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Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(1,857)
- People (4)
- News (570)
- Research (1,090)
- Events (10)
- Multimedia (24)
- Faculty Publications (632)
- 1985
- Chapter
Differential Information, the Market and Incentive Compatibility
By: Jerry Green
Green, Jerry. "Differential Information, the Market and Incentive Compatibility." Chap. 3 in Frontiers of Economics, by Kenneth J. Arrow and Seppo Honkapohja, 178–226. Basil Blackwell, 1985.
- January 1982
- Background Note
Canadian Constitution Amendment Scheme
By: Elon Kohlberg
Kohlberg, Elon. "Canadian Constitution Amendment Scheme." Harvard Business School Background Note 182-110, January 1982.
- September 2023
- Article
A Pull versus Push Framework for Reputation
Reputation is a powerful driver of human behavior. Reputation systems incentivize 'actors' to take reputation-enhancing actions, and 'evaluators' to reward actors with positive reputations by preferentially cooperating with them. This article proposes a reputation... View Details
Jordan, Jillian J. "A Pull versus Push Framework for Reputation." Trends in Cognitive Sciences 27, no. 9 (September 2023): 852–866.
- June 2012 (Revised July 2013)
- Exercise
Competition Simulator Exercise: Instructions
In the Competition Simulator Exercise, students explore through trial and error some important economic foundations of competitive strategy and managerial economics. In particular, the nine simulator exercises let students explore horizontal differentiation with and... View Details
Van den Steen, Eric. "Competition Simulator Exercise: Instructions." Harvard Business School Exercise 712-498, June 2012. (Revised July 2013.)
- June 1986
- Article
A Supergame Theoretic Model of Price Wars During Booms
By: J. J. Rotemberg and Garth Saloner
Rotemberg, J. J., and Garth Saloner. "A Supergame Theoretic Model of Price Wars During Booms." American Economic Review 76, no. 3 (June 1986): 390–407.
- December 2014
- Article
Selecting the Best? Spillover and Shadows in Elimination Tournaments
By: Jennifer Brown and Dylan B. Minor
We consider how past, current, and future competition within an elimination tournament affect the probability that the stronger player wins. We present a two-stage model that yields the following main results: (1) a shadow effect—the stronger the expected future... View Details
Keywords: Elimination Tournament; Dynamic Contest; Contest Design; Effort Choice; Betting Markets; Competitive Advantage; Game Theory
Brown, Jennifer, and Dylan B. Minor. "Selecting the Best? Spillover and Shadows in Elimination Tournaments." Management Science 60, no. 12 (December 2014): 3087–3102.
- January 2014
- Article
Pareto Efficiency in Robust Optimization
By: Dan Iancu and Nikolaos Trichakis
This paper formalizes and adapts the well-known concept of Pareto efficiency in the context of the popular robust optimization (RO) methodology for linear optimization problems. We argue that the classical RO paradigm need not produce solutions that possess the... View Details
Iancu, Dan, and Nikolaos Trichakis. "Pareto Efficiency in Robust Optimization." Management Science 60, no. 1 (January 2014): 130–147.
- 24 Mar 2008
- Research & Ideas
Reducing Risk with Online Advertising
readily gameable. If you need to sell one more unit and you can't find anyone to buy it, buy it for yourself or for your buddy. Because these systems can be gamed, firms spend extra money on online advertising. That money might be better spent in increasing... View Details
- Article
Buyer-Initiated vs. Seller-Initiated Information Revelation
Sales presentations are the core of the selling process where salespeople provide information to prospects. One challenge is that the amount of information available to be potentially communicated may exceed salespeople's ability to communicate or customers' ability to... View Details
- 2008
- Working Paper
Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples
By: Claus-Jochen Haake and Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus
We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples... View Details
Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus. "Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-017, August 2008.
- 05 Feb 2014
- Research & Ideas
Can Putin Score Olympic Gold?
A pall hangs over Sochi. Not since the bribery scandal overshadowed the 2002 Games in Salt Lake City has an Olympic Winter Games been so fraught with controversy. Fears of a terrorist attack by Islamic... View Details
- 10 Jul 2024
- News
Next Level
Gina Joseph (GMP 29, 2020), chief strategy officer for the technology media company VentureBeat, was recently honored by the San Francisco Business Times in their “40 Under 40” issue. Joseph is thriving in the media, tech, and gaming... View Details
Keywords: Catherine O’Neill Grace
- Fast Answer
Gaming: statistics
Where can I find information on gaming hardware and software? The Entertainment Software Association website lists sales, demographic, and usage data, as well as information intended to improve the image of the industry. Search eMarketer... View Details
- June 2013 (Revised March 2014)
- Technical Note
Strategic Complements and Substitutes
The framework of strategic complements and substitutes can help companies anticipate competitors' responses. It is particularly helpful in deciding on price- or capacity-commitments (or pre-emption), but it can provide more general guidance for analyzing the potential... View Details
Keywords: Competition; Strategic Substitutes; Strategic Complements; Puppy Dog Strategy; Competitive Strategy; Game Theory; Strategy; Economics
Van den Steen, Eric. "Strategic Complements and Substitutes." Harvard Business School Technical Note 713-542, June 2013. (Revised March 2014.)
- 2010
- Working Paper
Overconfidence by Bayesian Rational Agents
This paper derives two mechanisms through which Bayesian-rational individuals with differing priors will tend to be relatively overconfident about their estimates and predictions, in the sense of overestimating the precision of these estimates. The intuition behind one... View Details
Van den Steen, Eric. "Overconfidence by Bayesian Rational Agents." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 11-049, November 2010.
- February 2009
- Teaching Note
Microsoft Xbox: Changing the Game? (TN)
By: Andrei Hagiu
Teaching Note for [707501]. View Details
- August 1985 (Revised November 1987)
- Background Note
Videogame Design Process
The videogame industry grew explosively in the early 1980s. It is an example of a business which is highly dependent on the efforts of creative people. Videogame companies have shown a wide variation in their approach to managing creative resources, seen in such terms... View Details
Kao, John J. "Videogame Design Process." Harvard Business School Background Note 486-012, August 1985. (Revised November 1987.)
- Article
Heuristics Guide the Implementation of Social Preferences in One-Shot Prisoner's Dilemma Experiments
By: Jillian J. Jordan, Valerio Capraro and David G. Rand
Cooperation in one-shot anonymous interactions is a widely documented aspect of human behavior. Here we shed light on the motivations behind this behavior by experimentally exploring cooperation in a one-shot continuous-strategy Prisoner’s Dilemma (i.e. one-shot... View Details
Jordan, Jillian J., Valerio Capraro, and David G. Rand. "Heuristics Guide the Implementation of Social Preferences in One-Shot Prisoner's Dilemma Experiments." Art. 6790. Scientific Reports 4 (2014).
- 2007
- Other Unpublished Work
When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games.
By: Lucy White, George J. Mailath and Volker Nocke
White, Lucy, George J. Mailath, and Volker Nocke. "When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games." October 2007.
- 2003
- Other Unpublished Work
Compensatory Transfers in Two-Player Decision Problems
By: Jerry R. Green