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- All HBS Web
(4,911)
- People (10)
- News (822)
- Research (3,323)
- Events (34)
- Multimedia (28)
- Faculty Publications (2,038)
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- March 2012 (Revised May 2012)
- Module Note
Internal Governance and Strategy Execution: Coordination and Incentives
By: Julie Wulf
Wulf, Julie. "Internal Governance and Strategy Execution: Coordination and Incentives." Harvard Business School Module Note 712-465, March 2012. (Revised May 2012.)
- Article
Financial Incentives for Exercise Adherence in Adults: Systematic Review and Meta-analysis
By: Marc S. Mitchell, Jack M. Goodman, David A. Alter, Leslie K. John, Paul I. Oh, Maureen T. Pakosh and Guy E. Faulkner
Context
Less than 5% of U.S. adults accumulate the required dose of exercise to maintain health. Behavioral economics has stimulated renewed interest in economic-based, population-level health interventions to address this issue. Despite widespread implementation of... View Details
Mitchell, Marc S., Jack M. Goodman, David A. Alter, Leslie K. John, Paul I. Oh, Maureen T. Pakosh, and Guy E. Faulkner. "Financial Incentives for Exercise Adherence in Adults: Systematic Review and Meta-analysis." American Journal of Preventive Medicine 45, no. 5 (November 2013): 658–667.
- April 2002
- Article
Internal Capital Markets and Firm-Level Compensation Incentives for Division Managers
By: Julie Wulf
Do multidivisional firms structure compensation contracts for division managers to mitigate incentive problems in their internal capital markets? I find evidence that compensation and investment incentives are substitutes: firms providing a stronger link to firm... View Details
Keywords: Capital Markets; Executive Compensation; Capital Budgeting; Motivation and Incentives; Profit; Decisions; Resource Allocation; Performance; Investment; Contracts
Wulf, Julie. "Internal Capital Markets and Firm-Level Compensation Incentives for Division Managers." Journal of Labor Economics 20, no. 2 (April 2002): S219–S262.
- January 1996
- Background Note
The Motivation for Creativity in Organizations
People will be most creative when they feel motivated primarily by the interest, enjoyment, satisfaction, and challenge of the work itself--when they are driven by a deep involvement in their work and a passion for it. This note describes the ways in which creativity... View Details
Keywords: Compensation and Benefits; Managerial Roles; Organizations; Creativity; Motivation and Incentives; Satisfaction
Amabile, Teresa M. "The Motivation for Creativity in Organizations." Harvard Business School Background Note 396-240, January 1996.
- November 2001 (Revised April 2003)
- Case
Camp Dresser & McKee: Getting Incentives Right
By: Ashish Nanda
"If you try to use money to motivate behavior, you are in a powerful and dangerous place, especially with engineers and scientists," remarked Tom Furman, CEO of Camp Dresser & McKee, Inc. (CDM), a consulting environmental engineering firm. Historically, CDM had... View Details
Nanda, Ashish, and M. Julia Prats. "Camp Dresser & McKee: Getting Incentives Right." Harvard Business School Case 902-122, November 2001. (Revised April 2003.)
- April 2000
- Background Note
Aligning Incentives for Supply Chain Efficiency
By: V.G. Narayanan and Ananth Raman
Introduces students to the basics of principal-agency theory as it applies to supply chains. Operational problems in supply chains can often be traced to incentive issues. Students and managers lack frameworks to analyze incentive problems in supply chains. This note... View Details
Keywords: Supply Chain Management; Motivation and Incentives; Framework; Management Analysis, Tools, and Techniques; Agency Theory
Narayanan, V.G., and Ananth Raman. "Aligning Incentives for Supply Chain Efficiency." Harvard Business School Background Note 600-110, April 2000.
- January 2020
- Article
The Job Rating Game: Revolving Doors and Analyst Incentives
By: Elisabeth Kempf
Investment banks frequently hire analysts from rating agencies. While many argue that this "revolving door" creates captured analysts, it can also create incentives to improve accuracy. To study this issue, I construct an original dataset, linking analysts to their... View Details
Keywords: Credit Rating Agencies; Investment Banking; Recruitment; Performance Evaluation; Financial Services Industry
Kempf, Elisabeth. "The Job Rating Game: Revolving Doors and Analyst Incentives." Journal of Financial Economics 135, no. 1 (January 2020): 41–67.
- 2013
- Article
Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets
By: Fuhito Kojima, Parag A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth
Accommodating couples has been a long-standing issue in the design of centralized labor market clearinghouses for doctors and psychologists, because couples view pairs of jobs as complements. A stable matching may not exist when couples are present. This article's main... View Details
Keywords: Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability; Jobs and Positions; Family and Family Relationships; Health Care and Treatment; Employment Industry; Health Industry
Kojima, Fuhito, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. "Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets." Quarterly Journal of Economics 128, no. 4 (November 2013): 1585–1632.
