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Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(1,860)
- People (4)
- News (571)
- Research (1,095)
- Events (10)
- Multimedia (24)
- Faculty Publications (638)
- January 1982
- Background Note
Canadian Constitution Amendment Scheme
By: Elon Kohlberg
Kohlberg, Elon. "Canadian Constitution Amendment Scheme." Harvard Business School Background Note 182-110, January 1982.
- 2020
- Working Paper
To Infinity and Beyond: Scaling Economic Theories via Logical Compactness
By: Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Scott Duke Kominers and Ran I. Shorrer
Many economic-theoretic models incorporate finiteness assumptions that, while introduced for simplicity, play a real role in the analysis. Such assumptions introduce a conceptual problem, as results that rely on finiteness are often implicitly nonrobust; for example,... View Details
Gonczarowski, Yannai A., Scott Duke Kominers, and Ran I. Shorrer. "To Infinity and Beyond: Scaling Economic Theories via Logical Compactness." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 19-127, June 2019. (Revised November 2020.)
- 1990
- Book
Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis
By: A. E. Roth and M. Sotomayor
Keywords: Game Theory
Roth, A. E., and M. Sotomayor. Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. Econometric Society Monographs. Cambridge University Press, 1990. (Winner of Frederick W. Lanchester Prize Awarded for the best contribution to operations research and the management sciences published in English presented by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences.)
- January 1982
- Background Note
Bluffing at Poker I
By: Elon Kohlberg
Keywords: Game Theory
Kohlberg, Elon. "Bluffing at Poker I." Harvard Business School Background Note 182-111, January 1982.
- 1992
- Book
Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis
By: A. E. Roth and M. Sotomayor
Keywords: Game Theory
Roth, A. E., and M. Sotomayor. Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. Paperback ed. Cambridge University Press, 1992. (Winner of Frederick W. Lanchester Prize Awarded for the best contribution to operations research and the management sciences published in English presented by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Science.)
- Article
The Price of Anarchy of Self-Selection in Tullock Contests
By: Hau Chan, David C. Parkes and Karim R. Lakhani
Crowdsourcing platforms operate by offering their clients the ability to obtain cost-effective solutions for their problems through contests. The top contestants with the best solutions are rewarded, and the submitted solutions are provided to the clients. Within the... View Details
Chan, Hau, David C. Parkes, and Karim R. Lakhani. "The Price of Anarchy of Self-Selection in Tullock Contests." Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS) 19th (2020): 1795–1797.
- December 2014
- Article
Selecting the Best? Spillover and Shadows in Elimination Tournaments
By: Jennifer Brown and Dylan B. Minor
We consider how past, current, and future competition within an elimination tournament affect the probability that the stronger player wins. We present a two-stage model that yields the following main results: (1) a shadow effect—the stronger the expected future... View Details
Keywords: Elimination Tournament; Dynamic Contest; Contest Design; Effort Choice; Betting Markets; Competitive Advantage; Game Theory
Brown, Jennifer, and Dylan B. Minor. "Selecting the Best? Spillover and Shadows in Elimination Tournaments." Management Science 60, no. 12 (December 2014): 3087–3102.
- 1985
- Chapter
Differential Information, the Market and Incentive Compatibility
By: Jerry Green
Green, Jerry. "Differential Information, the Market and Incentive Compatibility." Chap. 3 in Frontiers of Economics, by Kenneth J. Arrow and Seppo Honkapohja, 178–226. Basil Blackwell, 1985.
- October 2020
- Article
Collusion in Markets with Syndication
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers, Richard Lowery and Jordan M. Barry
Markets for IPOs and debt issuances are syndicated, in the sense that a bidder who wins a contract may invite losing bidders to join a syndicate that together fulfills the contract. We show that in markets with syndication, standard intuitions from industrial... View Details
Keywords: Collusion; Antitrust; IPO Underwriting; Syndication; "Repeated Games"; Markets; Game Theory
Hatfield, John William, Scott Duke Kominers, Richard Lowery, and Jordan M. Barry. "Collusion in Markets with Syndication." Journal of Political Economy 128, no. 10 (October 2020).
