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- All HBS Web
(499)
- Faculty Publications (176)
- September 2003 (Revised September 2018)
- Exercise
RetailMax: Role for Regan Kessel
By: Kathleen McGinn and Dina Witter
This exercise requires students to enact an internal salary negotiation, taking on the roles of Cam Archer, a star employee, and Regan Kessel, a VP trying to attract the MBA into his department. The exercise presents a one-issue, distributive negotiation that... View Details
Keywords: Negotiation; Compensation and Benefits; Management Practices and Processes; Retail Industry
McGinn, Kathleen, and Dina Witter. "RetailMax: Role for Regan Kessel." Harvard Business School Exercise 904-025, September 2003. (Revised September 2018.)
- January 2003
- Article
Dyadic Processes of Disclosure and Reciprocity in Bargaining with Communication
By: Kathleen L. McGinn, Leigh Thompson and Max H. Bazerman
McGinn, Kathleen L., Leigh Thompson, and Max H. Bazerman. "Dyadic Processes of Disclosure and Reciprocity in Bargaining with Communication." Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 16, no. 1 (January 2003): 17–34.
- January 2002
- Article
How Communication Improves Efficiency in Bargaining Games
By: Kathleen L. McGinn, Leigh Thompson, Robert Gibbons and Max H. Bazerman
McGinn, Kathleen L., Leigh Thompson, Robert Gibbons, and Max H. Bazerman. "How Communication Improves Efficiency in Bargaining Games." Games and Economic Behavior 38, no. 1 (January 2002): 127–155. (Reprinted in M.H. Bazerman, ed., Negotiation, Decision Making and Conflict Management, Volume 3, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005.)
- 2001
- Working Paper
Disclosure and Reciprocity in Bargaining with Communication
By: Kathleen L. McGinn, Leigh Thompson and Max Bazerman
- 2000
- Working Paper
How Communication Improves Efficiency in Bargaining Games
By: Kathleen L. McGinn, Leigh Thompson, Robert Gibbons and Max Bazerman
- 1999
- Working Paper
Using Dyadic Strategies to Outperform Equilibrium Models of Communication in Bargaining Games
By: Kathleen L. McGinn, Leigh Thompson, Robert Gibbons and Max Bazerman
- September 1998 (Revised December 1998)
- Case
Infinity Carpets, Inc.
By: Ronald W. Moore and Thomas R. Piper
A turnaround expert must determine whether a firm in distress is worth more as a going concern than its liquidation value. If so, the finances of the firm must be restructured in a way consistent with the bargaining power of the holders of the various securities. The... View Details
Keywords: Restructuring; Borrowing and Debt; Financial Liquidity; Crisis Management; Value; Apparel and Accessories Industry
Moore, Ronald W., and Thomas R. Piper. "Infinity Carpets, Inc." Harvard Business School Case 299-014, September 1998. (Revised December 1998.)
- 1998
- Working Paper
Outperforming Equilibrium Models of Communication in Bargaining Games
By: Kathleen L. McGinn, Leigh Thompson, Robert Gibbons and Max Bazerman
- February 1997
- Article
Ultimatum Bargaining with a Committee: Underestimating the Importance of Decision Rule
By: D. M. Messick, D. A. Moore and M. H. Bazerman
Messick, D. M., D. A. Moore, and M. H. Bazerman. "Ultimatum Bargaining with a Committee: Underestimating the Importance of Decision Rule." Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 69, no. 2 (February 1997): 87–101.
- January 1997 (Revised October 2000)
- Case
Lynton V. Harris & Madison "Scare" Garden (A)
By: Michael A. Wheeler and Guhan Subramanian
A young entrepreneur, Lynton V. Harris, who successfully staged family-oriented shows in his native Australia and who had several entertainment ventures in the United States, is on the verge of signing an agreement with Madison Square Garden to jointly produce a new... View Details
Wheeler, Michael A., and Guhan Subramanian. Lynton V. Harris & Madison "Scare" Garden (A). Harvard Business School Case 897-143, January 1997. (Revised October 2000.)