- 1985
- Chapter
Differential Information, the Market and Incentive Compatibility
By: Jerry Green
Green, Jerry. "Differential Information, the Market and Incentive Compatibility." Chap. 3 in Frontiers of Economics, by Kenneth J. Arrow and Seppo Honkapohja, 178–226. Basil Blackwell, 1985.
- 13 Aug 2012
- Research & Ideas
When Good Incentives Lead to Bad Decisions
Among the culprits contributing to the recent financial crisis were bank loan officers who approved mortgage loans that were doomed to fail. Many of these frontline workers were motivated by bonuses and... View Details
- March 2010 (Revised February 2014)
- Case
Community Health Workers in Zambia: Incentive Design and Management
By: Nava Ashraf and Natalie Kindred
This case examines the various considerations relevant to selecting and compensating workers in a context where their work involves a pro-social component. This is relevant to not only health care in Zambia, but to NGO and public sector workers who are both motivated... View Details
Keywords: Developing Countries and Economies; Training; Health Care and Treatment; Compensation and Benefits; Recruitment; Selection and Staffing; Mission and Purpose; Non-Governmental Organizations; Motivation and Incentives; Health Industry; Zambia
Ashraf, Nava, and Natalie Kindred. "Community Health Workers in Zambia: Incentive Design and Management." Harvard Business School Case 910-030, March 2010. (Revised February 2014.) (Request a courtesy copy.)
- 1982
- Article
The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
By: Alvin E. Roth
Roth, Alvin E. "The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives." Mathematics of Operations Research, no. 7 (1982): 617–628.
- January 2006
- Article
Corporate Tax Avoidance and High Powered Incentives
By: Mihir A. Desai and Dhammika Dharmapala
Desai, Mihir A., and Dhammika Dharmapala. "Corporate Tax Avoidance and High Powered Incentives." Journal of Financial Economics 79, no. 1 (January 2006): 145–179. (This paper is a revised version of NBER Working Paper 10471.)
- fall 2002
- Article
Distortion and Risk in Optimal Incentive Contracts
By: George P. Baker
Baker, George P. "Distortion and Risk in Optimal Incentive Contracts." Journal of Human Resources 37, no. 4 (fall 2002).
- November 1976 (Revised November 1980)
- Background Note
A Brief Note on Social Motives
By: John J. Gabarro
Briefly describes in management terms the three social motives: Need for achievement; need for power; need for affiliation. Also briefly reviews the implications of the work of David McClelland, David Winters, and others for motivation within organizational settings.... View Details
Keywords: Motivation and Incentives
Gabarro, John J. "A Brief Note on Social Motives." Harvard Business School Background Note 477-053, November 1976. (Revised November 1980.)
- Article
Motivated Inferences of Price and Quality in Healthcare Decisions
By: Emily Prinsloo, Kate Barasz and Peter A. Ubel
Policy makers have increasingly advocated for healthcare price transparency, whereby prices are made salient before services are rendered. While such policies may empower consumers, they also bring price to the forefront of healthcare choices as never before, with yet... View Details
Keywords: Healthcare; Price Transparency; Health Care and Treatment; Price; Quality; Perception; Consumer Behavior; Decisions; Insurance
Prinsloo, Emily, Kate Barasz, and Peter A. Ubel. "Motivated Inferences of Price and Quality in Healthcare Decisions." Special Issue on Healthcare and Medical Decision Making edited by Dipankar Chakravarti, Jian Ni, Meng Zhu. Journal of the Association for Consumer Research 7, no. 2 (April 2022): 186–197.
- Teaching Interest
Organizational Behavior
Each of us maintains a set of beliefs and general assumptions about humans and their behavior, and those assumptions form the foundation for our beliefs about what motivates individuals; about how individuals make decisions; and about the ways in which the... View Details
- 2009
- Working Paper
Dishonest Deed, Clear Conscience: Self-Preservation through Moral Disengagement and Motivated Forgetting
By: Lisa L. Shu, Francesca Gino and Max H. Bazerman
People routinely engage in dishonest acts without feeling guilty about their behavior. When and why does this occur? Across four studies, people justified their dishonest deeds through moral disengagement and exhibited motivated forgetting of information that might... View Details
Shu, Lisa L., Francesca Gino, and Max H. Bazerman. "Dishonest Deed, Clear Conscience: Self-Preservation through Moral Disengagement and Motivated Forgetting ." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-078, January 2009. (Revised April 2009.)