- Article
Buyer-Initiated vs. Seller-Initiated Information Revelation
Sales presentations are the core of the selling process where salespeople provide information to prospects. One challenge is that the amount of information available to be potentially communicated may exceed salespeople's ability to communicate or customers' ability to... View Details
- 2008
- Working Paper
Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples
By: Claus-Jochen Haake and Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus
We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples... View Details
Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus. "Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-017, August 2008.
- June 1986
- Article
A Supergame Theoretic Model of Price Wars During Booms
By: J. J. Rotemberg and Garth Saloner
Rotemberg, J. J., and Garth Saloner. "A Supergame Theoretic Model of Price Wars During Booms." American Economic Review 76, no. 3 (June 1986): 390–407.
- January 2014
- Article
Pareto Efficiency in Robust Optimization
By: Dan Iancu and Nikolaos Trichakis
This paper formalizes and adapts the well-known concept of Pareto efficiency in the context of the popular robust optimization (RO) methodology for linear optimization problems. We argue that the classical RO paradigm need not produce solutions that possess the... View Details
Iancu, Dan, and Nikolaos Trichakis. "Pareto Efficiency in Robust Optimization." Management Science 60, no. 1 (January 2014): 130–147.
- September 2023
- Article
A Pull versus Push Framework for Reputation
Reputation is a powerful driver of human behavior. Reputation systems incentivize 'actors' to take reputation-enhancing actions, and 'evaluators' to reward actors with positive reputations by preferentially cooperating with them. This article proposes a reputation... View Details
Jordan, Jillian J. "A Pull versus Push Framework for Reputation." Trends in Cognitive Sciences 27, no. 9 (September 2023): 852–866.
- June 2012 (Revised July 2013)
- Exercise
Competition Simulator Exercise: Instructions
In the Competition Simulator Exercise, students explore through trial and error some important economic foundations of competitive strategy and managerial economics. In particular, the nine simulator exercises let students explore horizontal differentiation with and... View Details
Van den Steen, Eric. "Competition Simulator Exercise: Instructions." Harvard Business School Exercise 712-498, June 2012. (Revised July 2013.)
- Article
Heuristics Guide the Implementation of Social Preferences in One-Shot Prisoner's Dilemma Experiments
By: Jillian J. Jordan, Valerio Capraro and David G. Rand
Cooperation in one-shot anonymous interactions is a widely documented aspect of human behavior. Here we shed light on the motivations behind this behavior by experimentally exploring cooperation in a one-shot continuous-strategy Prisoner’s Dilemma (i.e. one-shot... View Details
Jordan, Jillian J., Valerio Capraro, and David G. Rand. "Heuristics Guide the Implementation of Social Preferences in One-Shot Prisoner's Dilemma Experiments." Art. 6790. Scientific Reports 4 (2014).
- 2007
- Other Unpublished Work
When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games.
By: Lucy White, George J. Mailath and Volker Nocke
White, Lucy, George J. Mailath, and Volker Nocke. "When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games." October 2007.
- October 2017
- Article
Elevating Repositioning Costs: Strategy Dynamics and Competitive Interactions
By: Anoop R. Menon and Dennis Yao
This paper proposes an approach for modeling competitive interactions that incorporates the costs to firms of changing strategy. The costs associated with strategy modifications, which we term “repositioning costs,” are particularly relevant to competitive interactions... View Details
Keywords: "Repositioning Costs; Strategy Dynamics; Strategic Interaction; Capabilities; Cost; Strategy; Change; Game Theory; Organizational Change and Adaptation
Menon, Anoop R., and Dennis Yao. "Elevating Repositioning Costs: Strategy Dynamics and Competitive Interactions." Strategic Management Journal 38, no. 10 (October 2017): 1953–1963.
- 2006
- Conference Paper
Modeling Repeated Play of the Prisoners' Dilemma with Reinforcement Learning over an Enriched Strategy Set
By: A. E. Roth and Ido Erev
- 10 Jul 2024
- News
Next Level
Gina Joseph (GMP 29, 2020), chief strategy officer for the technology media company VentureBeat, was recently honored by the San Francisco Business Times in their “40 Under 40” issue. Joseph is thriving in the media, tech, and gaming world—all industries traditionally... View Details
Keywords: Catherine O’Neill Grace