Publications
Publications
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- All HBS Web
(346)
- Faculty Publications (131)
- 2005
- Working Paper
Nominal versus Indexed Debt: A Quantitative Horse Race
By: Laura Alfaro and Fabio Kanczuk
The main arguments in favor of and against nominal and indexed debt are the incentive to default through inflation versus hedging against unforeseen shocks. We model and calibrate these arguments to assess their quantitative importance. We use a dynamic equilibrium... View Details
- November 2004
- Tutorial
Principles of Microeconomics for Strategists
By: Felix Oberholzer-Gee, Pai-Ling Yin and Elizabeth Raabe
Reviews microeconomic principles from a business strategy perspective, using the digital music industry as context. Contains three modules: demand, supply, and equilibrium. The demand module discusses the willingness to pay, market demand, price elasticity, and... View Details
- September 2004
- Article
Trust in Agency
Existing models of the principal-agent relationship assume the agent works only under extrinsic incentives. However, many observed agency contracts take the form of a fixed payment. For such contracts to succeed, the principal must trust the agent to work in the... View Details
- August 2004
- Article
Capital Controls, Risk and Liberalization Cycles
By: Laura Alfaro and Fabio Kanczuk
The paper presents an overlapping-generations model where agents vote on whether to open or close the economy to international capital flows. Political decisions are shaped by the risk over capital and labor returns. In an open economy, the capitalists (old) completely... View Details
Keywords: Business Cycles; Development Economics; Voting; Risk and Uncertainty; Cash Flow; Saving; Investment; Economy; Wages
- Article
Little Patents and Big Secrets: Managing Intellectual Property
By: James J. Anton and Dennis A. Yao
Exploitation of an innovation commonly requires some disclosure of enabling knowledge (e.g., to obtain a patent or induce complementary investment). When property rights offer only limited protection, the value of the disclosure is offset by the increased threat of... View Details
Keywords: Patents; Management; Innovation and Invention; Knowledge; Rights; Value; Information; Corporate Disclosure
- Article
Why Hospitals Don't Learn from Failures: Organizational and Psychological Dynamics That Inhibit System Change
By: A. Tucker and A. Edmondson
The importance of hospitals learning from their failures hardly needs to be stated. Not only are matters of life and death at stake on a daily basis, but also an increasing number of U.S. hospitals are operating in the red. This article reports on in-depth qualitative... View Details
- October 2003
- Article
Capture by Threat
By: Ernesto Dal Bo and Rafael Di Tella
We analyze a simple stochastic environment in which policy makers can be threatened by “nasty” interest groups. In the absence of these groups, the policy maker’s desire for reelection guarantees that good policies are implemented for every realization of the shock.... View Details
- 2003
- Working Paper
Dynamic Mixed Duopoly: A Model Motivated by Linux vs. Windows
By: Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and Pankaj Ghemawat
This paper analyzes a dynamic mixed duopoly in which a profit-maximizing competitor interacts with a competitor that prices at zero (or marginal cost), with the cumulation of output affecting their relative positions over time. The modeling effort is motivated by... View Details
- summer 2003
- Article
Patents, Invalidity, and the Strategic Transmission of Enabling Information
By: James J. Anton and Dennis A. Yao
The patent system encourages innovation and knowledge disclosure by providing exclusivity to inventors. Exclusivity is limited, however, because a substantial fraction of patents have some probability of being ruled invalid when challenged in court. The possibility of... View Details
- July 2002
- Article
The Sale of Ideas: Strategic Disclosure, Property Rights, and Contracting
By: James J. Anton and Dennis A. Yao
Ideas are difficult to sell when buyers cannot assess an idea's value before it is revealed and sellers cannot protect a revealed idea. These problems exist in a variety of intellectual property sales ranging from pure ideas to poorly protected inventions and reflect... View Details
- 1999
- Working Paper
Using Dyadic Strategies to Outperform Equilibrium Models of Communication in Bargaining Games
By: Kathleen L. McGinn, Leigh Thompson, Robert Gibbons and Max Bazerman
- 1998
- Working Paper
Outperforming Equilibrium Models of Communication in Bargaining Games
By: Kathleen L. McGinn, Leigh Thompson, Robert Gibbons and Max Bazerman
- 1996
- Article
Limits on Interest Rate Rules in the IS Model
By: William R. Kerr and Robert G. King
There has been a substantial amount of research on interest rate rules. This literature finds that the feasibility and desirability of interest rate rules depends on the structure of the model used to approximate macroeconomic reality. We employ a series of... View Details
- Article
Non-verifiability, Costly Renegotiation, and Efficiency
By: Jerry R. Green and J. J. Laffont
We study the implications of the non verifiability of information for the allocation of resources and the bearing of risk in a two party relationship. We consider a two step approach. In step one the two parties define a non contingent contract which will be executed... View Details
Keywords: Negotiation
- May 1992
- Article
Coordination in Split-Award Auctions
By: James J. Anton and Dennis Yao
We analyze split award procurement auctions in which a buyer divides full production between two suppliers or awards all production to a single supplier, and suppliers have private cost information. An intriguing feature of split awards is that the equilibrium bids are... View Details
- September 1990
- Article
Competition on Many Fronts: A Stackelberg Signaling Equilibrium
By: Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont
An economic agent, the incumbent, is operating in many environments at the same time. These may be locations, markets, or specific activities. He is informed of the particular conditions relevant to each situation. His action in each case is observable by another... View Details