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- 2007
- Chapter
Groups as Agents of Change
By: J. Richard Hackman and A. C. Edmondson
Hackman, J. Richard, and A. C. Edmondson. "Groups as Agents of Change." In Handbook of Organization Development, edited by Thomas G. Cummings. Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2007.
- 2006
- Working Paper
Too Motivated?
I show that an agent's motivation to do well (objectively) may be unambiguously bad in a world with differing priors, i.e., when people openly disagree on the optimal course of action. The reason is that an agent who is strongly motivated is more likely to follow... View Details
Keywords: Governance Controls; Employees; Wages; Measurement and Metrics; Outcome or Result; Performance; Agency Theory; Motivation and Incentives
Van den Steen, Eric J. "Too Motivated?" Sloan School of Management Working Paper, No. 4547-05, April 2006. (Available at SSRN.)
- January 2006 (Revised October 2009)
- Supplement
Negotiating Star Compensation at the USAWBL (A-3): Confidential Instructions for Jesse J's Agent
By: Ian Larkin, James K. Sebenius and Guhan Subramanian
Larkin, Ian, James K. Sebenius, and Guhan Subramanian. "Negotiating Star Compensation at the USAWBL (A-3): Confidential Instructions for Jesse J's Agent." Harvard Business School Supplement 906-028, January 2006. (Revised October 2009.)
- 2006
- Working Paper
The Limits of Authority: Motivation versus Coordination
This paper studies the effects of open disagreement on motivation and coordination. It shows how, in the presence of differing priors, motivation and coordination impose conflicting demands on the allocation of authority, leading to a trade-off between the... View Details
Keywords: Decisions; Governance Controls; Organizational Culture; Agency Theory; Conflict and Resolution; Motivation and Incentives
Van den Steen, Eric J. "The Limits of Authority: Motivation versus Coordination." Sloan School of Management Working Paper, No. 4626-06, January 2006. (Available at SSRN.)
- Article
Trust and Incentives in Agency
By: Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and Daniel F Spulber
Contracts between a principal and an agent are not formed in a vacuum. Although formal contracts between a principal and an agent contain explicit incentives for performance, the relationship between a principal and an agent also involves implicit incentives. Three... View Details
Keywords: Trust; Motivation and Incentives; Agency Theory; Contracts; Market Transactions; Performance; Relationships; Societal Protocols; Legal Liability; Cost
Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Daniel F Spulber. "Trust and Incentives in Agency." Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 15, no. 1 (Fall 2005): 45–104.
- October 2004
- Article
FDI and Economic Growth: The Role of Local Financial Markets
By: Laura Alfaro, Areendam Chanda, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan and Selin Sayek
The purpose of this paper is to examine the various links among foreign direct investment, financial markets and growth. We model an economy with a continuum of agents indexed by their level of ability. Agents have two choices: they can work for the foreign company in... View Details
Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment; Financial Markets; Economic Growth; Cost; Wealth; Investment Return; Knowledge
Alfaro, Laura, Areendam Chanda, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, and Selin Sayek. "FDI and Economic Growth: The Role of Local Financial Markets." Journal of International Economics 64, no. 1 (October 2004): 89–112.
- September 2004
- Article
Capital Controls: A Political Economy Approach
By: Laura Alfaro
This paper examines the economic consequences of political conflicts that arise when countries implement capital controls. In an overlapping-generations model, agents vote on whether to open or close an economy to capital flows. The young (workers) receive income from... View Details
Keywords: Economy; Voting; Conflict of Interests; Capital; Government and Politics; Wages; Saving; Forecasting and Prediction
Alfaro, Laura. "Capital Controls: A Political Economy Approach." Review of International Economics 12, no. 4 (September 2004): 571–590.
- September 2004
- Article
Rational Overoptimism (and Other Biases)
Rational agents with differing priors tend to be overoptimistic about their chances of success. In particular, an agent who tries to choose the action that is most likely to succeed, is more likely to choose an action of which he overestimated, rather than... View Details
Keywords: Prejudice and Bias; Decision Choices and Conditions; Performance Expectations; Outcome or Result; Opportunities; Risk and Uncertainty; Failure; Success; Management Analysis, Tools, and Techniques; Personal Characteristics; Values and Beliefs; Ethics
Van den Steen, Eric J. "Rational Overoptimism (and Other Biases)." American Economic Review 94, no. 4 (September 2004): 1141–1151.
- September 2004
- Article
Trust in Agency
Existing models of the principal-agent relationship assume the agent works only under extrinsic incentives. However, many observed agency contracts take the form of a fixed payment. For such contracts to succeed, the principal must trust the agent to work in the... View Details
Keywords: Trust; Agency Theory; Relationships; Behavior; Motivation and Incentives; Contracts; Business Model; Emotions; Forecasting and Prediction; Ethics; Standards; Risk and Uncertainty
Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon. "Trust in Agency." Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 13, no. 3 (September 2004): 375–404.
- August 2004
- Article
Capital Controls, Risk and Liberalization Cycles
By: Laura Alfaro and Fabio Kanczuk
The paper presents an overlapping-generations model where agents vote on whether to open or close the economy to international capital flows. Political decisions are shaped by the risk over capital and labor returns. In an open economy, the capitalists (old) completely... View Details
Keywords: Business Cycles; Development Economics; Voting; Risk and Uncertainty; Cash Flow; Saving; Investment; Economy; Wages
Alfaro, Laura, and Fabio Kanczuk. "Capital Controls, Risk and Liberalization Cycles." Review of International Economics 12, no. 3 (August 2004): 412–434.
