Publications

Purchase

January 2011
Article

Let the Right One In: A Microeconomic Approach to Partner Choice in Mutualisms

By: Marco Archetti, Francisco Ubeda, Drew Fudenberg, Jerry R. Green, Naomi E. Pierce and Douglas W. Yu

One of the main problems impeding the evolution of cooperation is partner choice. When information is asymmetric (the quality of a potential partner is known only to himself), it may seem that partner choice is not possible without signaling. Many mutualisms, however,... View Details

Keywords: Microeconomics; Strategy; Partners and Partnerships; System; Problems and Challenges; Information; Economics; Theory; Cost; Decision Choices and Conditions; Cooperation

2008
Chapter

Corporate Honesty and Business Education: A Behavioral Model

By: Rakesh Khurana and Herbert Gintis

Since the mid-1970s neoclassical economic theory has dominated business school thinking and teaching in dealing with the nature of human motivation. However valuable in understanding competitive product and financial markets, neoclassical economic theory employs an... View Details

Keywords: Business Education; Ethics; Managerial Roles; Corporate Social Responsibility and Impact; Organizational Culture; Business and Shareholder Relations; Mathematical Methods; Behavior

19 Jul 2011
Working Paper Summaries

Signaling to Partially Informed Investors in the Newsvendor Model

Keywords: by Vishal Gaur, Richard Lai, Ananth Raman & William Schmidt

2020
Working Paper

Collusion in Brokered Markets

By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Richard Lowery

The U.S. residential real estate agency market presents a puzzle for economic theory: commissions on real estate transactions have remained high for decades even though entry is frequent and costs are low. We model the real estate agency market, and other brokered... View Details

Keywords: Real Estate; ＂Repeated Games＂; Collusion; Antitrust; Brokered Markets; Game Theory; Real Estate Industry

SSRN

22 Jul 2002
Research & Ideas

How Business Strategy Tamed the “Invisible Hand”

devised, which paved the way for the use of quantitative analysis in formal strategic planning. In 1944, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern published their classic work, The Theory of Games and Economic... View Details

Keywords: by Pankaj Ghemawat

February 2015
Article

Location Choices under Strategic Interactions

By: Juan Alcacer, Cristian Dezso and Minyuan Zhao

The literature on location choices has mostly emphasized the impact of location and firm characteristics. However, most industries with a significant presence of multi-location firms are oligopolistic in nature, which suggests that strategic interaction among firms... View Details

Keywords: Location Strategies; Multinational Strategy; Oligopolistic Competition; Firm Heterogeneity; Geographic Location; Multinational Firms and Management; Balance and Stability; Decision Choices and Conditions; Game Theory

2015
Chapter

Negotiations: Statistical Aspects

By: James K. Sebenius

'Negotiation analysis' seeks to develop prescriptive theory and useful advice for negotiators and third parties. It generally emphasizes the parties' underlying interests, alternatives to negotiated agreement, approaches to productively manage the inherent tension... View Details

Keywords: Negotiation Preparation; Negotiation Tactics; Negotiation Participants

November – December 2011
Article

Explaining Influence Rents: The Case for an Institutions-Based View of Strategy

By: Gautam Ahuja and Sai Yayavaram

Research in strategy has identified and tried to explain four types of rents: monopolistic rents, efficiency rents, quasi rents, and Schumpeterian rents. Building on previous work on political and institutional strategies, we add a fifth type of rent: influence rents.... View Details

Keywords: Institutions; Influence Rents; Generic Strategies; Strategy; Organizations; Renting or Rental; Economics

Purchase

July 2008
Article

Fairness in Extended Dictator-Game Experiments

By: Felix Oberholzer-Gee and Reiner Eichenberger

We test the robustness of behavior in dictator games by offering allocators the choice to play an unattractive lottery. With this lottery option, mean transfers from allocators to recipients substantially decline, partly because many allocators now keep the entire... View Details

Keywords: Decision Choices and Conditions; Fairness; Game Theory; Risk and Uncertainty; Behavior

Article

Third-party Punishment as a Costly Signal of Trustworthiness

By: Jillian J. Jordan, Moshe Hoffman, Paul Bloom and David G. Rand

Third-party punishment (TPP), in which unaffected observers punish selfishness, promotes cooperation by deterring defection. But why should individuals choose to bear the costs of punishing? We present a game theoretic model of TPP as a costly signal of... View Details

Keywords: Third-party Punishment; Trustworthiness; Behavior; Trust; Game Theory

The literature on location choices has mostly emphasized the impact of location and firm characteristics. However, most industries with a significant presence of multi-location firms are oligopolistic in nature, which suggests that strategic interaction among firms... View Details

April 2017
Article

The New Look of Deal Protection

By: Guhan Subramanian and Fernán Restrepo

Deal protection in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) evolves in response to Delaware case law and the business goals of acquirers and targets. We construct a new sample of M&A deals from 2003 to 2015 to identify four such areas of evolution in current transactional... View Details

Keywords: Mergers and Acquisitions; Practice

2010
Working Paper

Conveniently Upset: Avoiding Altruism by Distorting Beliefs about Others

By: Rafael Di Tella and Ricardo Perez-Truglia

In this paper we present the results from a "corruption game" (a dictator game modified so that the second player can accept a side payment that reduces the overall size of the pie). Dictators (silently) treated to have the possibility of taking a larger proportion of... View Details

Keywords: Decision Choices and Conditions; Judgments; Fairness; Values and Beliefs; Game Theory; Personal Characteristics

February 2012
Article

Walking the Talk in Multiparty Bargaining: An Experimental Investigation

By: Kathleen L. McGinn, Katherine L. Milkman and Markus Noth

We study the framing effects of communication on payoffs in multiparty bargaining. Communication has been shown to be more truthful and revealing than predicted in equilibrium. Because talk is preference revealing, it may effectively frame bargaining around a logic of... View Details

Keywords: Competition; Negotiation Process; Fairness; Negotiation Types; Interpersonal Communication; Game Theory; Cooperation

October 2007
Article

The Art of Designing Markets

By: Alvin E. Roth

Traditionally, markets have been viewed as simply the confluence of supply and demand. But to function properly, they must be able to attract a sufficient number of buyers and sellers, induce participants to make their preferences clear, and overcome congestion by... View Details

Keywords: Market Design; Market Participation; Market Transactions; Information Technology; Internet and the Web

December 2014
Article

Selecting the Best? Spillover and Shadows in Elimination Tournaments

By: Jennifer Brown and Dylan B. Minor

We consider how past, current, and future competition within an elimination tournament affect the probability that the stronger player wins. We present a two-stage model that yields the following main results: (1) a shadow effect—the stronger the expected future... View Details

Keywords: Elimination Tournament; Dynamic Contest; Contest Design; Effort Choice; Betting Markets; Competitive Advantage; Game Theory