- August 1996
- Article
The Inconsistent Evaluation of Comparative Payoffs in Labor Supply and Bargaining
By: S. Blount and M. H. Bazerman
Keywords: Labor
Blount, S., and M. H. Bazerman. "The Inconsistent Evaluation of Comparative Payoffs in Labor Supply and Bargaining." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 30, no. 2 (August 1996): 1–14.
- Article
Investing in Distressed Situations: A Market Survey
By: S. C. Gilson
The risks of investing in distressed companies—a practice popularly known as "vulture" investing—are highly firm specific and idiosyncratic. Investors who are adept at managing these risks, who understand the legal rules that must be followed in corporate bankruptcy,... View Details
Gilson, S. C. "Investing in Distressed Situations: A Market Survey." Financial Analysts Journal 51, no. 6 (November–December 1995): 8–27.
- 1995
- Chapter
Bargaining Experiments
By: A. E. Roth
Keywords: Negotiation
Roth, A. E. "Bargaining Experiments." In Handbook of Experimental Economics, edited by John Kagel and Alvin E. Roth, 253–348. Princeton University Press, 1995.
- Article
Non-verifiability, Costly Renegotiation, and Efficiency
By: Jerry R. Green and J. J. Laffont
We study the implications of the non verifiability of information for the allocation of resources and the bearing of risk in a two party relationship. We consider a two step approach. In step one the two parties define a non contingent contract which will be executed... View Details
Keywords: Negotiation
Green, Jerry R., and J. J. Laffont. "Non-verifiability, Costly Renegotiation, and Efficiency." Annales d'économie et de statistique, no. 36 (October–December 1994): 81–95.
- Article
Commitments with Third Parties
By: Jerry R. Green
Observable irrevocable contracts between a principal and an agent have been suggested as a way in which the principal can enhance his payoff when playing a game against, or bargaining with, an opponent. It is shown that such beneficial agency relationships depend on... View Details
Green, Jerry R. "Commitments with Third Parties." Annales d'économie et de statistique, nos. 25-26 (January–June 1992): 81–95.
- Article
Renegotiation and the Form of Efficient Contracts
By: Jerry R. Green and J. J. Laffont
Two parties may agree to a mutually binding contract that will govern their behavior after an uncertain event becomes known. As there is no agent who can both observe this uncertain outcome and enforce the contract, contingent agreements are precluded. However, the... View Details
Green, Jerry R., and J. J. Laffont. "Renegotiation and the Form of Efficient Contracts." Annales d'économie et de statistique, nos. 25-26 (January–June 1992): 123–150.
- December 1991
- Article
Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study
By: A. E. Roth, V. Prasnikar, M. Okuno-Fujiwara and S. Zamir
Roth, A. E., V. Prasnikar, M. Okuno-Fujiwara, and S. Zamir. "Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study." American Economic Review 81, no. 5 (December 1991): 1068–1095.
- 1991
- Chapter
An Economic Approach to the Study of Bargaining
By: A. E. Roth
Roth, A. E. "An Economic Approach to the Study of Bargaining." In Handbook of Negotiation Research. Vol. 3, edited by M. H. Bazerman, R. J. Lewicki, and B. H. Sheppard, 35–67. Research on Negotiation in Organizations. JAI Press, 1991.
- June 1990
- Article
The Role of Bargaining Zones and Agents: A Negotiation Simulation
By: Y. M. Kim, M. H. Bazerman and M. A. Neale
Keywords: Negotiation
Kim, Y. M., M. H. Bazerman, and M. A. Neale. "The Role of Bargaining Zones and Agents: A Negotiation Simulation." Organizational Behavior Teaching Review 14, no. 3 (June 1990): 53–63.
- March–April 1990
- Article
The Costly Bargain of Trade Promotion
By: R. D. Buzzell, J. A. Quelch and W. J. Salmon
Keywords: Trade
Buzzell, R. D., J. A. Quelch, and W. J. Salmon. "The Costly Bargain of Trade Promotion." Harvard Business Review 68, no. 2 (March–April 1990): 141–149.