- July 2004
- Article
When a Contract Isn't Enough: How to Be Sure Your Agent Gets You the Best Deal
Keywords: Contracts
Sebenius, James K. "When a Contract Isn't Enough: How to Be Sure Your Agent Gets You the Best Deal." Negotiation 7, no. 7 (July 2004).
- June 2004 (Revised January 2005)
- Background Note
Principals, Agents, and Partners
By: Arthur I Segel, Armen Panossian and Jeff Mandelbaum
The establishment of the principal-agent relationship, the duties owed by the agent to the principal, and the principal's liability for illegal actions or representations made by the agent are all examined. Also covers the creation of partnerships and the duties of... View Details
Segel, Arthur I., Armen Panossian, and Jeff Mandelbaum. "Principals, Agents, and Partners." Harvard Business School Background Note 804-186, June 2004. (Revised January 2005.)
- 2004
- Book
Birth of a Salesman: The Transformation of Selling in America
This book chronicles the remarkable metamorphosis of the American salesman from itinerant amateur to trained expert. From the mid-nineteenth century to the eve of World War II, the development of sales management transformed an economy populated by peddlers and... View Details
Friedman, Walter A. Birth of a Salesman: The Transformation of Selling in America. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004.
- March 2004
- Article
Inflation, Inflation Variability, and Corruption
By: Miguel Braun and Rafael Di Tella
We present a model where agents can inflate the cost of goods needed to start an investment project and inflation variability increases monitoring costs. We show that inflation variability can lead to higher corruption and lower investment. We document a positive... View Details
Braun, Miguel, and Rafael Di Tella. "Inflation, Inflation Variability, and Corruption." Economics & Politics 16, no. 1 (March 2004).
- July 2003
- Article
Probabilistic Representation of Complexity
By: Nabil I Al-Najjar, Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and Emre Ozdenoren
We study individuals' behavior in an environment that is deterministic, but too complex to permit tractable deterministic representation. Under mild conditions, behavior is represented by a unique probabilistic model in which the agent's inability to think through all... View Details
Al-Najjar, Nabil I., Ramon Casadesus-Masanell, and Emre Ozdenoren. "Probabilistic Representation of Complexity." Journal of Economic Theory 111, no. 1 (July 2003): 49–87.
- Article
On the Political Economy of Temporary Stabilization Programs
By: Laura Alfaro
This paper provides a political economy explanation for temporary exchange-rate-based stabilization programs by focusing on the distributional effects of real exchange-rate appreciation. I propose an economy in which agents are endowed with either tradable or... View Details
Keywords: Government and Politics; Economy; Balance and Stability; Programs; Currency Exchange Rate; Cash; Value; Distribution
Alfaro, Laura. "On the Political Economy of Temporary Stabilization Programs." Economics & Politics 14, no. 2 (July 2002): 133–161.
- June 2002
- Article
The Timing of Bids in Internet Auctions: Market Design, Bidder Behavior, and Artificial Agents
By: Axel Ockenfels and Alvin E. Roth
Keywords: Auctions; Bids and Bidding; Internet and the Web; Markets; Design; Behavior; Internet and the Web
Ockenfels, Axel, and Alvin E. Roth. "The Timing of Bids in Internet Auctions: Market Design, Bidder Behavior, and Artificial Agents." AI Magazine (June 2002).
- March 2002 (Revised May 2002)
- Case
Astel Manufacturing Company
By: Joseph L. Bower
The FBI indicates that three purchasing agents are suspected recipients of bribes. After an inconclusive investigation, the agents leave. The superiors are unsure what to do. A rewritten version of an earlier case. View Details
Keywords: Crime and Corruption; Ethics; Problems and Challenges; Decision Choices and Conditions; Government and Politics; Resignation and Termination
Bower, Joseph L. "Astel Manufacturing Company." Harvard Business School Case 302-112, March 2002. (Revised May 2002.)
- November 2001 (Revised September 2002)
- Case
International Management Group (IMG)
By: Bharat N. Anand and Kate Attea
In 2001, International Management Group (IMG) is the dominant company in the sports management industry. Its founder and CEO, Mark McCormack, is credited with having created the industry of sports management in the early 1960s. Over the next 40 years, IMG's expansion... View Details
Keywords: Customer Focus and Relationships; Finance; Organizational Structure; Planning; Relationships; Conflict of Interests; Competition; Corporate Strategy; Expansion; Sports Industry
Anand, Bharat N., and Kate Attea. "International Management Group (IMG)." Harvard Business School Case 702-409, November 2001. (Revised September 2002.)
- September 2001
- Background Note
Financial Reporting Environment, The
Provides a framework for understanding the role of financial reporting and various intermediaries as mechanisms for reducing both adverse selection and moral hazard problems in capital markets. Financial reports reduce adverse selection by providing basic information... View Details
Keywords: Financial Reporting; Financial Statements; Capital Markets; Venture Capital; Corporate Disclosure; Conflict of Interests
Healy, Paul M., Amy P. Hutton, Robert S. Kaplan, and Krishna G. Palepu. "Financial Reporting Environment, The." Harvard Business School Background Note 102-029, September 2001.