah McAra
- September 1999
- Article
Rents, Competition and Corruption
By: Alberto Ades and Rafael Di Tella
Ades, Alberto, and Rafael Di Tella. "Rents, Competition and Corruption." American Economic Review 89, no. 4 (September 1999): 982–994.
- December 2006
- Article
Europe vs America: Institutional Hysteresis in a Simple Normative Model
By: Rafael Di Tella and Robert MacCulloch
We show how the differences in US and European institutions can arise in a normative model. The paper focuses on the labor market and the government's decision to set unemployment benefits in response to an unemployment shock. The government balances insurance... View Details
Keywords: Optimal Unemployment Benefits; Labor Market Institutions; Hysteresis; Europe; United States
Di Tella, Rafael, and Robert MacCulloch. "Europe vs America: Institutional Hysteresis in a Simple Normative Model." Journal of Public Economics 90, no. 12 (December 2006): 2161–86.